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I. INTRODUCTION
Physical takings of Indian lands erode the Indian peoples' political and
cultural autonomy.2 As "domestic dependent nations" they are distinguished from
other minority groups within the United States.' As self-governing societies long
2. Physical takings of Indian lands involve the wrongful appropriation, seizure,
or interference with the Indians' right to otherwise dispose of, or control, their lands. See,
JULIUS L. SACKMAN, 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.05[l], at 6-56 to 6-58 (3d ed.
1997).
3. Before European discovery, Indian peoples represented fully sovereign
nations. But after discovery, their international legal status was that of "domestic dependent
nations." See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
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before America was discovered by sixteenth-century European explorers, their
rights to self-governance and cultural autonomy were embodied in many treaties
with European governments.4 The federal government likewise entered into Indian
treaties that confirmed the Indian peoples' land titles and governmental authority.5
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives effect to these
sovereign bargains by barring state or private interference with the Indian peoples'
lands or their self-governance therein.
6
But these sovereign bargains have demonstrably failed, to preserve the
Indian peoples' most valuable asset-their lands. Many Indian treaties prohibited
the federal acquisition of Indian lands except with the express consent of a majority
of the adult male members of the affected Indian tribe.7 Indian consent to federal
land cessions served to legitimate the treaty-making process. But this idea of Indian
consent, along with the broader concept of tribal sovereignty, was swamped by the
nineteenth-century land demands of non-Indian settlers who had little sympathy for
the Indian peoples or their treaty rights. Indian treaty making in the mid-to-late
nineteenth century became the diplomatic "cover" for coerced and patently unfair
Indian land cession agreements Millions of acres of Indian lands were taken by
the federal government in outright congressional defiance of the Indian consent
provisions of many treaties.' Spurious land cession agreements and coerced Indian
4. Indian treaties evidenced an "essential [sovereign] equivalence" between the
European nations and the respective treaty tribes. STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE
NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 46 (1988). The treaties were
multifaceted diplomatic instruments whose purposes included mutual declarations of peace
and friendship, establishment of trading relations, and the legitimation of major transfers of
land from the Indian peoples to the respective discovering nations. Id. at 46-47.
5. The United States continued during and after the Revolutionary War to
regard the Indian peoples as independent sovereign nations. 1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE
GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 31 (1984).
6. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
7. Article 12 of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, for example, declared that
no part of the Kiowa and Comanche lands would be ceded without the consent of at least
three-fourths of the adult male members of the tribe. Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche
Tribes of Indians (Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek), Oct. 1, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat. 581,
585. But Congress, by its Act of June 6, 1900, ratified the agreement of the Jerome
Commission for the Indians' cession of their reserved lands, even though far fewer than the
required number of Indians had consented to that agreement. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813,
31 Stat. 676. This disregard of the Indian consent provision prompted Lone Wolf, a Kiowa
Indian, to sue to enjoin Interior Secretary Ethan Allen Hitchcock from implementing that
act on his reservation. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 107 U.S. 43 (1903).
8. Treaty-based Indian land cessions are characterized by Stephen Comell as
the "characteristic form" of dispossession of the Indian peoples during the "Indian conflict
years" from the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 45.
Peter Wolf estimates that Indian land cession agreements between 1789 and 1850
transferred some 450 million acres of Indian land to full federal ownership. The amount
paid to the Indians for these lands amounted to 90 million dollars or an average price of 20
cents an acre. See PETER WOLF, LAND IN AMERICA: ITS VALUE, USE, AND CONTROL 69
(1981).
9. Comell emphasizes that in 1800, after nearly 200 years of European
colonization, the bulk of what are now the "48 states" was Indian land. But by 1900, the
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land transfers in the mid-to-late nineteenth century were devastating for the Indian
peoples: they today retain only some fifty-seven million acres of their lands that
once stretched from the Atlantic Seaboard to the Pacific Coast."0 More
significantly, the contemporary Indian peoples' survival as distinct cultural and
economic entities has been jeopardized by this rapid and massive shrinkage of their
land base.
The demonstrable failure of these Indian treaties to prevent the federal
taking of Indian lands requires resort to an alternative legal strategy for the
contemporary preservation of the remaining Indian lands. A modem Indian takings
doctrine holds perhaps the best hope for achieving this goal. Such a doctrine is
compatible with Chief Justice Marshall's historically imposed Indian bargaining
model." It also complements the contemporary "government-to-government"
relationship between the federal government and the Indian peoples.'2 This
proposed doctrine would mitigate the federal takings incentive that implicitly
derives from Marshall's Indian bargaining model. Marshall's model has effectively
cloaked from judicial scrutiny spurious Indian land cession agreements or
unilateral federal action that rapidly shrunk the Indian land base from its 1848 size
of a billion plus acres to some forty-million acres by 1934."3
Indian lands were almost entirely in non-Indian hands. What had occurred in the interim
was not just the dispossession of the Indian peoples of their aboriginal lands, but the larger
transformation of the American economy as a capitalist society that successfully
commercialized land, labor, and capital as marketable commodities. Indian lands were
gradually incorporated into this larger American economy. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 34-
38.
10.
Indian tribes and [individual tribal members] own approximately 56.6
million acres of land, an increase of more that 4 million acres since
1980.... Alaskan Natives hold another 44 million acres as a result of the
Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act. In all, Native American groups
hold about 4.2% of the land in the United States.
DAVID H. GErCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 20 (3d ed. 1993).
11. Marshall's Indian bargaining model derived from older sources such as
Article III of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance. Act of Aug. 7, 1789 (Northwest Ordinance),
ch. 8, art. 12, 1 Stat. 50, 52. That article committed the United States to display the "utmost
good faith" toward the Indian peoples and pledged that their "land and property shall never
be taken from them without their consent." id.
12. President Richard Nixon in his 1970 Indian Message to Congress called for a
new federal policy of "self-determination" for the Indian peoples. Congress responded by
enacting several new Indian statutes that confirmed the inherent sovereign powers of the
Indian peoples and sought to establish a meaningful "govermment-to-government"
relationship between federal agencies and the affected Indian peoples. GETCHES ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 253-59.
13. In 1903, the Supreme Court decided, based on Chief Justice Marshall's
Indian law opinions, that Congress enjoyed a "[p]lenary authority over tribal relations...not
subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government." Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). The Lone Wolf doctrine permits the federal
government to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties if they conflict with an overriding federal
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By contrast, a modem Indian takings doctrine would explicitly
acknowledge the indispensable role that land plays in sustaining contemporary
Indian societies as viable cultural, and economic entities. Ironically, Marshall's
Indian bargaining model likewise acknowledged Indian lands as essential for the
governmental, cultural and economic survival of the Indian peoples. But his model
grew out of assumptions that even by his era were patently untenable. Marshall
envisioned Indian treaties as the consensual means for organizing the chaotic field
of Indian affairs over a wide array of subject-matter areas: trade, criminal
jurisdiction, war and peace, and land transactions.' 4 Indeed, reigning nineteenth-
century economic theory suggested that such a consent-based system would yield
sovereign bargains that represented 'Pareto-superior" outcomes for both the
federal government and the affected Indian peoples.' 5
But Marshall's seemingly laissez faire system of Indian bargaining was
undermined from the outset by background 'demographic changes and evolving
military realities. The Indian peoples should have expected, given the nature of
bargaining process, that they were free to bargain regarding any issue and that
bargains, once made, would bind both the federal government and the affected
Indian peoples.' 6 But these idealized background conditions have rarely, if ever,
governed Indian bargains with non-Indians regarding land cessions. Some of the
eastern Indian peoples may have possessed a temporary bargaining equality with
the European colonizers that made land cession agreements between them both
feasible and practicable. 7 But fundamental practical and demographic changes in
interest or no longer serve the best interest of the affected Indian people.
14. Indian treaties were multifaceted diplomatic instruments that allowed for the
mutual adjustment of military, jurisdictional, trading, and land issues between the federal
government and the Indian peoples. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 46.
15. The Pareto principle assumes that as "long as individuals know what is best
for themselves, they can enter only into those bargains that are best for themselves."
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 8-9 (1993). The Indian peoples and the
federal government are regarded by the treaty-making process as if they were a single
person that knows "its" preferences when measured against the pretreaty circumstances.
Epstein concludes that assuming the "stringent Pareto conditions are satisfied," there is no
"reason to worry about the terms and conditions that the [federal] government attaches to its
bargain." Ld.
The absence of constitutional limits on state power creates a socially destructive
"prisoner's dilemma," wherein disorganized land owners are unable to prevent the state
from imposing "collateral or unrelated" conditions upon their continued use of their lands.
Id. at 79.
16. Richard Epstein and other constitutional scholars recognize that there must
be a limit to state coercive power over private property rights because the "creation of
[state] monopoly power [over those rights] poses a great danger of abuse." Id. at 78.
17. Whether the Indians ever willingly sold their lands to the European colonists
and fully appreciated that they were forever giving up their land titles has long been a
subject of historical debate. Some historians argue that the eastern Indian tribes had fairly
well-developed concepts of land tenure especially with regards to the assignment of territory
for the purposes of planting and residence. Actual property rights in the Indians' lands
resided in the individual or family unit. See ALDEN T. VAUGHN, THE NEW ENGLAND
FRONTIER: PURITANS AND INDIANS, 1620-1675, at 105-07 (1979).
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the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries substantively undermined the Indian
peoples' ability to negotiate fair terms and conditions of land cession agreements. 8
The Indians' ability to prevent non-Indian takings of their lands increasingly
depended on their diplomatic acumen in forging trading or military alliances with
rival European or colonial interests. 9 But the triumph of the British Crown over
the French in 1763, followed by the successful American revolution against British
rule in 1783, effectively eliminated the Indians' opportunity for strategic alliances
that would preserve their lands from non-Indian intrusion. 0
The historian Wilcomb E. Washburn also challenges the "prevailing assumption
among Americans that the bulk of the land of the United States was simply appropriated
from the Indians without benefit of law or compensation." WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED
MAN'S LAND, WrrE MAN'S LAW 109 (2d ed. 1995). He cites Thomas Jefferson's Notes on
the State of Virginia (1787) wherein Jefferson asserts:
That the land of this country [was] taken from them [(the Indians)] by
conquest, is not so general a truth as is supposed. I find in our historians
and records, repeated proofs of purchase, which cover a considerable
part of the lower country; and many more would doubtless be found on
further search. The upper country we know has been acquired altogether
by purchases made in the most unexceptional form.
Id.
Other historians agree that early colonial land practices generally observed the formal
niceties of purchase of Indian land title. The respective Puritan governments apparently
controlled their subjects' purchases of Indian title and required that any potential purchaser
of Indian lands obtain prior governmental consent or that they purchase Indian lands
through governmental agents. These non-Indian purchasers used standard deed forms but
many times required the signatures not only of the individual land claimant but of the tribal
"sachem" as well. These colonial era purchasers were also careful to make their deeds of
purchase as specific as possible to avoid later challenge from competing non-Indian
claimants.
But Indian land, because the epidemics of 1616-17 and 1633-34 had devastated the
eastern Indian populations, became a surplus commodity in New England. The colonialists
offered the Indians hoes and metal knives-implements of great value to a neolithic
people-and in exchange acquired vast tracts of Indian lands. VAUGHN, supra, at 107-08.
18. The eastern Indian tribes' power to upset the delicate balance of European
power in the New World of the early eighteenth century was exploited by the Iroquois and
the southern Indian nations-the Choctaws, Creeks, Chickasaws, and Cherokees-as a
means of protecting their lands and economic resource bases. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 26-
27.
19. Cornell contends that the major eastern Indian tribes were able to resist non-
Indian encroachment on their lands through a "fortuitous combination of elements: military
strength, European alliance and practical economics." Id.
20. By the latter half of the eighteenth century, French power in the New World
collapsed with the Treaty of Paris in 1763, by which France ceded all of its territory east of
the Mississippi to Britain. The eastern Indian tribes could no longer play off the European
powers against each other in order to preserve their lands and resources. Id. at 27.
By the Treaty of Paris of 1783 ending the American Revolutionary War, the British
Crown transferred its territorial claims east of the Mississippi to the United States. The
newly formed Continental Congress took a radically different attitude toward these
territories; whereas the British Crown considered those lands "Indian Country," the
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The substantial erosion of the Indian populations and their military
capability directly contributed to their reduced nineteenth-century legal status. This
reality was candidly acknowledged by Chief Justice Marshall in his Indian law
opinions. 21 He referred to the Indian peoples' diminished political and legal status
as the "actual state of things. 22 This contemporary reality justified their
incorporation as "domestic dependent nations" into the body of the United States.21
Marshall had earlier concluded that it justified the incorporation of the Indians'
aboriginal land titles into the federal system of property rights. 24
Marshall's Indian bargaining model envisioned the federal government as
the senior partner and the Indian peoples as the junior partners in any future
sovereign bargaining process. Indeed, his opinions implicitly authorized a federal
bypass of recalcitrant Indian bargainers by allowing the federal government to
make out grants of Indian lands subject to continued Indian use and occupancy
rights.' Although modern legal parlance recognizes that imbalances in economic
and legal powers make a mockery of the bargaining process,26 such power
imbalances were hardwired into Marshall's Indian bargaining model. Marshall's
Indian law opinions undermined the Indians' inherent sovereignty over their
American Congress viewed its new territories as a source of revenue and as a means for
pacifying and paying off restive war veterans. Id.
As a practical matter, the Eastern Indian peoples now faced one single power, the
United States, and were no longer able to play off competing European powers against one
another for their own security and advantage. I PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 31.
21. Marshall's Indian Law Trilogy includes the following decisions: Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S (5 Pet.) I
(1831); and Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
22. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591.
23. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
24. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543.
25. In Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517 (1877), the Supreme Court held that the
United States could grant good title to Indian lands:
The grantee, it is true, would take only the naked fee, and could not
disturb the occupancy of the Indians: that occupancy could be interfered
with or determined by the United States. It is to be presumed that in this
matter the United States would be governed by such considerations of
justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an
ignorant and dependent race. Be that as it may, the propriety or justice of
their action towards the Indians with respect to their lands is a question
of governmental policy.... The right of the United States to dispose of
the fee of lands occupied by them has always been recognized by this
court from the foundation of the government.
Id. at 525.
Father Prucha emphasized that Marshall's legal theory eventually evolved into a
dictum that the United States held virtually absolute dominion over the Indian lands leaving
the Indian peoples with merely a usufructuary interest in the lands they occupied. I
PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 15-16.
26. The modem contract doctrine of "unconscionability" focuses on those
disparities in bargaining power that are evidenced by a "party's employment of sharp
practices,...the use of fine print and convoluted language and an inequality of bargaining
power." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrS § 4.28, at 314-15 (1982).
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aboriginal lands.' He judicially restricted the Indians' power to cede their lands to
anyone but the federal government. 28 He nonetheless insisted that they possessed
sufficient legal capacity to ensure fair land dealing with their paramount sovereign,
the federal government.29 Modem bargaining theory would candidly acknowledge
that the Indian peoples' subordinated legal status fundamentally compromised their
ability to bargain fairly with the federal government.3" Thus, it is not surprising that
Marshall's Indian bargaining model has failed to preserve the Indians' lands and
cultures.
Today's near extinction of the Indian peoples' cultures and economies
cries out for a new land-based relationship with the federal government. This new
relationship would not presume that today's Indian peoples are equal bargainers
with the federal government. Indeed, it would presume the opposite-that today's
Indian peoples face a heightened risk of federal takings of their lands given
Congress' now plenary power over their remaining lands. Such a relationship
would recognize that Indian lands are the essential means for the realization of the
contemporary federal policy of tribal self-determination. This new relationship
would further acknowledge that the development of contemporary Indian
economies and cultures are inextricably linked to the preservation of their lands.
31
A modem Indian takings doctrine would help mitigate the federal taking
incentive that unavoidably arises from the congressional plenary power over Indian
lands. First, it would unequivocally require the payment of just compensation for
the federal taking of any Indian lands. Second, it would require the award of, under
the appropriate factual circumstances, substitute or replacement value for those
lands. The federal judiciary would be empowered to ensure that the affected Indian
peoples, like other land owners, are justly compensated for their lost resources.32
Such a doctrine would not, by itself, ensure the preservation of
contemporary Indian societies as viable economic and cultural entities. But
27. Richard Epstein speaks of the government's threat of force as the major
destabilizer of any system of property rights. Such property rights remain in Epstein's "state
of nature" absent not only their definition but their successful enforcement and protection,
as well. EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 76.
28. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
29. Indian treaties are misleading, Cornell asserts, because they suggest an
"essential [sovereign] equivalence" between the United States and the respective signatory
Indian tribes that the Supreme Court has never honored. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 46-47.
30. Epstein rejects as morally reprehensible the "bargaining game" wherein
governmental threat may involve the use of force against an individual's person or property.
EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 41. The Indian peoples were on many occasions confronted with
the federal government's "offer they could not refuse."
31. Land is inextricably bound up within the Indians' "webs of kinship, ritual
and custom" so that at a conceptual and practical level each "received the imprint of the
other." CORNELL, supra note 4, at 38-39.
32. Indian lands, especially treaty reserved lands, arguably qualify as "public
facilities" whose taking require compensation measured by the reasonable cost of a
"substantially equivalent substitute." 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, §
12C.01[3][d], at 12C-38.
HeinOnline  -- 40 Ariz. L. Rev.  432 1998
PRESERVING INDIAN COUNTRY
coupled with other features of today's Indian self-determination program, it would
contribute to those goals.
This Article develops a modem Indians taking doctrine by critically
examining the unfolding of Marshall's Indian bargaining model through three
distinct eras:
1. Chief Justice Marshall's construction of the Indian bargaining model as
an American adaptation of the European doctrine of discovery;
2. the Supreme Court's subsequent reformulation of that model as the
Indian plenary power doctrine; and
3. the Court's failed reconciliation of the Indian plenary power doctrine
with the just compensation command of the Constitution.
These three eras are summarized and then fully analyzed as the backdrop
that demonstrates the necessity for a modem Indian takings doctrine. A sketch of
such a doctrine is provided by a case study of the most egregious modern Indian
taking: the 1949 taking of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. This taking
triggered a forty-three-year-long struggle by the Fort Berthold Indians for just
compensation. This struggle encapsulates the legal and practical disadvantages that
confront Indian peoples who bargain with Indian congressional committees over
the terms governing the taking of their lands. From this case study are extracted
economic and doctrinal principles that will form the backbone of modern Indian
takings doctrine.
A. Chief Justice Marshall's Construction of the Indian Bargaining Model
Marshall's Indian bargaining model broke down for two simple reasons.
First, the Indian peoples had been disabled by Marshall's opinions, which
prevented the Indians from alienating their lands to anyone but the federal
government. The United States enjoyed the enviable, strategic position of a "super-
monopsonist"-the sole, sovereign buyer of the Indian peoples' lands.3 3 Second,
the federal government was implicitly empowered by Marshall's opinions to
repudiate its Indian bargains if they later conflicted with overriding federal
interests.
34
33. Exclusive federal control over Indian lands must be viewed as one means for
realizing emergent national interests in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. Stephen Comell
argues that intertwined nineteenth-century ideas of progress, nationalism, and religious
mission forms the backdrop for understanding America's attitudes towards Indians and their
lands. Chief Justice Marshall, and other Indian policy makers, confronted an American
West that was controlled and peopled by Indians. His task was the practical and hopefully
fair incorporation of those Indian lands as the raw materials out of which a future vision of
America would be shaped. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 34-39.
34. Marshall had casually analogized the Indian peoples' relationship to the
federal government as like that of "ward to his guardian." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). A later Supreme Court decision transformed that casual analogy
into a "[p]lenary [congressional] authority over tribal relations...not subject to control by
the judicial department of government." Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565
1998] 433
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But the shadow of Marshall's vision and the inertia of history has long
prevented judicial reexamination of the Indian bargaining model. Its historic
weight squelched the Indian peoples' taking claims based on alleged
governmentally coerced Indian land transfers, inadequate compensation payments,
or the disregard of federal trust or fiduciary obligations. In its contemporary and
refurbished version, it sanctions Congress' plenary power over Indian lands by
foreclosing judicial scrutiny of putative "good faith" federal takings of Indian
lands.35 It is time now to fundamentally reassess that model that has so long
countenanced the federal taking of Indian lands in derogation of the just
compensation command of the Constitution.36
The Indian consent provisions of many Great Plains Indian treaties were
intended to mitigate the recognized disparity in nineteenth-century bargaining
power between the federal government and the respective Indian peoples. If they
had been judicially enforced to their terms and tenor, there would doubtless be far
more Indian lands than there are today. But these consent provisions were soon
swamped by Congress' obsession with national goals, which loomed far larger than
its promises to the Indian peoples.37
In his 1823 opinion in Johnson v. M'Intosh, Marshall concluded that the
federal government possessed the sovereign and exclusive power to acquire
Indians lands via purchase or conquest. 3 Thus, the Indian peoples' aboriginal lands
were subjected to Congress' paramount authority.39 This underlying dynamic of
federal paramount power over Indian affairs was fundamentally transformed as a
congressional power to unilaterally redefine Indian property rights. The Supreme
Court held that Congress possessed this judicially unreviewable power over Indian
lands in Justice White's 1903 opinion in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.4"
(1903).
The Lone Wolf doctrine permits the federal government to abrogate federal Indian
treaties or agreements if those agreements conflict with an overriding national interest or are
no longer deemed in the best interest of the affected Indian people. Nell Jessup Newton, The
Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment Taking of Indian Land: An Analysis of the Sioux Nation
Rule, 61 OR. L. REv. 245, 254-55 (1982).
35. Professor Newton traces the legal history of Indian taking claims against the
United States and concludes that Congress' plenary power over Indian lands still
"qualif[ies] the extent to which a tribe can recover on the merits [of its claim]." Newton,
supra note 34, at 254-55.
36. Congress exercises plenary power over Indian lands and may take those
lands as an incident of its trusteeship authority over the Indian peoples. Id.
37. Cornell cites the following ideas of "manifest destiny, dreams of empire and
vision of Progress" as "fueling [the United States'] westward expansion." CORNELL, supra
note 4, at 38.
38. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823).
39. See id. The noted historian Wilcomb E. Washburn views Marshall's opinion
in Johnson as "the basis of all subsequent determinations of Indian right." WASHaURN,
supra note 17, at 66.
40. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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Indian land owners thus have been deprived of the constitutional
protection afforded other land owners under the Just Compensation Clause.4 That
clause prohibits the uncompensated or undercompensated taking of privately
owned lands. This Indian exemption has had stark consequences for these
culturally distinct, land-based societies; once fiercely self-reliant and economically
independent, Indians now constitute America's most impoverished and insular
minority population.42
B. The Giving and Taking of Indian America
The Indian peoples are traditionally depicted as the willing and fairly
compensated "givers" of their lands to the European colonizers. The familiar
painting of the Canarsie Indians' bargain in 1626 that transferred Manhattan Island
to Peter Minuet, Director of the Dutch West Indian Company, for twenty-four
dollars in Indian trade goods, trinkets, and rum exemplifies this European view of
Indian bargaining.43 But the Indians' counternarrative views the Europeans as the
"takers" of their lands. The 1948 photograph of the taking of the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation powerfully depicts this reality.44 There, Tribal Chairman
George Gillette of the Three Affiliated Tribes covers his eyes with his left hand as
he openly weeps beside Interior Secretary Krug-the Indians' trustee-as he signs
the documents taking the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation as the site for a large
federal water project.45
41. Newton emphasizes that Indian land owners do not enjoy the same
constitutional protection from uncompensated takings as do other private landowners under
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Newton, supra note 34, at 248-49.
42. "Per capita income for Native Americans in 1991 was slightly more than
$8300, the lowest for all racial groups in the United States, and less than half the level for
the entire population." GETcHEs ET AL., supra note 10, at 16. The Indian unemployment rate
as of 1991 was 45%. That is 3% lower than 1989 but still more than 37% higher than the
average unemployment rate for the United States as a whole. Id.
43. Indian giving of land title did not always redound to the benefit of
Europeans. American humorist Nathaniel Benchley contends that the Dutchman Minuet
was, in fact, the unwitting victim of the first Indian "bait and switch" con in America! Chief
Seyseys, the unscrupulous leader of the Canarsee Indians, exploited Minuet's ignorance
about which Indian tribe actually held the "use and occupancy" rights to Manhattan Island.
Nathaniel Benchley, The $24 Swindle, AM. HERITAGE, Dec. 1959, at 62.
Benchley asserts that another Indian tribe, the Weckquaesgeeks, actually held title to
the upper two-thirds of Manhattan Island. As Benchley tells the story, the wily old chief
Seyseys readily agreed to remove his few tribal members from lower Manhattan Island and
"he took the sixty guilders' worth of knives, axes, clothing, and beads (and possibly rum),
and went chortling all the way back to Brooklyn." Id. at 93.
44. This photograph may be viewed in PETER IVERSON, PLAINS INDIANS OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 144 (1985).
45. Historian Roy Meyer describes "an emotion filled ceremony" on May 28,
1948, in Secretary Krug's Washington, D.C., office. There, Chairman Gillette and 13 other
tribal council leaders signed a contract by which the Fort Berthold Indians relinquished title
to over 153,000 acres of treaty-reserved lands as the site for the Garrison Dam and
Reservoir. Chairman Gillette remarked that "our Treaty of Fort Laramie, made in 1851, and
our tribal constitution are being torn into shreds by this contract." Roy G. Meyer, Fort
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The Indian peoples' challenges to the underlying validity of Indian land
cession agreements have long been stifled by uncritical adherence to Marshall's
Indian bargaining model. Indian complaints that they did not understand the
cession agreements that they had signed, or that the federal treaty commissioners
had obtained their signatures by threat, or during their collective, liquor-induced
stupor, or through outright fraud, have been shrugged off as not within the federal
courts' jurisdiction.46 Such Indian complaints were simply not heard by the courts
unless Congress expressly granted them legal or equitable jurisdiction to do so. But
the widely varying jurisdictional terms of these statutory grants subjected Indian
land rights to a "rigged lottery" approach to just compensation.47
Congress' plenary power over Indian lands has been only modestly
limited by contemporary judicial decisions. 48 Federal courts may now scrutinize
federal Indian legislation under the rational basis test.49 But this modest review
standard does not significantly alter the egregious power disparity that is exhibited
most fulsomely in the federal takings of Indian lands.50 The Supreme Court's 1980
decision in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians"' reaffirmed the federal
government's plenary power over Indian lands. While the Court in Sioux Nation
rejected the irrebutable presumption of congressional good faith that it had
declared in its Lone Wolfdecision, and replaced it with a "good faith in fact" test, it
did little to ensure that Indian peoples will be justly compensated for their taken
lands.52
Berthold and the Garrison Dam, 35 N.D. HIsT. 215, 259 (1968).
The Garrison site was selected by Colonel Lewis A. Pick of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers as essential to the success of the Pick-Sloan Project even though his predecessor
had rejected that site as unsafe. Major General Lytle Brown had reported to Congress in
1931 that the Garrison site was rejected because it was "entirely impracticable because of
the lack of suitable foundation for a dam of such magnitude." Id. at 239 n.2.
46. Because many Indian tribes were at war with the federal government in
1863, the Congress barred the Indian peoples from bringing any claims against the United
States in the Court of Claims. The tribes needed a special act of Congress that waived the
sovereign immunity of the United States in order to bring and maintain such a claim.
GErcHEs ET AL., supra note 10, at 311.
47. Rosenthal concludes that the admitted inadequacy and inconsistency of these
special jurisdictional acts cried out for congressional reform in Indian claims processing.
H.D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION 20
(1990).
48. Newton concludes that contemporary Indian law "grants too much deference
to assumed congressional powers and too little weight to Indian rights." Newton, supra note
34, at 250.
49. Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977).
50. Newton, supra note 34, at 245.
51. 448 U.S. 371 (1980). The Sioux Nation rule does not allow a federal court to
inquire into the adequacy of consideration that an Indian tribe received in compensation for
a federal taking of its lands. Instead, an Indian tribe whose lands have been taken by the
federal government must overcome the Sioux Nation's good faith test if it is to receive just
compensation for its taken lands or resources. Newton, supra note 34, at 258-59.
52. The Indian plenary power doctrine permits the federal government to "take"
Indian property and give it to others. One constitutional scholar contends that the
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Indeed, the Sioux Nation decision judicially immunizes the federal
government from liability for all but the most heavy-handed and patently self-
interested Indian takings.53 The best evidence of this is the "good faith" defense
that was offered by the federal government in Sioux Nation itself.54 The
government theorized that, as the trustee of the Sioux peoples, it demonstrably
acted in their best interests by agreeing to provide them subsistence rations in
perpetuity in exchange for the Indians' cession of the Black Hills.55 This "good
faith" exchange arguably immunized the government from any takings liability
despite the objective disparity in value between the Black Hills' resources and the
value of the Indian subsistence rations.56 The federal government vociferously
insisted that its past provision of strategically motivated subsistence rations to the
destitute and starving ancestors of today's Indian claimants immunized it from any
financial liability for the unjust taking of the Black Hills in South Dakota. 57
These decisions mean that the federal government may no longer invoke
the "slam dunk" immunity to Indian takings claims that it enjoyed under Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock.58 But the death of the irrebutable presumption doctrine does little to
limit Congress' retained plenary power over Indian lands. The Sioux Nation
decision does little to ensure that just compensation is, in fact, paid to those Indian
peoples who suffer devastating economic losses due to a federal taking of their
Constitution's Takings Clause was intended to limit the federal government's power to
confiscate, seize, destroy, or regulate private property. EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3.
53. Newton wryly concludes that in "less egregious instances of involuntary
[Indian] land acquisitions, the plaintiff tribes have rarely been successful." Newton, supra
note 34, at 259.
54. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 407-17.
55. Id. at 416-17.
56. There must be a limit to state coercive power over private property rights
because the "creation of [state] monopoly power" over those rights "poses a great danger of
abuse." EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 78. Epstein may have been referring to Native-American
landowners when he describes the "prisoners' dilemma" game that individual landowners
face in direct bargaining with a state that seeks to impose "collateral or unrelated"
conditions upon their continued use of their private property. Epstein references the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as a means of restraining state power over otherwise
"disorganized citizens" so as to allow them to escape from the socially destructive game. Id.
at 79.
The Court's failure to specify an objective yardstick against which to measure the
federal government's assertion that it gave a good faith value for the Indians' taken land,
imposes an "illogical test [that] turns most [Indian land] confiscations into [the] actions of a
trustee." Newton, supra note 34, at 261.
57. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 420-21. This decision sought to "harmonize"
congressional plenary power over Indian affairs with the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
The Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the federal government's role as the Indian
peoples' trustee with its sovereign eminent domain power over privately held land. Newton
criticizes the failure of that attempted synthesis. This failure stems, she contends, from the
"good faith" defense that allows the federal government to subjectively assert that it has
"given compensation as a fair equivalent for the land taken, even though it is far less than
the land's fair market value." Newton, supra note 34, at 259.
58. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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lands.59 Its "good faith" standard of judicial review focuses on the wrong end of the
just compensation telescope in Indian takings cases. It focuses on the federal
government's legitimation of its exercise of plenary power over Indian lands, not
on the actual economic losses suffered by those Indian peoples whose lands are
taken for a federal purpose. 60
C. The First Era: Americanizing the European Doctrine of Discovery
Indian occupation of the American West presented a perplexing early
nineteenth-century legal challenge. Chief Justice Marshall seized on the 1823 case
of Johnson v. M'Intosh6' as the means to resolve the ticklish and potentially
dangerous issues that arose from the non-Indians' unruly competition for the
control of the western Indian lands. Marshall invoked the European doctrine of
discovery as the legal basis for his opinion. 62 He established an exclusive
preemptive right in the federal government to acquire Indian lands as the rightful
successor to similar sovereign prerogatives that had been held by Spain, France,
and Great Britain.63 But the Indian peoples were deemed by Marshall to retain their
inherent right of exclusive use and occupancy of their aboriginal lands until those
59. Newton illustrates this point by hypothesizing a contemporary Indian land
sale by Congress on behalf of its Indian wards. Because the federal government fails to
conduct a geological survey or obtain competitive bids for these Indian lands, the lands are
sold at a price that is three or four times lower than their actual fair market value. She
concludes that this congressional action would likely fall short of the blatant and egregious
"bad faith" conduct that triggered Fifth Amendment liability in Sioux Nation. For that
reason, the United States would likely be shielded from fiscal or political accountability for
the economically disastrous consequences that befell its Indian wards due to its actions.
Newton, supra note 34, at 262-63.
60. Newton asks, why should the federal trust relationship immunize the federal
government from Indian takings claims? She concludes that the Sioux Nation Court's focus
on the federal trustee's subjective judgment about the Indian peoples' best interests
undervalues and potentially ignores the "real world" economic losses that federal takings
impose on the Indian peoples. This decision does little to protect them from the federal
government's negligent or uninformed judgments that result in the taking of Indian lands.
See id. at 263-64. This decision requires the federal judiciary to "abdicate its normal
judicial role" in takings cases. Id. at 264.
61. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
62. Historical scholars agree that the Indian peoples' right to "complete
sovereignty, as independent nations" was diminished by Marshall's opinion that European
"discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it." WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 66.
63. Despite Marshall's personal misgivings about the justice of the discovery
doctrine, he declared that "if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, and
afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the
great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be
questioned." Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591.
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lands were acquired by the federal government.' 4 The purchase of those lands was
to be the preferred means of legitimate federal land acquisition.65
Legal commentators understandably emphasize Marshall's practical
motives and result-oriented rationale in his opinion.66 First, they read Johnson as
holding that the federal government possesses the exclusive authority to prescribe
the terms and conditions for future non-Indian settlement of the western Indian
lands.67 Second, they read that decision as restricting the Indian peoples' inherent
sovereign power to alienate their aboriginal land titles to anyone but the federal
government.68 They view the Indians' exclusive use and occupancy rights as a
temporary accommodation that served primarily to ensure the federal government's
paramount ownership over a vast, federalized public domain that would eventually
extend to the Pacific Ocean.69
But Marshall's accommodation of the Indian peoples' exclusive use and
occupancy rights in their lands derived from federal commitments to protect Indian
land rights that were embodied in many federal Indian treaties.7" It likewise
justified the federal government's paternalistic interest in prohibiting unauthorized
Indian land transactions by private parties, states, or rival foreign governments.7'
Furthermore, it was the self-executing nature of the European doctrine of discovery
that supposedly divested the Indian peoples of their inherent right to freely alienate
their lands to anyone but the federal government.72 Marshall's accommodation of
this doctrine to nineteenth-century American circumstances was arguably intended
to serve the complementary interests of the federal government and the Indian
peoples.
64. Marshall viewed the Indian peoples as the "rightful occupants of the soil,
with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their
discretion." Id. at 574.
65. The Indian peoples' "right of possession has never been questioned" by the
federal government that has the "exclusive power of acquiring" Indian title. Id at 603.
66. Historian Wilcomb E. Washburn emphasizes Marshall's "practical"
appreciation of the "economic and political demands of the millions [of non-Indians]" who
populated the continent at the time of his decision. WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 66.
67. Professor George C. Coggins views that decision as laying the "legal
predicates for the federal [land] disposition program and the westward expansion." GEORGE
C. COGGINS E" AL., FEDERALPUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 49 (3d ed. 1993).
68. Id. at 54 (citing FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 468-93 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982)).
69. Id
70. Indians as "original inhabitants" of America were "admitted to be the rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession of it, and to use
it according to their own discretion." Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
71. Washburn cites the Johnson decision as the federal government's basis "for
all subsequent determinations of Indian right." WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 66.
72. Marshall weighed issues of conscience, expediency, and law in his recasting
of what Washburn calls the "natural rights of Indians." Id. He reworked the Indians' land
rights in terms of the "speculative" rights of the discovering European nations, the
"juridical" rights of the successor American states, and the "practical" economic and
political demands of those non-Indian settlers that came to populate the American
continent. Id.
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The federal government, through its Indian treaties, defined the evolving
boundary line between Indian Country and those lands available for non-Indian
settlement. Indian consent not only legitimated the treaty-making process, but was
the preferred means for defining Indian Country.73
Indeed, Indian diplomacy resulted in many Indian treaties, including those
that confirmed vast roaming and hunting reserves to the powerful Great Plains
Indian tribes.74 Some view these Indian treaties as a monument to Marshall's Indian
73. President George Washington and War Secretary Henry Knox both
emphasized respect for the Indian peoples' aboriginal land titles and rights. President
Thomas Jefferson described the federal government's preemptive right in the Indian
peoples' lands:
not as amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or paramountship
whatever, but merely in the nature of a reminder after the extinguishment
of a present right, which gave us no present right whatever, but of
preventing other nations from taking possession, and so defeating our
expectancy; that the Indians had the full, undivided and independent
sovereignty as long as they choose to keep it, and that this might be
forever.
1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 59.
Henry Knox echoed that sentiment on pragmatic, moral grounds, writing to President
Washington:
that a nation solicitous of establishing its character on the broad basis of
justice would...reject every proposition to benefit itself, by the injury of
any neighboring community, however contemptible and weak it might
be, either with respect to its manners or power.... The Indians being the
prior occupants, possess the right to the soil. It cannot be taken from
them unless by their free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of a
just war.
Id. 59-60.
Marshall's opinions describe the Indian peoples as independent political entities that
despite their status as "domestic dependent nations" were assumed to have retained the
power of self-governance over their members and their territories. But Indian reformers
after the Civil War began to agitate for the unilateral and coercive extension of federal law
and jurisdiction into Indian Country. The Board of Indian Commissioners declared in 1871
that "we owe it to them, and to ourselves, to teach them the majesty of civilized law, and to
extend to them its protections against lawlessness among themselves." 2 PRUCHA, supra
note 5, at 676.
74. The Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851 was drawn up at one of the most
dramatic meetings of Indian peoples and federal treaty negotiators. Some ten thousand
Indians-Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapahos, Crows, Assiniboine, Gros Ventres, Mandans, and
Arikaras-assembled along the Platte River at Horse Creek, where there was enough
pasturage to support such a large gathering of Indian peoples and their horses. Francis
Prucha describes the meeting as "slowly paced and formal" as Superintendent Mitchell's
comments had to be translated by interpreters on behalf of many tribal nations. Despite
some confusion and missteps by the treaty commissioners, the treaty was signed on
September 17, just before the federal supply train arrived with goods for distribution to the
Indians.
The Indian peoples agreed in the treaty to cease hostilities among the tribal groups and
to accept the respective hunting and roaming boundaries declared in the treaty for each of
the respective tribal groups. They also agreed to the United States' establishment of roads
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law legacy.75 But they would later loom as a major impediment to the United
States' realization of the late nineteenth-century dream of manifest destiny. The
task of empire building required a judicial revision of Marshall's Indian bargaining
model. Only by fundamentally reformulating that model could Marshall's opinions
be made to serve the national imperatives of rapid western settlement and
development. In reformulating its inherited model, the Court unleashed the much
criticized, but never repudiated, congressional plenary power doctrine to take
Indian lands.76
Marshall's opinions provided the context for the later judicial
reformulation of the Indian bargaining model."'
D. The Second Era: The Indian Peoples' Descent from Sovereign to Wardship
Status
Indian treaties inextricably bound the Indian peoples and federal
government together in a land-based relationship. 8 The treaties committed the
federal government to protect the Indians' exclusive use and occupancy rights from
infringement by increasingly raucous and numerous non-Indian settlers who
clamored for the opening of the Indian-owned western lands.79 But federal Indian
policy became inexorably driven by the late nineteenth-century notion of an
American manifest destiny to acquire and settle all of the western lands to the
Pacific Ocean."
The Indian Country concept had assumed that sufficient land was
available on America's western frontier to accommodate the Indians' and non-
Indians' settlement needs. By the 1830s, the eastern Indian tribes had already been
and military outposts in Indian Country, and to pay restitution for wrongs committed
against non-Indians who lawfully passed through their lands. The federal government, in
return, agreed to protect the Indian peoples from non-Indian depredations and to pay
annuities of $50,0000 annually. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE
HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 238-39 (1994).
75. Charles Wilkinson characterizes these treaties and the resulting reservation
system as "intended to establish tribal homelands for the tribes, islands of tribalism largely
free from interference by non-Indians or future state governments." CHARLES WILKINSON,
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 14 (1987).
76. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); see also PRUCHA, supra
note 74, at 356.
77. The Indian peoples did not possess "complete sovereignty" over their
territories because their status had been diminished by "the original fundamental principle
that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it." WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 66.
78. See CORNELL, supra note 4, at 34-38; supra note 9.
79. Congress originally sought to define and maintain a meaningful boundary
around Indian Country for a variety of practical reasons. For this reason, Congress asserted,
under various Indian trade and intercourse acts, regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians
who intruded into Indian Country or sought to purchase Indian lands. Id. at 47.
80. William Gilpin wrote in 1846 of the American people's "untransacted
destiny...to subdue the continent-to rush over this vast field to the Pacific Ocean...to
establish a new order in human affairs." Id. at 38. But between Gilpin and the Pacific Ocean
lay many Indian peoples who were willing to fight to preserve their land and territory. Id.
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compelled to cede their lands east of the Mississippi and remove to an Indian
Territory west of the Mississippi. President Jackson convinced himself and others
that this Indian removal strategy could be a cornerstone of Indian policy.8 Indian
peoples could always be removed farther west to arguably equivalent and
conveniently distant western lands.
82
Indian bargains could be fairly revised so as to accommodate emerging
non-Indian settlement needs.83 This simple faith in a boundless western frontier
made easy those treaty promises that the Indian peoples would retain their lands for
as "long as the grass is green and the rivers flow."" But by the 1870s, this
convenient view had proven a disastrous failure. Non-Indian settlement of western
lands proceeded at such a breathless pace after the Civil War as to make nonsense
of any future Indian bargaining strategy.85
81. Removal of the eastern Indian peoples had been a central concern of federal
policy makers since the War of 1812. President Jackson's warning in 1830 to the
Chickasaws to either emigrate or submit to state law served to formalize the Indian removal
idea as policy. Id. at 47-48.
82. The concept of a permanent Indian Country contemplated a secure western
territory for the resident Indian peoples in which federally sponsored programs of
acculturation and education would have sufficient time to transform many of the Indian
peoples into civilized and acceptable neighbors. PRUCHA, supra note 74, at 235-36.
83. The earlier acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 allowed President
Andrew Jackson to implement the Indian removal policy on a large scale in the 1830s.
President Jefferson had earlier suggested that the eastern Indian peoples could be granted
western lands in exchange for their aboriginal lands that lay east of the Mississippi River.
President Jefferson's notion of a western geographic expanse vaguely called "Indian
Territory" took concrete shape by the 1860s when many of the eastern Indian peoples had
been relocated into a concentrated area now known as Oklahoma. CORNELL, supra note 4, at
42.
The westward removal of the eastern Indian peoples during the 1830s served a variety
of goals held by the early federal Indian policy makers. It quickly cleared Indian lands for
non-Indian settlement. It effectively insulated the removed Indian peoples from a proximate,
unhealthy and conflict-ridden contact with non-Indian frontiersmen. Cornell emphasizes
that the federal government's Indian policy goal was both the progressive extinction of
Indian land title and the displacement of Indian cultures with non-Indian values and norms.
Id. at 40-41.
84. Wilkinson cites promises by treaty commissioners that the Indian peoples
would possesses their reservations as "permanent home[s] from which there will be no
danger of your moving again." WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 17.
85. Indian removal and assimilation policies were fused in 1887 by the General
Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358,
381 (1994)). It authorized the president to allot communally held Indian lands in severalty
as among the members of the respective resident Indian peoples. Indian heads of
households would generally receive 160-acre parcels and single Indian individuals or
children would receive smaller parcels of tribal land. Allotted lands were originally to be
held in federal trust for twenty-five years for the individual allottees. But Indian lands that
were deemed surplus to the allotment requirements of a specific reservation could be put up
for sale by the president to non-Indian settlers with the sales proceeds being placed in
Treasury accounts for the benefit of the affected Indian people. CORNELL, supra note 4, at
42-43.
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Sovereign bargains can be enforced only through legally binding
proceedings or at gunpoint.8 6 The Indian peoples, unable and unwilling to once
again accommodate the federal government's land cession demands, engaged in a
lengthy, but ultimately futile, military defense of their roaming and hunting
reserves." The Indian peoples' resort to the gun ended with the ignominious 1890
massacre by federal cavalry of Big Foot's ragtag band of a few Sioux warriors and
many women, children, and old men. 88
The Indian peoples' resort to the federal courts to enforce their sovereign
bargains came in Lone Wolf 9 The Comanches and Kiowas sued for an injunction
to prevent the federal allotment and sale of their treaty reserved lands in
contravention of the Indian consent provisions of the 1867 Treaty of Medicine
Lodge Creek.'
Congress decided in 1871 to repudiate future Indian treaty making. Some
non-Indians wanted Congress to go further and repudiate all existing Indian
treaties.9 ' But the 1871 statute only prohibited the president from future negotiation
86. Marshall's Indian bargaining model presumed that later revision of the
Indian peoples' territorial rights would come through good faith bargaining that was
reasonably free of federal coercion, threat, or unfair inducements to obtain the Indians'
consent to future land cessions. But federal Indian policy soon deviated from this standard
by countenancing treaty negotiation practices that bordered on the coercive, if not
downright fraudulent. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 45-50.
87. Custer's defeat by the combined forces of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors on
June 26, 1876, at the Little Bighorn effectively bookends Stephen Comell's Indian conflict
era, which stretched from the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries. I at 14.
88. A small Sioux band of some 100 Indian warriors and 250 women and
children surrendered near the South Dakota Badlands to troops of the Seventh Cavalry on
December 28, 1890. These Indians were surrounded, as they camped near Wounded Knee
Creek, by 500 soldiers and several pieces of Hotchkiss light artillery. Apparently, the
frightened soldiers searched the Indian camp for firearms the next morning and a scuffle
ensued in which an Indian warrior fired a gun. Both Indians and soldiers exchanged fire and
the non-Indian commander ordered the firing of the Hotchkiss artillery at the fleeing Indian
women and children as they retreated into a ravine near the camp. The Indian bodies would
eventually stretch for miles as some 200 Sioux Indians were killed by the federal troops. Id.
at 3.
The military subjugation of the Apaches, Sioux, and Nez Perce by the federal cavalry
in the 1870s marked the effective end of armed Indian resistance on the Great Plains and
Far West. The collapse of Indian military might left the Indian peoples vulnerable to
retributive congressional action and the pressures of treaty negotiators. Cornell cites the
words of Shoshone Chief Washakie in 1878 as the closing elegy of this era: "Our fathers
were steadily driven out, or killed, and we, their sons, but sorry remnants of tribes once
mighty, are cornered in little spots of the earth all ours by right-comered like guilty
prisoners and watched by men with guns." Id. at 50.
89. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
90. Lone Wolf's attorney, William C. Springer, filed an injunction action against
Interior Secretary Hitchcock on June 6, 1900, in the equity division of the Supreme Court
for the District of Columbia, alleging that the allotment and sale of the Indians' land
violated their due process rights. BLUE CLARK, LONE WOLF v. HITCHCOCK: TREATY RIGHTS
AND INDIAN LAW AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 62-63 (1994).
91. Termination of Indian treaty making, Indian reformers believed, would allow
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or execution of treaties with the Indian tribes.92 Congress expressly declined to
abrogate the many Indian treaties negotiated by the president and ratified by the
Senate before 1870' Several of these treaties allocated vast tracts of hunting and
roaming lands to powerful Great Plains Indian tribes.94 Further, those treaties
required that at least a majority of the adult male members of the tribes consent to
any future cession of their lands to the federal government. 95
Congress avoided the wholesale abrogation of existing Indian bargains,
but the Supreme Court was directly confronted with the abrogation issue in Lone
Wolf.96 It had to decide whether the Kiowas and Comanche Indians could prevent
the federal government from allotting their reservation and selling the so-called
surplus tribal lands to non-Indian settlers in violation of the Indian consent
provisions of the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek. 7 Indian treaties-such as
the Medicine Lodge Creek Treaty-had long legitimated the federal acquisition of
Indian lands.9" Such Indian land agreements were portrayed as the outcome of
mutually beneficial arms-length negotiations between the federal government and
the affected Indian peoples.9
individual Indians to be integrated into white society via a stringent educational program
and the extension of private property rights into Indian lands. WASHBURN, supra note 17, at
73.
92. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 71 (1994)).
93. Existing Indian treaties are expressly preserved by the statute's terms.
WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 138 n.3.
94. The 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie, II Stat. 749 (1859), with the Sioux,
Cheyennes, Arapaho, Crow, Assiniboins, Gros Ventres, Mandans, and Arikaras spelled out
the hunting and roaming boundaries for each signatory tribe. But Prucha emphasizes that it
was the Sioux, along with their Cheyenne and Arapaho allies, who "dominated the
conference" and achieved federal acknowledgment of their "power" and effectively allowed
them to dominate the reserved hunting grounds. I PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 343.
95. See, for example, Article 12 of the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek
with the Kiowa and Comanche peoples, which stated that "[n]o treaty for the cession of any
portion or part of the reservation herein described...shall be of any validity or torce as
against the said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult
male Indians occupying the same." Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes of Indians
(Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek), Oct. 1, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585.
96. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
97. Art. 12, 15 Stat. at 585. Clark reports that "[f]riends of the Indian
approached the court appeal buoyed with an air of positive anticipation [because] never
before had the executive, legislative or judicial branches seized Indian property and thrown
it open without at least the tacit consent of the Indians." CLARK, supra note 90, at 67. They
were hopeful that the judiciary would enforce Article 12 of the 1867 Medicine Lodge
Treaty after Congress ratified the Jerome Commission agreement for the Indians' cession of
their reserved lands, even though far fewer than the required number of Kiowas and
Comanches had consented to that agreement. See Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, 31 Stat. 676.
This disregard of the Indians' treaty-guaranteed property rights was the basis for the suit of
Lone Wolf, a Kiowa Indian, to enjoin Interior Secretary Hitchcock from implementing that
act on his reservation. CLARK, supra note 90, at 67-76.
98. CLARK, supra note 90, at 99.
99. The Lone Wof decision stripped away the Indian reformers' delusion that the
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But Congress' 1871 decision to abandon Indian treaty making presented
the Supreme Court with a dilemma. The Court had two options in Lone Wolf. It
could accept Lone Wolf's argument that the Indian consent requirement bound
Congress and prevented the coerced allotment of their reservation. That provision
required that at least three-fourths of the adult male members of the tribes consent
to any future tribal land cessions to the federal government.'0 1 It had been inserted
in the 1867 treaty to specifically reassure those Indians who wanted a federal
guarantee of their future, undisturbed use and occupancy of their reserved lands. 2
But stringent judicial enforcement of this and similar Indian consent provisions
would likely throttle any envisioned federal opening of the vast western Indian
lands subject to similar treaty provisions. 3 Alternatively, it could decide that
Congress was morally, but not legally, bound to respect its Indian bargains. Only
by fundamentally reformulating Marshall's Indian bargaining model could the
Court sustain Congress' coerced allotment and sale of Indian lands in defiance of
its treaty commitments. 0 4
The federal government was freed from its treaty promises by the Court's
redefinition of the relationship between the Indian peoples and the federal
government. ' The Court seized on Marshall's early dictum in Cherokee Nation v.
Indian peoples enjoyed the unqualified ownership of their treaty-reserved lands. Congress,
thereafter, proceeded with the opening of many treaty-established Indian reservations. 2
PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 775-76.
100. Lone Wolf argued that Indian consent to the Jerome Agreement had been
procured by misrepresentation or threat and that, in any case, fewer than the required three-
fourths of the adult male members had signed the agreement. The Court's possible
acceptance of this due process argument represented option one. Alternatively, the Court
could choose to reformulate Marshall's Indian bargaining model so as to allow Congress to
exercise plenary power over the Indian peoples' lands and resources. PRUCHA, supra note
74, at 355-60.
101. Article 12 of that treaty provided that:
No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation herein
described, which may be held in common, shall be of any validity or
force against the said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least
three-fourths of all the adult male Indians occupying the same, and no
cession by the tribe shall be understood or construed in such a manner as
to deprive, without his consent, any individual member of the tribe of his
rights to any tract of land selected by him as provided in Article III of
this treaty.
Art. 12, 15 Stat. 581.
102. Kiowa warriors such as Satanta were opposed to the reservation system. He
asserted that when Indians "settle down, we grow pale and die." CLARK, supra note 90, at
24. These warriors much preferred a life of freedom. The treaty negotiators held out the
prospect of "gifts, annuities, [and] houses" as inducements to these warriors to agree to this
treaty. Md.
103. IM
104. The new Lone Wolf doctrine conceived of the Indian peoples as
governmental "wards [to be] confined on Indian reservations, with the power and dignity of
independent nations supported by treaty guarantees all but forgotten." PRUCHA, supra note
74, at 358.
105. Id.
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Georgia. 6 Marshall had casually analogized the relationship of the federal
government and the Indian peoples as like that of a guardian and its wards." But
the Court in Lone Wolf transformed this casual analogy into a sweeping doctrine of
federal plenary power over Indian affairs. The repercussions of the Lone Wolf
doctrine for the Indians' land base were deep and long lasting. It swept away any
legal impediment to the coerced allotment and sale of Indian lands to non-Indian
interests. The short- and long-term effects of this decision on the Indians' land base
have been devastating. Between ninety and one-hundred million acres of Indian
lands were lost to Indian ownership.'08
The Lone Wolf decision drove a stake through the heart of Indian consent
doctrine. Presumed congressional good faith in its Indian dealings, not Indian
consent, would govern future Indian land cessions to the federal government.
Furthermore, Congress was judicially authorized to take Indian lands incident to its
exercise of guardianship power over the Indian peoples. The Court's action
unleashed the federal government's forced Indian assimilation program that was
aimed at the systematic dismantling of traditional tribal governance and cultural
systems."°
The Lone Wolf decision authorizing the congressional allotment and sale
of the Indian peoples' treaty-reserved lands and birthing the federal plenary power
doctrine represents the second era of Marshall's Indian law legacy."0
E. The Third Era: Judicial Indecision Regarding the Compensability of Indian
Title
The demolition of the Indian consent principle signaled a low point for the
Indian peoples.I" However, the Indian peoples and their advocates did not give up
106. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
107. Id at 17.
108. Congress' 1887 allotment program fused earlier disparate Indian removal
and assimilation policies in a dramatic and global manner. Between 1887 and 1934, when
Congress officially repudiated its allotment program, some 60% of the remaining Indian
land base-more than 86 million acres-had passed into non-Indian hands. These lands
were transferred from Indian ownership through a variety of means. Much of those lands
were directly sold to non-Indians under the federal surplus lands acts. Some of those lands
were lost to Indian ownership through amendments to the Allotment Act that allowed
individual Indians to sell or encumber their lands as a means of obtaining some income for
subsistence needs on the new and substantially diminished Indian reservations of the
twentieth century. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 44-45.
109. Professor Getches suggests that the Indian plenary power doctrine grew out
of three basic assumptions: first, strict adherence to the terms of Indian treaties would have
distributed an unfair share of the nation's wealth to Indians; second, federal courts declined
the role of enforcing arguably imprecise treaty terms; and third, the Indian plenary power
doctrine preserves federal flexibility to adapt Indian policy in light of fundamentally
changed circumstances. GETCHEs ET AL., supra note 10, at 208.
110. Indian allotment served as the characteristic dispossession device of the
"reservation era," dating from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s. CORNELL, supra note
4, at 42-43.
111. Allotment marked the beginning of a new process of incorporation of Indian
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hope of somehow protecting their lands from federal takings." 2 Did Lone Wolf
absolutely immunize the federal government from Indian takings claims? This
issue was squarely presented to the Supreme Court in the 1938 case of Shoshone
Tribe v. United States."3 In Shoshone, the Court upheld the lower court's judgment
that awarded just compensation to the Shoshone Indians for Congress' late
nineteenth-century decision to settle another Indian tribe, over the Shoshone's
vehement objection, on those lands reserved for the exclusive use and occupancy
of the Shoshone Tribe." 4 That decision heartened Indian peoples.1 5 The Court
seemed poised to overrule its 1903 Lone Wolf decision." 6 Did the Shoshone
decision really establish a per se Indian just compensation rule? Was the federal
government required to pay just compensation to injured Indian peoples when it
took their lands for federal purposes?
17
Any hope for a broad-gauged Indian takings doctrine was soon derailed.
One factor in this derailment was Congress' creation in 1946 of the Indian Claims
Commission ("ICC")."' The ICC was to hear and determine all those
jurisdictionally defined claims for relief that the Indian peoples may have against
the United States." 9 The ICC's creation, coupled with the Supreme Court's 1955
decision in Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, doomed any easy
optimism.' Tee-Hit-Ton dashed the Indians' hopes of realizing Fifth Amendment
protection of their aboriginal use and occupancy rights. That case reinterpreted
Johnson so as to restore the Lone Wolf doctrine that courts must defer to Congress'
plenary power over Indian lands.'
2
'
lands into the surrounding American economy. The Indian peoples' descent under the
federal plenary power doctrine from their historic status as semisovereign nation to
dependent ward mirrors their cultural and economic subordination by assimilative and
antitribal programs of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Il at 44-50.
112. Professor Nell Newton contends that extending generally the just
compensation principle to Indian lands "would strike a fair balance between the competing
interests of federal power and Indian rights." Newton, supra note 34, at 264.
113. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
114. Because the Shoshone Tribe held a federally recognized right of occupancy
in their lands, Congress' exercise of eminent domain to transfer them to the use and
occupancy of another Indian tribe required the payment of just compensation to the
wronged Indian tribe. Id. at 115.
115. Governmental interference with Indian lands, not the scope of title held by
the Indians, has been regarded by some commentators as the Indians' "key to recovery" in
the Shoshone decision. Daniel G. Kelly, Jr., Indian Title: The Right of American Indians in
Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 655, 666 (1975).
116. Il at 668.
117. Id.
118. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049
(1946) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3). The Indian Claims Commission
terminated on September 30, 1978, by the terms of 25 U.S.C. § 70v.
119. President Truman signed the ICC legislation to allow the "First Americans"
the opportunity to "vindicate their property rights and contracts in the courts against the
violations of the federal government itself." RoSENTHAL, supra note 47, at 92.
120. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
121. Id. at 290-91.
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The Court's failure in Tee-Hit-Ton to circumscribe the federal plenary
power doctrine by extending just compensation protection to the Indian peoples'
aboriginal use and occupancy rights represents the third era of Marshall's Indian
law legacy.
22
F. The Final Era: Reexamining the 1949 Taking of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation
In 1949, Congress took 156,035 acres of Indian lands located within the
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation as the site for a massive multipurpose water
resource development project known as the Pick-Sloan Program.1'2 The Fort
Berthold Indians' impassioned, but ultimately futile, struggle to preserve their
historic reservation demonstrates the contemporary impact of Marshall's Indian
bargaining model. As will be demonstrated in Part V, the clash between the Fort
Berthold Indians and the combined forces of the Army Corps of Engineers and two
powerful congressional Indian committees starkly illustrates the need for a modem
Indian takings doctrine. 24 Extending just compensation protection to the remaining
Indian lands would require no heroic innovations in existing legal doctrine or
practice. The 1949 Fort Berthold taking reveals the deep disadvantages faced by
contemporary Indian peoples who must bargain with the federal government to
preserve their unique land-based tribal cultures and economies."z
II. THE FIRST ERA: AMERICANIZING THE EUROPEAN DOCTRINE OF
DIsCOvERY
A. The Prologue to Johnson v. M'Intosh
Sovereign bargaining between the federal government and the Indian
peoples would be unthinkable absent Marshall's 1823 opinion in Johnson v.
M'Intosh.2 6 He created the needed bargaining framework via the concept of Indian
title. 27 By federalizing Indian land titles he established Congress as the exclusive
dealer in Indian lands. Three foundational principles were declared by the Johnson
decision: First, only the federal government may acquire Indian lands by purchase
or conquest. Second, only the federal government may grant Indian lands, subject
122. From a constitutional standpoint, Professor Newton contends that there is no
defensible reason "for treating Indian property different from non-Indian property."
Newton, supra note 34, at 264. She concludes that shielding the federal government from
potentially large Indian takings claims should not be deemed an overriding governmental
interest that shields the federal government from liability in these cases, Id.
123. Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 664, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887, 897-
98 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C.).
124. See Meyer, supra note 45.
125. Id.
126. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
127. Id. at 574.
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to their right of use and occupancy. Third, only the Indian people have the right to
use and occupy their lands, subject to future federal divestment of those rights.'28
The commodification of.Indian lands reflected the nineteenth century's
changed valuation of the western lands. Increasing scarcity of available lands for
non-Indian settlement prompted states and private land syndicates to acquire vast
tracts of land directly from the Indian peoples. Avoiding needless bloodshed and
conflict between the encroaching settlers and those Indians who would fight to
protect their remaining lands was the goal of early federal Indian policy makers.
129
Congress in 1790 had asserted its regulatory authority over Indian lands
by enacting its first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act. 3 ' But its meaningful
enforcement was a problematic affair along the volatile frontier of Indian Country.
Although federal regulations prohibited the unauthorized acquisition of Indian
lands, private land speculators and states' rights advocates openly defied Congress'
assertion of an exclusive police power over these resources.13 1 Indeed, similar
initiatives by the British Crown to restrict private commercial intercourse with the
Indians had prompted widespread evasion by rebellious colonial interests.
Frontiersmen and private land-speculation syndicates likewise greeted the federal
government's feeble efforts to protect the Indian lands with disdain. They openly
challenged the federal government's authority to restrict their asserted natural
liberty to acquire land directly from the Indian peoples.'32
128. GErcHEs ET AL., supra note 10, at 78.
129. The federal government sought to establish a boundary around Indian
Country via Indian treaties and the assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over Indian land and
commercial transactions under the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act. This federal regulatory
effort was directed at restraining private and state efforts to dispossess the Indian peoples of
their lands. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 47.
130. President Andrew Jackson's efforts to remove the Five Civilized Tribes-the
Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Seminoles-from their lands in the
southeastern United States helped to undermine the federal government's commitment to
protecting Indian lands. Id.
131. The 1796 version of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act specified a discrete
boundary line between the whites and Indians. Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, I Stat.
469, 469 (1796). Prucha points to this as the first such formal statutory designation of
Indian Country. Despite frontiersmen dissatisfaction with a law that intended to frustrate
their direct dealings with, or depredations upon, the Indians, Congress reenacted the statute
in 1799 without amendment and with little debate. Apparently, Congress valued the
friendship and pacification of its Indian allies more than it feared the outrage of those
frontiersmen who felt they were deprived of their settlement opportunities or natural
liberties by Congress' high-handed treatment of its own citizenry. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5,
at 92-93.
132. Enforcement of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act in frontier America of
the early nineteenth century proved well-nigh impossible. The American frontier had
spawned a subculture of a breed of lawless, sometimes depraved, men who lived off
clandestine intercourse with the Indians. The Indian fur trade literally created these men
who went off with their packs for months on end into the wilderness. Prucha emphasizes
that though they often took Indian wives, they nonetheless "mercilessly exploited the
Indians, debauched them with whiskey, and then robbed them of their furs." I PRUCHA,
supra note 5, at 95. They totally disregarded legalities, and their well-heeled capitalist
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B. The Devolution of Original Indian Title
Sovereign bargaining via Indian treaty making had arguably served the
European nations' need for exclusive control over Indian lands.'33 Marshall
assumed that it could also serve that same goal on behalf of the federal
government. 3 4 Curbing non-Indian incursions into Indian lands was also an
important goal of the early federal government.'35 Such bitter land-related conflicts
helped convince the framers of the Constitution that an unregulated Indian
commerce was unwise and dangerous. Constitutional responsibility for regulating
Indian commerce was explicitly assigned to the federal government by the 1787
Constitutional Convention.'36
But a major practical issue was left undecided: who held legal title to the
western Indian lands? Whoever held that title would control the destiny of non-
Indian western settlement. Marshall recognized that the peculiar facts and issues
presented in Johnson offered the Court an opportunity to domesticate Indian title in
a manner favorable to the federal government. 3 '
Johnson involved private land transactions with Indian tribes in 1773 and
1775, prior to the United States' existence."3 The Court's ostensible task in
Johnson was to determine which of the two competing private claimants had the
better title to a large tract of former Indian lands in the Ohio Valley.'39 One of the
non-Indian claimants traced his land title to private land purchases in 1773 and
1775 directly from the chiefs or headmen of the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians.1
40
The other non-Indian claimant traced his land titles to a later federal grant of those
masters, such as John Jacob Astor of the American Fur Company, sought legislative relief
against overstrong enforcement of federal Indian treaties and the various federal protective
statutes. Ia.
133. Id. at 113-14. Marshall's Indian law decisions laid the legal basis for such
federal regulation of Indian Country by declaring the principles of federal preemption over
Indian lands and tribal sovereignty. Prucha reads these decisions as establishing the federal
government's exclusive power to extinguish the Indian peoples' aboriginal rights of
occupancy in their lands. But the federal government was interested in exercising its legal
power to protect Indian land rights only up to a point. The federal government's main
interest was in policing the process of non-Indian settlement of Indian lands so as to ensure
that it was achieved with as little disorder and bloodshed as possible. Indeed, the notion of
Indian removal far west of the Mississippi convinced some Indian policy makers that they
could forever defer the problem of non-Indian encroachment on Indian Country. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id at 108-14.
136. The new Constitution vested exclusive authority in Congress to regulate
trade and commerce and make treaties with the Indian peoples. This was a "far simpler and
clearer" declaration of federal legislative authority over Indian affairs than had been
contained in the superseded Articles of Confederation. GETcHES ET AL., supra note 10, at
70-71.
137. G. EDWARD WHrrE, TIM MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-
1835, at 710-11 (1991).
138. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 571-72 (1823).
139. Id. at 572.
140. Id. at 543-71.
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lands that was subsequent to a land cession agreement between the federal
government and those same Indians. 4'
Marshall seized the opportunity to address the broader question of who
had the power to grant "good title" to Indian lands-the federal government or the
respective Indian peoples? 42 By a creative interweaving of sixteenth-century
European notions of sovereignty over "heathen and infidel peoples" with the
practical necessity for the orderly western settlement, Marshall established the
federal government's paramount title to Indian lands. 143 Based on the European
sovereigns' preemptive rights over Indian lands, he concluded that only the federal
government could grant "good title" to former Indian lands." Despite Marshall's
personal doubt that the Pope or the European monarchs possessed any such power
to grant Indian lands to their colonizing expeditions or chartered companies, 14 he
nonetheless concluded that the American courts were bound by established
European law and custom to recognize the federal government's power over Indian
lands. 46
The de facto success of the Europeans in incorporating the Indian lands
into their respective domestic system of property rights established, for Marshall, a
judicially unassailable "actual state of things."' 47 By Marshall's "velvet
revolution," the United States acceded to paramount title over Indian lands,
without resort to a gruesome and expensive war of conquest against fierce tribal
opponents who would fight rather than surrender their lands to non-Indians.
141
But Marshall was required to tweak the discovery doctrine to adapt it to
American circumstances." 9 Marshall's moral disquiet about the seeming
141. Id at 571-72.
142. Id. at 572-73.
143. M at 591.
144. Ma at 587-92.
145. Id. at 590-91.
146. The discovering European nations had the "sole right of acquiring the soil
from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it." Id. at 573. The United States
likewise "maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or conquest." Il at 587.
147. Marshall reasoned that the British Crown had successfully asserted its
"limited sovereignty over [the Indian peoples], and the exclusive right of extinguishing the
title which occupancy gave them." Id. at 588. This sovereignty and preemptive right over
the Indians' land passed to the United States after its successful revolution against British
authority in 1783.
148. The discovery doctrine, however much it "may be opposed to natural right,
and to the usages of civilized nations," is yet "indispensable to that system under which [the
United States] has been settled." Id. at 591.
149. Marshall's task in Johnson was to:
consider not only law but conscience and expediency as well. The
"natural" rights of the Indians had to be seen in terms of the
"speculative" rights of the earlier European monarchs, the "juridical"
rights of their successor American states, and the "practical" economic
and political demands of the millions who now populated the continent.
WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 66.
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dispossession of the Indian peoples may have prompted his action) Judicial
confiscation of the Indians' aboriginal land titles was arguably allowed by the
European doctrine of discovery. But he had also to elide a delicate public relations
problem: such dispossession would have outraged international public opinion and
led to the condemnation of his new nation.'5'
Marshall could not confirm the Indian peoples' inherent authority to
alienate their lands to whomever they wished. That decision would have frustrated
the revenue raising capability and expansionist ambitions of the federal
government.' 52 He avoided this dilemma by legally bifurcating the Indian peoples'
land titles into two federally recognized property interests. 53 The Indians, as first
possessors of the soil, held the right of exclusive use and occupancy in their
aboriginal lands. This possessory right was declared to be as legally sacred as the
Anglo-American right of fee ownership. 54 However, the United States, as the
sovereign successor in interest to the European discovering nations, held the
paramount fee simple title to the Indians' lands.'55
This bifurcation of Indian title both justified and necessitated a land-based
relationship between the federal government and the Indian peoples. Doubtless, the
Indian peoples would have charged, if they had been consulted, that the Johnson
decision wrongfully impaired their preexisting sovereign authority over their lands.
They lost their inherent right to sell or alienate their lands to anyone but the federal
government. 5 6 Doubtless, the non-Indian settlers and speculators, if they had
likewise been consulted, would have charged that the Johnson decision ignored
150. Washburn characterizes Marshall's opinion as balancing "conscience and
expediency" in justifying what may be regarded as his dispossession of the Indians' "natural
right" to the full ownership of those lands they had occupied from time immemorial. Id.
151. G. Edward White described Marshall's difficulty as arising from distinct
legal principles that apply to the Indian peoples:
The Indians had been the initial possessors of the American continent:
the land and, presumably, the property rights emanating from it were
theirs.... The Indian tribes had been recognized from the outset of white
settlement as nations and had entered into legal relationships, such as
treaties or contracts, with whites. Theoretically, then, Indian tribes
holding land had not only rights of sovereignty but a bundle of natural
rights deserving of legal recognition, rights related to the concepts of
liberty, property, and self-determination that occupied so exalted a
position in early-nineteenth-century jurisprudence.
WHrrE, supra note 137, at 704.
152. But the availability of this land and resources for American expansion "was
dependent on the dispossession of the original inhabitants." CORNELL, supra note 4, at 35.
153. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591-94.
154. Id.
155. Marshall's message in Johnson to the Indian peoples was that "the natural
rights of human beings to dispose of property that they held by virtue of possession did not
apply to Indians in America." WHrrE, supra note 137, at 710.
156. The natural law idea was reduced in Johnson to an "advisory capacity."
White concludes that the Indians' inherent right to dispose of property had been
subordinated to the "positive enactments of American states and the federal government."
d at 710-11.
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their God-given natural liberty to acquire lands from the Indians. Furthermore, the
Indian peoples, private land dealers, and state rights advocates would have
protested the judicially created and exclusive power of the federal government to
prescribe those terms and conditions by which private parties would hereinafter
acquire title to western Indian lands. 5 ' Few of the now innumerable grantees of
federal land titles know or care that the Indian peoples had originally granted those
lands to the United States. 58
C. Marshall's Creation of an American "Charter of Discovery"
Marshall extolled the sacredness of the Indian peoples' use and occupancy
rights in their aboriginal lands.'59 To some this seems mere judicial sugarcoating
that shrouds a culturally biased taking of Indian lands.' 60 But contemporary efforts
157. Theorizing about the Indian rights played little role in the thinking of the
non-Indian settler or the eastern Indian land speculator. Prucha remarks that "they saw the
rich lands of the Indians and they wanted them." 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 108. John
Sevier's natural liberties philosophy served to legitimate the aggressive attitudes of the
frontiersmen. He argued that the "law of nations...agree[s] that no people shall be entitled to
more land than they can cultivate." Id. His frontiersman's philosophy triumphed because the
federal government could make only sporadic and relatively feeble military efforts to
regulate this non-Indian pressure to settle Indian lands. Id. at 111-12.
158. The incorporation of the Indian lands into the American property system was
essential for the realization of nineteenth-century visions of America's destiny. Thomas
Jefferson, as champion of the social agrarian movement, promoted the commercialization
and appropriation of western Indian lands as the basis for founding an independent-minded
"yeoman" class of free-holder farmers. By contrast, William Gilpin focused in 1846 on the
idea of progress and manifest destiny when he wrote: "The untransacted destiny of the
American people is to subdue the continent-to rush over this vast field to the Pacific
Ocean...to establish a new order in human affairs." CORNELL, supra note 4, at 37-38.
Common to both of these visions is the need to incorporate the Indian lands as a commodity
for future federal disposition.
159. The United States government treated the Indian peoples as if they were
autonomous foreign nations. Marshall concluded that this treaty-making history confirmed
an "autonomous nationhood" for Indian peoples. But Marshall could not recognize that the
Indian peoples retained full sovereignty over their aboriginal lands. Id. at 57-58.
The qualified character of Indian sovereignty over their aboriginal lands is evidenced
in Jefferson's proposed constitutional amendment that would have authorized the federal
government's acquisition of the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803. Although he
proposed a recognition of Indian land rights, he limited that recognition to an exclusive
right of occupancy in their aboriginal lands. The proposed language read:
The right of occupancy in the soil, and of self-government, are
confirmed to the Indian inhabitants, as they now exist. Preemption only
of the portions rightfully occupied by them, & a succession to the
occupancy of such as they may abandon, with the full rights of
possession as well as of property & sovereignty in whatever is not or
shall cease to be so rightfully occupied by them shall belong to the U.S.
Id. at 59.
160. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THouGHT 308-17 (1990).
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to mitigate or prevent the federal taking of Indian lands require a critical
revaluation of Marshall's Indian bargaining model.
This analysis focuses on two elements: (1) Marshall's adoption of a
conflated notion of European sovereignty over the "heathen and infidel" peoples of
the New World; 16' and (2) Justice Reed's later revision of the Johnson decision in
holding that the Indians' aboriginal use and occupancy rights are not compensable
property interests.' 62 The federal government may take aboriginal use and
occupancy rights without any payment of judicially mandated compensation. 63
But Reed's opinion confounds Johnson and extends it beyond its facts and
rationale. By the time of Justice Reed's opinion in 1955, the West had long been
settled. 1" Doubtless Johnson foreclosed Indian land claims by foreign
governments, private parties, or states that were based solely on ostensible
agreements with Indian tribes. 65 But did it authorize the federal taking of Indian
lands without compensation as claimed by Justice Reed?
Contemporary historical scholarship reveals that the European doctrine of
discovery was a hotly contested notion by sixteenth-century legal and religious
scholars. Indeed, by the time of Marshall's Indian law opinions it was clearly
rejected as an international normative principle for the regulation of Europeans'
treatment of indigenous peoples and their lands in the New World. 66 Furthermore,
Marshall's interpretation of the discovery doctrine also conflicted with the purpose,
tenor, and intent of French, British, colonial, or American treaties with those many
and powerful eastern Indian tribes. 67 Many influential sixteenth- and seventeenth-
161. The European doctrine of discovery was intended to broker discovery claims
of "new lands" between competing European monarchs. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 15. But
Marshall turned this doctrine against the governmental and property rights of the Indian
peoples as the aboriginal occupants of America.
162. Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272,279-85 (1955).
163. Id
164. The noted Indian historian Wilcomb E. Washburn interprets Marshall's
opinion in Johnson as holding that the "Indians of the United States did not possess an
unqualified sovereignty despite the centuries of relations conducted with them in terms of
treaties and diplomatic agreements." WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 66. He cites Marshall's
dictum that the European doctrine of discovery governed American law: because "the
property of the great mass of the [non-Indian] community originates in it, it becomes the
law of the land and cannot be questioned." Id. (quoting Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823)). Washburn asserts that Marshall recognized that "title to the real
estate of the nation," as well as the "economic and political demands of the millions [of
non-Indians] who now populated the continent," hinged upon his decision in Johnson. Id. at
65-66.
165. Id. at 66.
166. L.C. GREEN & OLIVE P. DICKASON, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE NEW
WORLD 201-26 (1989).
167. Conciliation of the Indian peoples and centralization of Indian commerce
was the motivating force that directed British Imperial policy toward the Indian peoples.
Indian trade was the economic lifeblood of colonial life in America and it behooved the
European and colonial government to cultivate diplomatic relationships that ensured the
continued flow of Indian goods and furs into the larger European economic system. See 1
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century European jurists and thinkers who soundly condemned the Europeans'
treatment of the Indios of the New World would have also condemned Marshall's
interpretation of the discovery doctrine in Johnson. A cursory examination of those
thinkers' writings flatly contradicts Marshall's claim of an extant and clear
European consensus that would legitimize his interpretation of the European
doctrine of discovery.
168
D. Reassessing the Contemporary Value of the Charter
Justice Reed later candidly admitted that America's nineteenth-century
dream of a manifest destiny would not have been realized but for the Johnson
decision.'69 But Reed mistakenly read Johnson as a "just so" story that explained
that the United States' ascension to power necessarily doomed the Indian
peoples. 70 Reed bluntly acknowledged the spurious logic by which Marshall
extended preemptive federal title over a vast expanse of Indian lands that were
occupied by numerous and powerful tribes who were prepared to militarily contest
the federal government's claimed ownership of their lands.'
Reed implicitly rejected Marshall's touted reliance on the established
"actual state of things" as mostly wishful thinking that anticipated the federal
government's successful conquest of the Indian West. Many of the western Indian
tribes continued to exercise full sovereignty over their lands well after the Johnson
decision.' Marshall and Reed's shared grim vision of the Indian peoples' future
derived not from a hypothetical sixteenth-century European charter of discovery
but from the nineteenth- and twentieth-century desire to possess Indian lands. 173
Substantial growth in the nineteenth-century non-Indian population,
supplemented by the influx of many landless European immigrants, required the
states and private land syndicates to shift from an Indian "trading" to an Indian
"raiding" strategy as the more efficient means of acquiring Indian lands.' 74 The
PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 18-28.
168. The Indians' legal status provoked sharp debate between, among others, Juan
Gines de Sepulveda (1490-1573) and Fray Bartolome de Las Casas (1484-1566) at
Valladolid, Spain, in 1551. Las Casas denounced Spain's reliance on the papal bulls of
1493 as conveying any title to the Indian peoples' lands. Sepulveda, relying on the authority
of Aristotle and St. Augustine, concluded that the Indian peoples were obligated to "accept
Spanish domination because of the their idolatry and human sacrifice." GREEN & DICKASON,
supra note 166, at 201-09, 204.
169. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1955).
170. Id. at 279-91.
171. Justice Reed described Marshall's opinion in Johnson as rationalizing the
subordinate legal position of the Indian peoples. Id. at 279.
172. Justice Reed concluded: "Every American schoolboy knows that the savage
tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force." Id. at 289-90.
173. Justice Reed's opinion is noted for its arguably "pejorative" references to the
Indians' "nomadic" stage of development and "savage" land-tenure concepts. He deploys
these notions as the basis for his conclusion that aboriginal occupancy rights may be
extinguished without just compensation. WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 114.
174. Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An Economic
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Johnson decision, by monopolizing federal control over Indian lands, effectively
closed this troublesome gap in federal authority. Only Congress may prescribe the
terms and conditions for the future non-Indian settlement of the American West. 7 5
But Marshall's theory of federal ownership of Indian lands would have
left many sixteenth-century jurists and theologians dumbfounded. 176 They would
have flatly rejected his hypothesized charter of discovery as wrongfully
dispossessing the Indians of their lands. The Indios of New Spain were considered
by most reputable European theologians and jurists to be entitled to the possession
and ownership of their aboriginal lands.77 But the key distinction between the
Johnson decision and the ruling sixteenth-century opinion regarding the Indians'
land rights in the New World is this: the Spanish Crown of the sixteenth century
sought to incorporate the Indian peoples into the larger political and social order,
whereas the federal government of the United States sought only to incorporate the
Indian lands into its domestic legal order. 7 '
Model ofIndian-White Relations, 37 J.L. & ECON. 39 (1994).
175. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 279-80 (citing Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 587-88 (1823)).
176. Brutality toward the Indians of New Spain endangered the Spaniards' souls,
according to Father Bartoleme de Las Casas, who was to become known as "the protector of
the Indians." Las Casas' personal conversion to the cause of the Indians may have been
hastened by a Dominican priest's refusal of the sacraments in 1614 because he owned and
exploited Indian slaves. Nonetheless, Las Casas devoted his life to persuading both the
temporal and spiritual authorities of the sixteenth century that the Indians' rationality as
men entitled them to respect and protection under Spanish law. His entreaties to Emperor
Charles V were rewarded with authority to establish an Indian mission colony at Terra
Firme in Venezuela. Others, such as Fray Antonio de Montesinos, challenged the
conquistador community to honor the royal edict that proclaimed Indians to be free men in a
sermon that asked: "Are these Indians not men? Do they not have rational souls?" FRANCIS
JENNINGS, THE FOUNDERS OF AMERICA 131-32 (1993).
177. GREEN & DICKASON, supra note 166, at 196-97. Vera Cruz, a Spanish
professor of theology at the newly created University of Mexico, lectured extensively on
Amerindian rights and concluded that the Indians had been "true lords of their lands" from
time immemorial and that the Spanish Crown had no right under natural law to grant their
lands to anyone without their express consent. Id. at 197.
Professor Green surmises that Vera Cruz's lectures are "another.. .indication [that]
Europe's expansion into the Americas did not accord with proclaimed principles." Id. at
198.
178. The Spanish Crown accepted its "special obligation" to protect and preserve
its Amerindians. Id. at 203. Las Casas and other Spanish theologians denounced the
institution of encomienda as an "iniquitous and tyrannical" usurpation of the Amerindians'
land and political rights. Id. at 202. Las Casas specifically rejected the civilizing rationale
for Spanish conquest of the Amerindians by observing:
Not only have [Amerindians] shown themselves to be very wise peoples
and possessed of lively and marked understanding, prudently governing
and providing for their nations (as much as they can be nations, without
faith or knowledge of the true God) and making them prosper in justice;
but they have equaled many diverse nations of the world, past and
present, that have been praised for their governance, politics and
customs, and exceed by no small measure the wisest of all of these, such
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But the Johnson decision can be read as far more than a temporary
accommodation of the Indians' use and occupancy rights pending ultimate federal
disposition of their lands. 79 Indian use and occupancy rights were to be protected
by federal regulatory and military action, if necessary, as against defiant non-Indian
settlers. Ironically, the minimal successes by the federal government in this regard
seemed only to hasten the Indian peoples' undoing. The federal military forays
undertaken to protect the Indian use and occupancy rights served only to outrage
frontiersmen and states' rights advocates. 80
But the Indian bargains generated via Marshall's model proved to be a
potent barrier to non-Indian settlement of the American West. ' The Indian
peoples proved to be far more astute bargainers than Marshall may have
anticipated. 182 Many of the federal treaties with the powerful Great Plains tribes
required an express Indian consent to the future cession of Indian lands. Unless
three-fourths of the adult male tribal members consented to a future land cession,
the federal government could not get their lands." 3
The self-limiting character of the Johnson decision became clear. The
federal government emerged from that decision as a "super-monopsonist": the sole
sovereign buyer of the Indians' lands. But its dominant market power position over
Indian lands would prove radically insufficient to achieve its later nineteenth-
century goal of rapid western settlement and development.
8 4
as the Greeks and Romans, in adherence to these rules of natural reason.
Id. at 208-09.
179. Marshall concluded that "Indian title [is] entitled to the respect of all courts
until it should be legitimately extinguished." Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592.
180. The federal government did use military force to drive illegal settlers off
Indian lands. I PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 112-13. But the settlers always seemed to win out
eventually in their goal of settling Indian lands. Prucha cites the insufficiency of federal
military forces and the unwillingness of civil 'authorities to fairly prosecute non-Indian
violators of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act. Id. Prucha also surmises that the federal
government acquiesced in illegal settlements on Indian lands that had gone on so long and
thoroughly as to be irremediable in nature. Md
181. Marshall's Indian law decisions and related federal treaties confirmed the
Indian peoples' exclusive use and occupancy rights in vast hunting and roaming reserves in
the American West. Cornell argues that the federal government had to "back-peddle" on its
treaty commitments so as to facilitate the further incorporation of Indian lands under the
allotment program of the late nineteenth century. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 45-50.
182. Wilkinson cites as common treaty language those provisions that guarantee
the Indian peoples' "permanent" possession of their lands for their undisturbed "use and
occupancy." WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 15.
183. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text.
184. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 45-50.
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III. THE SECOND ERA: THE INDIAN PEOPLES' DESCENT FROM
SOVEREIGN TO WARDSHIP STATUS
A. The Rise and Fall of the "Measured Tribal Separatism" Policy
The vast expanse of western lands could presumably accommodate the
divergent and increasingly antagonistic land uses by encroaching non-Indian
settlers and the resident Indian peoples. War Secretary Henry W. Knox believed
that an Indian Territory could be carved out of the American West." 5 Congress
indeed legislated in 1834 an expansive definition of Indian Country that
encompassed virtually all the lands west of the Mississippi River to the Sierra
Nevada Mountains.1
86
Indian peoples, Knox believed, should be allowed the necessary time,
space, and opportunity to adapt their cultures and economies to a non-Indian way
of life." 7 His idea of a "measured tribal separatism" was later implemented through
federal "peace and friendship" treaties with the strong Great Plains Indian tribes.
88
These treaties confirmed vast roaming, hunting, and gathering reserves for the use
and occupancy of these tribes.8 9 These treaties also preserved the Indians' lands by
requiring that at least a majority of the adult male members of the affected tribes
consent to any future land cessions to the federal government.'90
But Knox's assumption that there was enough western land to long
accommodate the Indian peoples' hunting and roaming way of life was soon
proven mistaken. A tsunami wave of non-Indian demand for western lands
swamped Knox's strategy of a measured tribal separatism. The demand for Indian
lands skyrocketed after the Civil War, fed by successive waves of new European
immigrants and an unexpected increase in America's indigenous non-Indian
population.'9 ' Constituent pressure grew for the congressional repudiation of its
185. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 58-60.
186. Congress provided a statutory definition of Indian Country in the
Nonintercourse Act of 1834:
[AIll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not
within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas,
and, also, that part of the United States east of the Mississippi river, and
not within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished,
for the purpose of this act, [shall be] deemed to be the Indian Country.
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (1834) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 177, 194 (1994)).
187. Knox's Indian policy grew out of practical motives. Prucha cites Knox as
saying that "[i]f our modes of population and War destroy the tribes the disinterested part of
mankind and posterity will be apt to class the effects of our Conduct and that of the
Spaniards in Mexico and Peru together." I PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 65-66.
188. WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 14-15.
189. Id. at 14-19.
190. Indians and their congressional allies attacked proposed territorial bills for
Oklahoma in the 1870s as conflicting with treaty promises of self-governance without non-
Indian interference. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 741-43.
191. Cornell cites "[w]hite demand" for Indian lands in the 1860s as a key
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Indian bargains so as to open the vast hunting and roaming reserves of the Great
Plains Indians to non-Indian settlement.
192
By the 1870s, both the enemies and friends of the Indians grew
disenchanted with existing Indian treaties. Their practical objection to these treaties
was simple: the Indians had too much land! They faulted these Indian bargains for
not forcing the Indian peoples to adopt civilized habits such as farming or
ranching. The Indians were largely left free to pursue their traditional subsistence
hunting, fishing, and gathering ways of life on their large reserves. 93
The Great Plains tribes had driven hard bargains with the federal treaty
negotiators. They succeeded in establishing a formidable legal barrier to non-
Indian incursions into their lands. 94 But critics argued that these bargains thwarted
the highest and best economic uses of these lands, locked up, as they were, in large
roaming and hunting reserves. These lands could be "unbundled" into highly
valued products, goods, and services only through intensive use, substantial capital
investment, and the extension of private property rights into those lands.
95
B. Reformulating Marshall's Indian Bargaining Model: The Birth of the
Plenary Power Doctrine in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock
By the 1870s, many non-Indians were convinced that the tribal separatism
policy had proven to be a disastrous failure.'96 The Great Plains Indians clung
tenaciously to their ancestral lands and cultural traditions. They evinced little
obvious interest in adapting to a non-Indian way of life. Furthermore, Indian
peoples were regarded as semiautonomous governmental entities. But
contemporary critics viewed Indians as dependent governmental wards, not as
quasi-independent peoples.'97 They urged that the federal Indian treaties be
impetus for the development of the Indian reservation system. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 42.
192. The reform-minded Board of Indian Commissioners had come to support the
principle of Indian allotment as a means of assimilating and civilizing the Indian peoples.
At the famous Lake Mohonk Conference in 1884, the Board endorsed "heartily" the
allotment concept. Non-Indian settlers supported Indian allotment because it would
eventually release millions of acres of Indian lands as "surplus lands" for non-Indian entry
and settlement. 2 Prucha, supra note 5, at 659-71.
193. Id.
194. ICL
195. Stephen Cornell frames the Indian-White conflict over land as a struggle
between precapitalist and capitalist views of land use. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 34-39.
Capitalist "commercialization means that labor and land are no longer controlled by social
bonds or cultural practice but are subject instead to market forces." Id. at 36. By contrast, in
Indian society, "[l]and, labor, and the productive process are inextricably bound up in webs
of kinship, ritual, and custom, which themselves render the different aspects of social reality
mutually intelligible and interdependent." Id. at 38.
196. WILKNSON, supra note 75, at 19-23.
197. Bishop Whipple, among other influential friends of the Indian, wanted
President Lincoln to treat the Indian peoples as governmental wards, not as members of
quasi-sovereign political entities. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 470.
1998]
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repudiated and that Indian peoples be dealt with as the dependent subjects of
congressional will.'98
Three congressional actions in the late nineteenth century combined to
transform Marshall's Indian bargaining model. First, Congress decided in 1871 to
end Indian treaty making.' Second, Congress decided in 1887 to break up the
Indian peoples' communally held lands into small homestead-size land parcels that
were to be assigned to each tribal member for farming or ranching purposes.2"
Third, Congress decided to offer those "surplus" Indian lands that were released by
the Indian allotment process to non-Indian settlers.20'
Many friends of the Indian, including Caleb H. Smith, the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, supported both the repudiation of Indian treaties and the forced
Indian allotment program."° By 1869, Smith argued, Indian treaty making had
degenerated into a "cruel farce." He urged that Indians be expressly recognized by
Congress as the dependent wards of the federal government. 3 Ending Indian treaty
making, Smith argued, would mark the beginning of a more humane and rational
Indian policy. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, headed by Smith, would become the
primary authority to regulate the Indians' lands and lives.2"
But the end to Indian treaty making came as the pragmatic outcome of an
institutional revolt led by a handful of congressmen who demanded a greater role
for the House of Representatives in the formulation of Indian policy. Historically,
the president and his treaty commissioners had directed Indian policy.0 5 But some
House members grew increasingly resentful of the Senate's exclusive legislative
power to ratify proposed Indian treaties submitted to it by the president. The
House, for its part, was expected to routinely appropriate the monies necessary for
the implementation of any Indian treaties agreed to by the president and the
Senate.2°
The House demanded and ultimately achieved in 1871 the passage of an
appropriations rider that ended Indian treaty making.2' It thereby obtained a role in
198. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 659-86.
199. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 71 (1994)).
200. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358, 381 (1994)).
201. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 668-69.
202. It was believed that the end of treaty making with the tribes and the
beginning of congressional direct rule by statute would be the departure point for a rational
and more effective, if not more humane, Indian policy. COHEN, supra note 68, at 106.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Critics of Indian treaty making increasingly advocated that Indian tribes
should be dealt with by general congressional legislation rather than through treaties that
acknowledged Indian tribes as semiautonomous government bodies. Instead, the tribes
should be considered as wards of the government and not "quasi-independent nations." Id.
at 105. The end to the process of treaty making, however, was more a product of traditional
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the development and control of future Indian policy. This fundamental shift to
congressional, rather than executive, administration of Indian affairs was
rationalized as unifying Indian policy and reducing the substantial transaction costs
of bargaining on a "government to government" relationship with each Indian
tribe.2"' But Congress did not go so far as to abrogate, as many non-Indians had
advocated, existing Indian treaties. These Indian bargains remain today as
bulwarks protecting the Indian peoples' quasi-sovereign status.2"
Congress' enactment of the General Allotment Act of 1887 likewise
represented a clear repudiation of measured tribal separatism. 10 That policy had
sought to preserve the traditional Indian cultures, economies, and lands from undue
or premature disruption by the non-Indian settlement of the West.21' But the federal
allotment program expressly contemplated breaking up the Indian roaming and
hunting reserves into individual, Indian-owned agricultural homesteads."'
Each Indian family and individual tribal member would receive a federal
trust patent to a homestead-sized parcel of land."' Only a lone senator, Henry
Teller from Colorado, opposed the General Allotment Act. He reviled the Indian
allotment policy as a thinly veiled "Indian land grab" that was dressed up in "save
the Indian" garb. He predicted that the Indian allotment process would only serve
to impoverish, not improve, the Indian peoples' lives.
214
But the Indian allotment program ran headlong into a potentially lethal
road block. Many Indian treaties required that future land cessions be approved by
at least a majority of adult male members of the affected tribes.2"' Could Congress
unilaterally revise these Indian bargains? Indeed, the Kiowas and Comanches
invoked just such an Indian consent provision, Article 12 of the 1867 treaty of
Medicine Lodge Creek, in an effort to enjoin the federal government's coerced
allotment of their reservation.2 16 That article required that any further cessions of
Indian lands be approved by "at least three-fourths of the adult male" Kiowas and
Comanches who were residing on the reservation.2 7
political jealousies than of rigorous policy. Members of the House of Representatives
resented the senatorial power to ratify Indian treaties without any role for the House in
treaty formulation. The House therefore demanded, and received in 1871, an end to treaty
making, and a greater role in the development and control of Indian affairs. Id. at 105-07.
208. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 527-33.
209. Id.
210. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358,381 (1994)).
211. WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 19-23.
212. Id. at 14-19.
213. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 666-71.
214. Id.
215. Blue Clark surmises that the allotment policy implicated fundamental
express and implied treaty pledges made to Great Plains' Indian tribes in the post-Civil War
era. CLARK, supra note 90, at 2-3. Common phenomena of the allotment era were
"assimilation pressures, land hunger and Indian resistance." Id. at 2.
216. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
217. Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes of Indians (Treaty of Medicine
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Indian Treaty Commissioner David H. Jerome was assigned the
unenviable task of persuading those Indians to consent to the allotment of their
reservation and to the sale of the surplus lands to non-Indians." 8 He met with the
assembled Kiowas and Comanches at Fort Sill in 1892. He talked candidly to those
Indians about the very limited options that the Kiowas and Comanches faced if
they refused to accept the allotment of their reservation:
If the Indians will do what the Great Father wants them to do, and
do their part well, it will result in your having plenty of food and
clothing; and instead of having, as you sometimes do, only one meal
a day, you will have three meals a day and have plenty of clothing
and things that will make you comfortable through the winter.
Instead of having to wait for an issue of beef every two weeks, you
can go out and kill a beef of your own and have a feast every day if
you please. I told you a little while ago that for twenty-four years the
Indians had increased very little if any in numbers. Now, if you
follow the plan that we have told you about you will not have your
babies die from the cold, but you will have them grow up good,
strong, healthy men and women, instead of putting them in the
ground.219
Indian Commissioner Warren Sayre was even more direct when he spoke
to the assembled Indians. He told them that the president could force them to
accept allotments whether they wanted them or not. He reminded them that this
forced allotment program had already occurred on other Indian reservations.220 But
Lone Wolf answered that his people were not ready for the allotment of their lands
and that they did not possess the skills or inclination to succeed as farmers and
Lodge Creek), Oct. 1, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585.
218. David Howell Jerome was a former Michigan governor who replaced
General Lucius Fairchild as head of the so-called Cherokee Commission that had been
charged in 1889 with the negotiation of the cession of Indian Territory west of the 96th
degree of longitude and the "opening" of those ceded lands to non-Indian settlement. The
newly styled Jerome Commission would later facilitate 11 land cession agreements with
Indian tribes in Indian Territory that would affect some 15 million acres of Indian lands.
CLARK, supra note 90, at 36-37.
219. GsrCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 200. Clark contends that the Jerome
Commission came with "fixed conceptions regarding private ownership of land, the
democratizing effects of yeomanry, and the necessity for American Indians to enter the
national marketplace of competitiveness for private gain." CLARK, supra note 90, at 39.
From the Jerome Commission's viewpoint, communal land ownership was
unworkable, tribal governments had to be abolished, and Indian lands allotted to individual
tribal members if Indians were to survive in American society. By contrast, the Kiowa
Indians approached the negotiations "with their own well established opinions" and they
knew already what the commission wanted and why they came. Id. at 39. The older warriors
who had helped negotiate the 1867 treaty wanted the federal government to adhere to the
treaty's guarantee that they would have no less than 30 years in which to hold their ancestral
and traditional lands. Jerome opened the negotiations with ill-chosen remarks saying, "I
want you to remember that the Government wants nothing from you." Few of the assembled
Indians likely gave credence to that remark. Id. at 41.
220. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 201.
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ranchers.22' Commissioner Jerome responded to Lone Wolf by pressing the Kiowas
and Comanches even harder to accept his proposed agreement. Every tribal
member would be allotted a 160-acre trust parcel of land. The Kiowas and
Comanches would be paid a lump sum of two million dollars for two million acres
of tribal lands that would then be opened to non-Indian settlement.
222
But Quanah Parker and other Indians played for time, arguing that the
treaty commissioners should either give the Indians more money for their lands or
that the negotiations should be delayed so as to allow the Indians to consult with
legal counsel regarding the proposed agreement.2' However, Jerome would hear
none of it. He wanted the Indians' decision regarding the proposal as presented. By
the time he and his colleagues had left the reservation he felt he had done the job
that he had been sent to do: he had successfully collected 456 Indian signatures.
These were enough Indian signatures to allow Indian agent George Day to certify
that well over three-fourths of the adult male tribal members had consented to the
Jerome Agreement as required by Article 12 of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge
Creek.224
Jerome transmitted the Indians' signed agreement to President Harrison in
January 1893. The Indians had only grudgingly agreed to the allotment and sale of
their reserved lands, Jerome admitted in his transmittal letter to the President, but
he believed that the agreement was legally binding.225 Jerome was proven
premature in his assessment of the agreement's validity. Interior Secretary Bliss
decided to have a new tribal census taken before Congress acted on the Jerome
Agreement. 6 This census revealed that Jerome had severely undercounted the
adult male members of the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes: there were 725 Indian
adult males who were eligible to vote on the Jerome Agreement. Treaty
commissioner Jerome had collected only 456 signatures, which fell considerably
short of the required three-fourths majority. Secretary Bliss recommended to the
congressional committees that the Jerome Agreement not be ratified. He pointed
out that the proposed Indian allotments were far too small to support tribal families
by livestock grazing or farming. He suggested that negotiations be held with the
affected Indian tribes.227
Despite doubts about the validity of the Jerome Agreement, the Fifty-sixth
Congress chose to move forward with final action on the ratification of the Jerome
Agreement. The Kiowas and Comanches petitioned Congress not to ratify the
Jerome Agreement. They contended that the allotment of the reservation would
mean their "destruction as a people and [would bring them] to the same
impoverished condition to which the Cheyenne Arapaho and Indian tribes have
been brought from the effects of prematurely opening their reservations for the
221. CLARK, supra note 90, at 41.
222. Id. at 42.
223. Id. at 42-46.
224. GErcHEs ET AL., supra note 10, at 203.
225. CLARK, supra note 90, at 43-44.
226. GETcHEs ET AL., supra note 10, at 200.
227. Id. at 204.
HeinOnline  -- 40 Ariz. L. Rev.  463 1998
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
settlement of white men among them."" 8 But Congress chose not to listen to the
Kiowas and Comanches or to Secretary Bliss, and by the Act of June 6, 1900,
Congress ratified the Jerome Agreement.229
C. The Effect of Lone Wolf on the Indian Land Base
Lone Wolf sued in federal court to enforce his people's sovereign bargain
by enjoining Interior Secretary Hitchcock from allotting or selling the Kiowas' and
Comanches' lands. His complaint alleged that the proposed allotting of the
reservation constituted a taking of their lands in violation of Article 12 of the
Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek. His lawyer, William Springer, filed an injunction
action on his behalf in the equity division of the Supreme Court for the District of
Columbia. His action asked the court to prevent the Interior Department from
implementing the General Allotment Act. Lone Wolf urged in his petition that the
court hold illegal the Act of June 6, 1900 as contravening the express terms of the
1867 treaty.2o
But Justice A. C. Bradley denied Lone Wolf's request for a preliminary
injunction against the federal government's allotment and sale of the Indians'
lands." Lone Wolf had argued that this unilateral federal action would deprive the
Kiowas and Comanches of their treaty-protected property without the due process
of law. But the judge disagreed and reasoned that it was within Congress'
prerogative to allot any Indian reservation regardless of alleged tribal
misunderstandings, deception by treaty commissioners, or a demonstrable failure of
tribal consent. Only Congress had the constitutional power to decide this issue, not
the courts. Therefore, Lone Wolf's due process objections to the forced allotment
and sale of their lands, the court held, should be dealt with by the body that could
appropriately balance the competing public interests and the rights of the Indian. 32
But time and events had overtaken Lone Wolf. By the time that Lone
Wolf s appeal from the lower court's decision was scheduled for appellate hearing,
more than 150,000 non-Indians had already registered with the federal land office
for some 13,000 homesteads in what had once been Kiowa and Comanche land.233
Those homesteads were sold to the non-Indian settlers at a price of $1.75 an
acre. 4 It came as no surprise when the court of appeals quickly affirmed the lower
court's ruling.2
5
Whether the Secretary's allotment and sale of the Kiowa and Comanche
lands should be enjoined as violating Article 12 of the 1867 treaty would be
decided by the Supreme Court. Lone Wolf urged the Court to hold that Article 12
228. Id at 205.
229. Id
230. Id
231. Decree of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, No. 1109, 4
Mar. 1902, RG 267, File 18454, National Archives.
232. CLARK, supra note 90, at 62-63.
233. Id. at 66.
234. GErcHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 206.
235. CLARK, supra note 90, at 66.
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plainly prohibited the unconsented allotment or sale of the Indians' lands.236 But
requiring Indian consent as a condition for the federal allotment or sale of their
lands was unacceptable to the Court. The judicial imposition of an Indian consent
condition, Justice White reasoned, would actually hurt the Indian people. It would
"deprive Congress...[of its ability] to partition and dispose[e] of tribal lands...if the
assent of the Indians could not be obtained." 7 Justice White readily agreed with
Lone Wolf that the Indians' right of occupancy in their lands was legally regarded
as "sacred as the fee [title] of the United States in the same lands."238 But only
private parties and the states-not Congress-were legally bound to respect Indian
land titles.239 Congress, unlike private citizens or states, was possessed of a plenary
authority over the Indians' lands. 2' It would be fruitless, therefore, Justice White
concluded, to require the federal courts to hear Indian testimony that would
demonstrate that their signatures to the Jerome Agreement had been procured by
the fraud or that three-fourths of the adult male tribal members had not signed that
agreement.24' The unquestioned tribal status of the affected Indians, coupled with
Congress' declared purpose to give adequate consideration to the Indians for their
lands, meant to Justice White that there were no viable issues for judicial
decision.242
From White's viewpoint, the Indians' complaint that Congress had
illegally taken their lands was wide of the mark.243 Congress' allotment and sale of
the Indian peoples' lands was not a taking so much as it was a transmutation of
those lands into equivalent financial assets. Justice White concluded his opinion
with the notorious admonition that the federal courts must "presume that Congress
acted in perfect good faith in dealing with the Indians."' The Court's decision
affirmed the federal government's demurrer to Lone Wolf's petition for injunctive
relief.24
5
The Lone Wolf decision fundamentally reformulated Marshall's Indian
bargaining model. It replaced its "government to government" relationship with a
new judicial creation-the federal plenary power doctrine. That doctrine freed
Congress to allot and sell the Indian peoples' lands without their consent. Congress
was empowered as the Indians' guardian to freely dispose of Indian lands. 246
236. Id.
237. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 554 (1903).
238. Id.
239. See id. at 564-65.
240. l at 565-66.
241. Id. at 567-68.
242. CLARK, supra note 90, at 71-72. But from Justice White's viewpoint, the
Indians' right of occupancy was not equivalent to ownership of their lands. The federal
government was the owner of the Indian lands and could effectuate a change in the Indians'
use of those lands if it was necessary for the Indians' benefit. Id.
243. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568.
244. Id. Justice White characterized Congress' allotment and sale of the Indians'
land as effecting "a mere change in the form of the investment of tribal property." Id.
245. CLARK, supra note 90, at 73.
246. Id. at 102-03. Clark places Lone Wolf in the larger, international law context
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IV. THE THIRD ERA: JUDICIAL INDECISION REGARDING THE
COMPENSABILITY OF INDIAN TITLE
A. Judicial Confirmation of Compensability: The Impact of United States v.
Shoshone Tribe
Sovereign bargaining had been the historic means by which Indian
peoples sought to preserve their lands from federal takings. But the idea of an
Indian Country wherein the Indian peoples were free to create their own laws,
cultures, and economies had seemingly collapsed under the weight of the federal
plenary power doctrine. No longer did the federal government pledge to use its
military forces to ensure that states and non-Indians respected the Indian Country
boundary.247 The Lone Wolf doctrine breached this boundary by recognizing a
judicially unfettered federal plenary power over Indian lands.248 The Indian peoples
were forced to seek a new strategy to preserve their remaining lands.
The federal courts would clearly not enjoin a congressional breach of
Indian bargains, but would the courts require the payment of just compensation for
the federal taking of Indian lands?249 Such a requirement would provide the Indian
peoples with some measure of substantive protection against Congress'
unprincipled exercise of plenary power over their lands."5
The Indian allotment program and the sale of "surplus" Indian lands
reduced the total Indian land holdings by some ninety to one-hundred million
acres." Congress' primary purpose in the allotment program was to spur the non-
Indian settlement of America's western lands. Many non-Indian constituencies-
railroads, homesteaders, mineral prospectors, and land speculators-benefitted
from Congress' largess in disposing of the Indian peoples' lands.2 52 Indeed, Justice
Reed later remarked that the rapid and efficient development of the American West
would have been inconceivable absent Marshall's Indian law decisions.
2 53
But by the advent of the New Deal Era in the 1930s, America's western
frontier had long since closed.2 54 In 1934, Congress repudiated its Indian allotment
when he analyzes Henry Cabot Lodge's reliance upon that decision, among other Indian law
decisions, as the basis for the United States' assumption of guardianship over foreign
"domestic, dependant nations" during Senate debates for the federal government's
assumption of guardianship over the "dark skinned" peoples of the Philippines. Id.
247. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 42-43. Cornell contends that Indian "assimilation
and removal" joined hands in the late nineteenth century as reflected in federal Indian
policy. Id.
248. Id.
249. See Kelly, supra note 115, at 668.
250. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much
Is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721,751-53 (1993).
251. GErcHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 196.
252. See CORNELL, supra note 4, at 37-38.
253. Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians.v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955);
see supra note 175 and accompanying text.
254. Homestead filings on "opened" Indian lands had by the late 1920s dwindled
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policy and adopted fundamental Indian land and governmental reforms as the
hallmark of its "Indian New Deal." 255 These reforms were intended to promote the
new federal policy of tribal economic development and political self-
determination. 6 But only forty-eight million acres of Indian lands remained by
then. 7 Those lands were owned by either Indian tribes or individual Indian
allottees. Indian land reform became a central focus of Roosevelt's Indian policy.
This policy expressly rejected the flawed and failed Indian allotment policy of the
late nineteenth century.25 A judicial rethinking of the Johnson-Lone Wolf line of
decisions that had made Indian allotment and the surplus lands sales possible
seemed likewise justified.
Renewed respect for Indian land rights was the Supreme Court's
contribution to the goal of tribal revitalization. The Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Shoshone Tribe 9 was hailed by Indians as a major step toward the
judicial protection of Indian lands.2" The facts of the Shoshone case were
straightforward: the federal government had decided to settle an additional band of
Indians upon the Shoshone's reservation without their consent. By an earlier Indian
treaty of 1863, the United States had set aside a vast area of some forty-four
million acres for the hunting and gathering use of the Shoshone people. However,
Congress prevailed on the Indians to cede all but three million acres of those lands
to the federal government by the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868.261 Those lands were
"set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Shoshone
Indians." '62
The Shoshone Court emphasized that the federal government knew in
1868 that the Shoshone's lands contained valuable mineral deposits of gold, oil,
coal, and gypsum.263 Those lands also included more than 400,000 acres of timber,
to almost nil. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 89. Land acquisition that had been the "motor" of
Indian policy was no longer to shape Indian policy as it had in the late nineteenth century.
New social goals of progressivism, cultural pluralism, and economic rejuvenation would
have their resonance in the reshaping of federal Indian policy in the 1930s. Id.
255. David Getches points to section 1 of the Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L.
No. 73-383, § 1, 48 Stat. 984, 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1994)), which
ended the Indian allotment program and section 4, id. Stat. at 985 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 464 (1994)), which prohibited future alienation of Indian land without tribal
consent as evidence of this land reform impulse. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 218-19.
256. Cornell contends that the protribal rhetoric of the Indian New Deal only
thinly disguised its assimilative character. Indian tribes were required to choose between
"an alien constitutional form of government and the uncertainties of the pre-IRA period."
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 94.
257. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 196.
258. Id.
259. 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
260. GETCHES ET AL, supra note 10, at 294. Getches concluded that this decision
"removed considerable confusion over the extent of tribal property interests relative to the
interests of the United States." Id.
261. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. at 114.
262. Id. at 113.
263. Id. at 114.
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extensive well-grassed bench lands, and fertile river valleys that were readily
irrigable.2" The lower court ruled that the settling of the Northern Arapaho Tribe
on the Shoshone's Wind River Reservation had amounted to a Fifth Amendment
taking of one-half of that reservation as of March 19, 1878.265
The lands so taken amounted to 1,171,770 acres, for which the trial court
awarded the tribes $1.35 an acre or $1,581,889.50.266 But the United States
disputed the trial court's inclusion of certain additional elements of value in its
calculation of the just compensation owing to the Shoshone Tribe. It argued that
the Indians' right of the use and occupancy of the taken lands should be valued
"net the value of the timber or mineral assets. 267
The Shoshone Court responded to this contention with a resounding
affirmation of Chief Justice Marshall's bold and sweeping principle that the
Indians' right of occupancy is "as sacred and as securely safeguarded as is fee
simple absolute title. '268 It held that the federal government's appropriation of that
tribal interest rendered the government liable for the payment of just
compensation.269 The Court limited its 1903 Lone Wolf decision as holding only
that Congress had the power to "prescribe title by which individual Indians may
hold [allotments and] to pass laws regulating alienation and descent. ' 270 In
affirming the lower court's just compensation award, the Court observed that this
federal guardianship power over Indian lands "detracts nothing from the tribe's
ownership."27'
B. Judicial Indecision Regarding the Compensability of Aboriginal Indian Title:
The Two Decisions in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks
The Shoshone Tribe decision gave new life to those sovereign agreements
that guaranteed the Indians' use and occupancy rights in their lands. But that
decision seemed to cut deeper by recognizing the sanctity of the Indian peoples'
aboriginal use and occupancy rights. 2 Some thought that the Shoshone Tribe
decision had substantially limited, if not overruled, the Lone Wolf doctrine.
Because the Court had resoundingly reaffirmed the Indians' right of "use and
occupancy," it seemed poised to extend just compensation protection to the
aboriginal right of "use and occupancy. ' 273 But this hope would soon be dashed by
subsequent judicial decision.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 112.
266. Id. at 114-15.
267. Id. at 115.
268. Id. at 117.
269. Id. at 118. The Lone Wolf doctrine allows Congress to "prescribe title by
which individual Indians may hold tracts.. .within the reservation [, but this power] detracts
nothing from the tribe's ownership." Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See id.
273. Id. at 115, 118. The jurisdictional act allowing the Indian tribe to bring suit
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Commentators have various explanations for the Supreme Court's refusal
to extend just compensation protection to aboriginal lands. 1 4 Some suggest the
Court concluded that it be would be financially imprudent to constitutionalize all
Indian land titles. That step potentially would have required the United States to
pay billions of dollars in just compensation to satisfy those Indian takings claims.275
Some suggest that the Court conceived of the federal plenary power doctrine as a
logical complement to the federal trust authority over Indian lands.276
The Supreme Court, whether motivated by timidity or prudence, struggled
in the 1940s and 1950s to develop a workable concept of Indian title that would
reconcile Congress' plenary power over Indian lands with the just compensation
command of the Fifth Amendment.277 But the Court failed in its effort to synthesize
a modem Indian takings doctrine. Instead, the Court recategorized Indian title into
two classes: a judicially protected class of Indian title based on federal recognition
and an unprotected class of Indian title based on aboriginal "use and occupancy." 27
The Court had earlier refused to differentiate types of Indian title in
Tilamooks L279 Its plurality decision seemingly abolished any constitutional
against the United States created no new cause of action. Therefore, whatever legal or
equitably compensable rights the Indians had unavoidably derived from their aboriginal use
and occupancy of those taken lands. Kelly, supra note 115, at 668.
274. The Court's analogy of aboriginal title to treaty title strongly suggested a
Fifth Amendment basis for recovery in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S.
40 (1946) [hereinafter Tillamooks 1]. But soon after, in Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337
U.S. 86 (1949), the Court began to retreat from that position. Justice Reed suggested in
Hynes that the Indian right of occupancy is not compensable without a special statutory
direction to make payment for such a taking. Id. at 105-06 & n.28.
275. The "specter of huge, fiscally ruinous interest recoveries in Indian title
litigation-recoveries far in excess of the fair market value of the appropriated lands-may
have dissuaded [the Court in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48
(1951) [hereinafter Tillamooks 11]] from constitutionalizing its prior decision." Kelly, supra
note 115, at 669-70
Given that the Court has chosen to "characterize the Indian land issue as primarily a
matter for congressional determination, the future of the Indian title concept remains as
vulnerable to political pressure as it had been in the past." Id. at 686.
276. Newton, supra note 34, at 254-55.
277. Historian Wilcomb E. Washburn traces the Court's struggle in the 1940s and
1950s to reconcile Indian taking claims with the just compensation command. He
characterizes the "fundamental constitutional issue" as whether the federal taking of
aboriginal lands required that just compensation be paid to the affected Indians. Washburn
concludes that the Court was clearly troubled by the federal government's assertion that it
could take aboriginal lands without any liability to pay compensation. WASHBURN, supra
note 17, at 110-15.
278. Id. at 255.
279. 329 U.S. 40. Historian Wilcomb E. Washburn notes that the "fundamental
constitutional issue" of the compensability of taken Indian title was not confronted until the
Tillamooks I & II decisions. WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 110-11. This Indian band had
been statutorily authorized to sue the United States in 1935 for "any and all legal and
equitable claims arising under or growing out of the original Indian title, claim, or rights in,
to, or upon the whole or any part of the lands and their appurtenances occupied by the
Indian tribes or bands." Id. at I11.
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distinction between aboriginally based Indian title and federally recognized Indian
title.28 That decision seemingly protected aboriginal use and occupancy rights
from taking by the federal government.21 Justice Vinson concluded in Tillamooks I
that the Indians had more than a mere moral claim for just compensation. 2 2 Some
lower federal courts thought that the Court's decision in Tillamooks I extended
Shoshone's just compensation protections to the Indian peoples' purely aboriginal
use and occupancy rights. 83
But this assumption was rudely dispelled by the Court's decision nine
years later in Tee-Hit-Ton.2" That decision sharply differentiated between those
Indian takings claims based on mere aboriginal use and occupancy and those based
on federally recognized Indian land titles.285 Two intervening factors may help
explain this decision. First, in 1946, Congress created the ICC,286 which was
authorized to hear a wide variety of Indians' claims against the federal government
consistent with a broad jurisdictional grant that was set forth in its organic act.287
Second, the Department of Justice and the General Accounting Office advised the
Court of the potential liability involved if the United States were required to pay
interest from the time of taking on all pending Indian takings claims.288 This advice
arguably influenced the Court's decision in Tillamooks 1I.2 9 There, the Court noted
Given that the usual federal practice was "not to coerce the surrender of [Indian] lands
without consent and without compensation." Id. at 112. This federal practice led the Court
to conclude that more than "sovereign grace prompted the obvious regard given to Indian
title." Id. Washburn concludes that the Court expressly rejected the federal government's
proffered distinction between "recognized" and "unrecognized" Indian title as the basis "to
rule out" the Tillamooks' compensation claim. Id.
280. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 50-54.
281. WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 110-15.
282. 329 U.S. at 49-50.
283. The three dissenters in Tillamooks I, led by Justice Reed, seemed to think so
as well. Despite their agreement with the majority regarding the necessity of judicial limits
on Congress' plenary power over Indian lands, the dissent did not think that meant "Indian
lands unrecognized by specific actions of Congress were protected by the Fifth
Amendment." WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 112.
284. Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
285. The Tee-Hit-Ton Indians were a small band of Tlingit Indians who resided in
Alaska and claimed compensation for the federal cutting of timber from lands that they
claimed they held by original Indian title. WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 113.
286. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049
(1946) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3).
287. Interior Secretary Ickes and Associate Solicitor Felix S. Cohen urged the
congressional committee to amend the pending ICC legislation so as to allow for the
"broadest possible jurisdiction to hear all manner of [Indian] claims, guarantee finality,
establish an investigation division and allow review by the Court of Claims and the
Supreme Court." ROSENTHAL, supra note 47, at 84-85.
288. Separation of powers concerns arguably explain Justice Reed's opinion in
Tillamooks I. His citation to a Department of Justice's estimate that the interest component
alone on pending Indian taking claims amounted to some nine billion dollars recognizes
that it is Congress, not the judiciary, that controls the nation's expenditures. Kelly, supra
note 115, at 670.
289. In Tillamooks II, 341 U.S. 48 (1951), the Court held that an award of interest
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that the principal value of the taken Indian lands was some three million dollars,
but the interest component of the award amounted to fourteen million dollars.2'
The Department of Justice, in the interim, advised the Court that the estimated total
liability of the federal government, in terms of accumulated interest owing from the
time of taking of the Indian lands, exceeded nine billion dollars!291
Tee-Hit-Ton involved a takings claim by a small Indian band regarding
the federal sale of all the merchantable timber within a 350,000-acre area of the
Tongass National Forest in Alaska.29 2 The Tee-Hit-Tons claimed title based on
their aboriginal use and occupancy of this area.293 They'sued for just compensation
for value of the taken timber based on either their demonstrated aboriginal use and
occupancy of those lands or by virtue of the federal government's recognition of
their title to the lands in question.294
The Tee-Hit-Tons contended that, unlike the nomadic Indian peoples of
the lower forty-eight states, their band had a well-developed social order that
included a clear conception of property rights and ownership.295 But the Court
found that the Tee-Hit-Tons' conception of property ownership was based on
shared communal use and ownership.296 The band did not, Justice Reed opined,
recognize or enforce individual rights of ownership in distinct parcels of land.2"
He quoted the only expert witness that was offered at trial by the Indian band. That
witness testified:
Any member of the tribe may use any portion of the land that he
wishes, and as long as he uses it that is his for his own enjoyment,
and is not to be trespassed upon by anybody else, but the minute he
stops using it then any other member of the tribe can come and use
the area.
298
This testimony convinced him, as it had the trial judge, that the Tee-Hit-Tons had
only evolved to "a hunting and fishing stage of civilization."2'
against the federal government requires a specific statutory direction to do so. Because the
1935 jurisdictional act that authorized this band to sue did not contain such direction, the
Court of Claims award of 14 million dollars in interest was in error. WASHBURN, supra note
17, at 113.
290. Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 283 n.17
(1955).
291. Id.
292. IM. at 273.
293. Id. at 293.
294. Id. at 277.
295. Historian Washburn cites Justice Reed's "pejorative references" to the Indian
band's "savage status" and "nomadic pattern of land use" as a basis for Justice Reed's
conclusion that Indian title can be extinguished by Congress without compensation.
WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 114.
296. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 287-88.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 286.
299. Id. at 287.
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Given its status as a nomadic tribe with nomadic concepts of property
rights, Justice Reed concluded that the band possessed mere "claims of right to use
identified territory," which were indistinguishable from those enjoyed by the
similarly nomadic Indian tribes of the lower forty-eight states. 30 Further, because
the Tee-Hit-Tons' notion of property was indistinguishable from those held by
Indians of the lower United States, the band's claim was governed by the Johnson
rule that "discovery gave an exclusive right [to the federal government] to
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest. '301
Justice Reed also distinguished the Court's holding in Tillamooks L That
decision, which had awarded just compensation for a taking of clearly aboriginal
Indian title, resulted from a specific statutory direction to pay that level of
compensation to the wronged tribe.3" Justice Reed chastised the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals for its wrong-headed reading of the Tillamooks decision
regarding the compensability of aboriginal Indian title.03 In United States v.
Miller, the Ninth Circuit held that a federal taking of the Indians' right of
aboriginal "use and occupancy" entitled them to an award of just compensation
under the Tillamooks rationale.3" Justice Reed sought to resolve this issue with a
knockdown holding: Indian occupation of land without governmental recognition
of ownership creates no right against taking or extinction by the United States
protected by the Fifth Amendment or any other principle of law.
305
Justice Reed also expressed his moral disquiet regarding an arguably
outsized award of just compensation to a small, possibly dying band of Indians. 306
Imposing such a financial requirement on the federal government did not seem,
given the circumstances of the Tee-Hit-Ton Band, to make moral or equitable
sense to Justice Reed. His language suggests reluctance to award a windfall that
would be enjoyed by the few remaining members of a now significantly diminished
band of Indians. He pointedly emphasized that the Tee-Hit-Ton Band was
comprised of some sixty-five members with only a "few women of child bearing
age." His factual citation illustrated his view of the contemporary Tee-Hit-Tons as
a remnant band of Indians."
C. Justice Reed's Revision of Johnson v. M'Intosh: Rationalizing the Bright-
line Distinction Between Recognized and Unrecognized Indian Title
The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton seemingly sought to coordinate its judicial
function with Congress' 1946 creation of the ICC. The ICC had been directed by
Congress to evaluate those Indian claims that arose out of, among other things, the
300. Id. at 287-88.
301. Id. at 280.
302. Id. at 282-83.
303. Id.
304. 159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947).
305. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 284-85.
306. Id. at 285-86.
307. Id. at 286.
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federal government's takings of aboriginal Indian title."' The prudential response
to the ICC's creation required the Court's revitalization of the political question
doctrine."° The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton clearly wanted to close the courthouse doors
to aboriginally based Indian taking claims. The Court's revitalized political
question doctrine formed the "bright line" boundary that marked off takings claims
based on federally recognized title from those based on aboriginal use and
occupancy. Indian takings claims based on aboriginal use and occupancy rights
were relegated to Congress for relief.1
Indians were entitled to just compensation for a taking of their lands only
if they could meet two conditions. First, they had to show that Congress had taken
deliberate action to recognize their permanent use and occupancy rights. Absent
evidence of such recognition-usually embodied in an authoritative treaty, statute,
or a demonstrated congressional course of conduct-they were deemed to hold
only unrecognized and noncompensable Indian title. 1' Second, they had to show
that Congress had not acted in its Lone Wolf garb as Indian guardian when it took
their lands." 2 Congress, as the Indian guardian, had the power to make a good faith
transmutation of those lands into equivalent financial assets. If Congress made a
prima facie showing on this issue, then it was immune from any just compensation
claim regardless of the economic injuries that may have been inflicted on the
affected Indians.
D. Judicial Deference to Congressional Grace in Compensating Indian Peoples:
Clearing Indian Title Through the Indian Claims Commission
Justice Reed's opinion in Tee-Hit-Ton must be read against the
background of the 1946 creation of the ICC.313 The ICC's purpose was to achieve a
pragmatic and definitive settlement of longstanding Indian claims against the
federal government. 4 It was Congress' exclusive prerogative, according to Justice
Reed, to compensate Indians for the taking of their aboriginal use and occupancy
rights. 5
The ICC grew out of the perceived need for a general mechanism for the
adjudication of longstanding Indian claims against the United States. Non-Indian
groups had long pressured Congress to either repudiate or settle outstanding
aboriginal Indian land claims. They sought the enactment of a title-clearing
mechanism that would remove the troubling cloud of original Indian title from their
308. Kelly, supra note 115, at 675-76.
309. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
310. Kelly, supra note 115, at 667-71.
311. Id. at 672-73.
312. Id. at 672-74.
313. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049
(1946) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3).
314. The ICC was established with the "explicit purpose of disposing of all pre-
existing Indian claims against the government." Sandra C. Danforth, Repaying the
Historical Debt: The Indian Claims Commission, 49 N.D. L. REV. 359, 360 (1972).
315. Kelly, supra note 115, at 670-71.
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lands.3 16 Those present-day occupiers of former Indian lands justifiably worried
that Indians would seek the judicial enforcement of their aboriginal Indian titles
through common law ejectment or trespass actions. They sought congressional
protection that would extinguish those Indian claims." 7
By contrast, the friends of the Indians pointed to their well-known
heroism during World War II and earlier as warrant for congressional action that
would fairly settle the many outstanding Indian claims.3"8 These ideas converged as
the ICC. This administrative tribunal would maximize several values. It would
ensure congressional oversight of proposed ICC compensation awards to prevailing
Indian tribes or bands, and would provide an efficient and flexible vehicle for the
liquidation of Indian claims against the United States.319
The ICC's expected efficiency and flexibility was a relative concept.
Historically, Indian claims could be heard only if Congress enacted a jurisdictional
grant that authorized a particular tribe or band to bring suit against the United
States.32 This Indian claims process was both time consuming and cumbersome. It
functioned much like a lottery in that chances for recovery were arbitrarily
allocated by widely varying jurisdictional grants of authority to the Court of
Claims.
321
Congress sought to standardize the jurisdictional guidelines under which
the ICC would hear and determine authorized Indian claims.3' However, critics of
the ICC fault the process as not achieving either flexibility or efficiency in its
administrative implementation of its jurisdictional authority.32 3 The ICC's failure
stems from many factors. First, only Indian tribes, not individual Indians, were
authorized to prosecute any claims within the purview of the ICC's jurisdictional
grant.324 Second, the ICC could only adjudicate those Indian claims that arose on or
316. One purpose of the commission was to "wipe the slate clean" of Indian
claims "that weighed upon the white conscience." ROSENTHAL, supra note 47, at 49.
317. GErCHEs ET AL., supra note 10, at 311-18.
318. Congress' desire to right moral wrongs to Indians focused on two issues:
first, the ICC mechanism would eliminate the historic discrimination that Indians had faced
in being barred from bringing takings and other claims against the United States; and
second, the ICC mechanism would allow resolution of all outstanding Indian claims, not
only those with a basis in law or equity. Danforth, supra note 314, at 366-67.
319. The Indian claims processing policy contemplated that the ICC's jurisdiction
would extend to recommendeding claims awards to Congress, but Congress would be the
"focal point" in that it could "finally dispose of claims, by rejecting them or granting
awards, or it could stipulate that a court hearing was necessary to resolve all relevant
issues." Id. at 372.
320. Id. at 362-63.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Danforth concludes the ICC became "more concerned with accomplishing its
task than ensuring that all just claims receive a hearing and appropriate compensation." Id.
at 402.
324. Only groups of Indians, not individuals, were authorized by the ICC statute
to file claims with that commission. Id. at 388.
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before August 13, 1946.3' 5 Third, although the federal government agreed to waive
its defenses that it may otherwise have asserted to bar those Indian claims, it
exacted concessions from the Indian claimants as well.326 Indian claimants were not
entitled to receive interest from the time of taking regardless of whether their
claims arose in 1846 or 1946.327 Furthermore, the taken Indian property was to be
appraised as of the time of taking, not at its contemporary highest and best use
value.328
Fourth, thQ ICC failed to fully utilize its jurisdictional grant so as to
achieve the full 'remedial intent of the statute. 329 Few innovative or novel Indian
takings claims were heard by the ICC, despite its broad grant of authority to do
so. 330 By a crabbed interpretation of its authority, the ICC heard only a limited
claims docket of standard Indian claims. By its narrow construction of its authority,
the ICC arguably eviscerated the "fair and honorable dealings" provision of the
ICC Act.33' The ICC's practice was to disallow Indian damages claims that were
based on novel legal theories.332 For example, it refused to hear those Indian claims
that alleged real, but intangible, injuries such as the destruction of aboriginal
hunting or fishing reserves; or the purposeful destruction of tribal governmental
structures; or the imprisonment of tribal members in remote detention sites. 333 The
actual cases decided by the ICC fell into a narrow bandwidth of its potential
jurisdiction. A cursory assessment of the ICC's docket reveals standard Indian land
claims and claims that were based on the federal government's failure to perform
specific treaty obligations or to pay specified amounts of annuities.
334
325. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, § 24, 60 Stat.
1049, 1056 (1946)) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3).
326. Danforth, supra note 314, at 388.
327. The ICC adopted the general rule that, in the absence of a specific statutory
direction to pay interest or unless the taking occurred in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
no interest was to be paid to the prevailing Indian parties. Id. at 397.
328. Valuations of Indian lands were to be made at the time of taking with no
consideration of the element of future profits that could have been made by the Indians from
their exploitation of their agricultural, mineral, or timber resources. Id.
329. Danforth cites the ICC's view that it "had no role in claims filing" and the
lawyers' conservative claims strategy that led them to avoid the "risks of using new causes
of action...for which there were now precedents to indicate how assessments might be made
and thus how large recoveries would be." Id. at 391.
330. Id. at 389-90.
331. Section 2, clause 5, of the ICC Act authorizes the commission to "hear and
determine...claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any
existing rule of law or equity." Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-
726, § 2, 60 Stat. 1049, 1050 (1946)) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3).
Danforth believes that the "most important reason.. .was related to the nature of
compensation to be awarded and to the novel character of parts of Section 2." Danforth,
supra note 314, at 390. She concludes that lawyers that represented the Indian claimants on
a contingent fee basis were, by nature, wary of novel claims that may not result in large
monetary awards. See id. at 391.
332. See Danforth, supra note 314, at 391.
333. See id.
334. See id. at 389.
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Fifth, the ICC limited its remedies to damage awards, while some
prevailing Indian claimants clearly desired the replacement or restoration of their
taken lands. 35 Certain intangible values-the lands' roles as sacred cultural or
religious sites--could not be addressed via a damages award. Furthermore, the
futility and failure of small per capita distributions of Indian claims awards as
meaningful remedies is well documented.3 ' Those per capita distributions were
patently insufficient to allow injured Indians to replace, at contemporary market
prices, their taken lands or resources. History shows that these meager per capita
distributions were quickly expended to meet current subsistence needs. Only a
small amount of the accumulated ICC claims monies were used to provide
meaningful substitutes for taken tribal resources so as to provide injured Indians
with replacement subsistence values or incomes.337
Eight-hundred million dollars in ICC awards was hailed by Felix S. Cohen
as having finally and fairly "closed the books" on the federal government's duty to
fairly compensate its Indian wards. 38 But this idea of retrospective justice, Cohen
would likely agree, is elusive given the historic harms done to the Indian peoples.
Cohen's conclusion was not intended to address the contemporary need for an
Indian takings doctrine that will protect today's vestigial Indian Country from
similar depredations.339 Today's Indian peoples seek practical approaches, not
retrospective remedies, to preserve their lands. This desire must translate into
practical means for enforcing sovereign bargains that guarantee their use and
occupancy of their lands.' °
The Tee-Hit-Ton decision represents the extreme parameter of judicial
thinking on this issue." l It suggests that Indian lands remain in a judicially declared
335. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 47, at 250.
336. See id.
337. Rosenthal characterizes the ICC as a "legal-bureaucratically oriented
structure more concerned with accomplishing its' task than insuring that all just claims
receive a hearing and appropriate compensation." Id. at 245 (citation omitted).
Rosenthal cites legal scholar Morton E. Price's conclusion as evidence of the ICC's
overall failure to treat the Indians justly:
If there had been full compensation, the Indians would have gathered
enormous wealth, either in land or money. Economic development-in
the sense of providing immediate financial security-would have been
assured.... On the other hand, it was preposterous to recognize fully
such extraordinary claims of a handful of poor people, even to the extent
that they were based on legitimate entitlement.
Id. at 245-46.
338. See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34-43
(1947).
339. See id.
340. See iL
341. Newton points out that the decision "greatly narrowed the protection of the
fifth amendment for Indian land." Newton, supra note 34, at 255. The Court narrowed the
definition of Fifth Amendment protected property so as to exclude aboriginal Indian land
titles established by use and occupancy. See id.
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"state of nature" wherein federal plenary power can trump the Indian peoples'
rights 42
V. RECONSTRUCTING MARSHALL'S INDIAN BARGAINING MODEL:
A SKETCH OF A MODERN INDIAN TAKINGS DOCTRINE
Analyzing the 1949 congressional taking of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation aids in reconstructing Marshall's Indian bargaining model. The Fort
Berthold Indians ostensibly bargained with the federal government for a fair
agreement for the taking of their lands.343 But the forty-three-year-long struggle by
those Indians to obtain just compensation exemplifies the power disparity that
allows Indian congressional committees to ignore basic principles of just
compensation doctrine and practice. The formulation of modem Indian takings
doctrine encompasses three basic issues. First, should the plenary power doctrine
immunize Congress from an Indian taking claim regardless of the economic and
governmental injuries imposed on the affected Indian people? Second, should
congressional guardianship power over its Indian wards limit judicial scrutiny of
federal takings of Indian lands? Third, should subjective legislative valuation of
Indian lands be deemed just compensation when it is plainly at odds with the
"make whole" command of the Just Compensation Clause?3
A. The Fort Berthold Indians' Challenge to the 1949 Congressional Taking of
Their Reservation
Congress decided in 1949 to take 156,035 acres of the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation as the site for a federal dam and reservoir.345 The Army Corps
of Engineers determined in 1946 that it needed those lands as the preferred
engineering site for the Garrison Dam and Reservoir. 3 6 This dam was to be the
342. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 39-49.
343. Meyer quotes anthropologist Ruth Hill Useem regarding the dominant
assumptions that govern the federal government's relations with the Indian peoples:
(1) That over the years, the Indian can expect no consistency in policies
regarding him; (2) .That the interests of the dominant society will take
precedence over the interests of Indians in any policy decision; (3) That
the Indian can do little to affect decisions concerning Indians; (4) That
whatever the policy enacted, the Indian will be told that such policy "is
in his best interests" or is "for his own good"; and (5) That the stated
goals of a policy may be and usually are quite different from the
consequences, with the goals being more favorable to the Indians than
the consequences.
Meyer, supra note 45, at 349.
Meyer concludes that the Fort Berthold Indians likely shared in these beliefs given
their "disillusioning experiences" that "characterized the period of negotiations over the
Garrison project." Id.
344. See Newton, supra note 34, at 259-60.
345. Fort Berthold Taking Act, ch. 790, Pub. L. No. 81-437, 63 Stat. 1026
(1949).
346. Colonel Lewis A. Pick, head of the Missouri River Division of the Army
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main structural component of the large Pick-Sloan Program for the harnessing of
the Missouri River for basinwide economic and social development purposes.
347
The Flood Control Act of 1944 had earlier authorized a plan that directed the
Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers to harness the Missouri
River for the multipurpose water resources development: hydroelectric power
production, navigation improvement, irrigation development, flood control, and
public recreation. 48
The Fort Berthold Indians had been required to bear a substantial and
disproportionate share of the needed public investment for the Pick-Sloan
Program. 9 The Garrison Diversion Unit Commission ("GDUC"), an eleven
member congressionally appointed body, made this finding based on its review of
the legislative record of the 1949 taking act.350 It was convinced that the Fort
Berthold people had suffered devastating economic, cultural, and social losses due
to the federal taking of their most productive agricultural lands.35' It also found that
Congress may have failed to make the Fort Berthold Indians whole for losses
arising from the 1949 taking.352 It therefore directed the Indians' trustee-the
Secretary of the Interior-to hold administrative hearings on the Indians' just
compensation and related claims.
353
Corps of Engineers, was determined to go ahead with the Garrison Dam even though that
site had reportedly been considered and rejected earlier by the Corps' engineers as
impracticable. See Meyer, supra note 45, at 239.
347. See id.
348. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat 887, 897. The states
in the lower and upper Missouri River Basin differed as to why the Missouri River should
be controlled by a series of federal dams and reservoirs. The upstream states (North and
South Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming) were interested primarily in developing the
irrigation potential of the river. The downstream states (Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas, and
Missouri) were more interested in flood control. Meyer, supra note 45, at 239.
349. This was the finding of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission ("GDUC"),
an 11 member congressional commission that had been created in 1984 to assess the
impacts of the Garrison Project on the peoples of North Dakota. Recommendations of the
Garrison Diversion Unit Commission and H.R. 1116, A Bill to Implement Certain
Recommendations of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission Pursuant to Public Law 98-
360, Hearings on H.R. 1116 Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power Resources of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong. 114 (1985) [hereinafter GDUC
Recommendations].
350. The GDUC was charged by section 207(c)(2)(A) of its authorizing statute to
assess the "costs and benefits incurred and opportunities foregone" by affected stakeholder
groups due to the construction of the Garrison Dam. Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-360, § 207(c)(2)(A), 98 Stat. 403, 412 (1984). The
commission concluded that the "Fort Berthold Indian Reservation bore an inordinate share
of the cost of implementing Pick-Sloan Missouri River Basin Program mainstem
reservoirs." GDUC Recommendations, supra note 349, at 114.
351. GDUC Recommendations, supra note 349, at 114.
352. Id.
353. It recommended that the Interior Secretary establish a five-member
commission to assess and report on the steps necessary to "complete the indemnification of
Indian communities of North Dakota that were disrupted by construction of Pick-Sloan
478 [40:425
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Interior Secretary Donald Hodel was directed by the GDUC report to
establish a secretarial commission that would examine the Fort Berthold Indians'
claims that arose from the 1949 Garrison taking.354 He was also directed to
recommend appropriate implementing legislation if his commission concluded that
the federal government had failed justly to compensate the Fort Berthold Indians.31
He established the Joint Tribal Advisory Committee ("JTAC") by secretarial
charter in 1985 to hear and evaluate the Fort Berthold Indians' claims arising from
the 1949 taking.356 That commission construed its charter so as to allow the Fort
Berthold Indians to present relevant lay and expert testimony regarding their just
compensation claim.357 The Indians urged the JTAC to review the entire
circumstances surrounding the federal taking of their lands.358 Such a
Missouri Basin Program dams and reservoirs." Id. at 74.
The GDUC recommended that the Interior Secretary appoint the five-member
commission no later than January 31, 1985, that would address the following issues on the
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation:
-Full potential for irrigation
-Financial assistance for on-farm development costs
-Replacement of infrastructures lost by the creation of Garrison Dam
-Preferential rights to Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin power
-Development of shoreline recreation potential
-Return of excess lands
-Additional financial compensation
-Protection of reserved water rights
-Other items the five-member Commission may deem appropriate
-Funding of all items from Garrison Diversion Unit funds, if
authorized.
Id. at 187.
354. See id. at 74, 187.
355. The GDUC cited section 207(c)(2)(H) of Pub. L. No. 98-360, 98 Stat. 412,
the institutional equity section of that statute, as the legal basis for directing the Secretary to
establish the Joint Tribal Advisory Committee ("JTAC") and to "recommend corrective
measures, if warranted." GDUC Recommendations, supra note 349, at 188.
356. Secretary Donald Hodel created the JTAC on May 10, 1985, and that
committee submitted its final report to the Secretary on May 23, 1986. See S. REP. No.
102-250 (1992).
357. The JTAC report documented the devastating effects of the Garrison and
Oahe Dams, which caused the removal of tribal peoples and communities and flooded
"prime tracts of the Missouri River bottomiands." Id. at 3.
It also recommended a range of just compensation for the respective injured Indian
tribes-between $181.2 million and $349.9 million for Standing Rock and $178.4 million
and $411.8 million for Fort Berthold. This just compensation recommendation was
"intended to substitute for or replace the [tribal] economic base that was taken as the site for
Lake Sakakawea and Lake Oahe." Id.
358. Chairman Edward Lone Fight testified in oversight hearings regarding the
JTAC Report that the lengthy negotiations from 1946 to 1949 between the Fort Berthold
Indians and the federal government demonstrated the Three Affiliated Tribes' entitlement to
just compensation in the amounts recommended by JTAC. Final Report and
Recommendations of the Garrison Unit Joint Tribal Advisory Committee, Hearings Before
the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, Senate Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources,
and House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 100th Cong. 30-41 (1987).
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comprehensive review was essential for a reliable inquiry into the fairness of the
1949 federal taking of the affected Indian lands." 9
Whether the federal government had made a good faith effort to justly
compensate the Fort Berthold Indians was the most significant issue confronted by
the JTAC. That issue focused the JTAC's attention on the administrative and
legislative record that justified the 1949 Indian taking.3 60
Testimony by natural resource economists and related experts aided the
JTAC in its examination of the Indians' claims.3"' They provided the JTAC with a
valuation theory of Indian lands that fulfilled the "make whole" standard of the Just
Compensation Clause. 62 Other expert testimony provided the JTAC with historical
and sociological evidence of the 1949 taking's devastating effects on the tribal
farming and ranching economy.
63
359. The Senate report on the JTAC recommendations recites that:
The Pick-Sloan Plan was presented to the tribes as a fait accompli. The
Corps of Engineers was so confident that it could acquire the Indian land
it needed through the Federal power of eminent domain that it began to
construct the dams on the reservations even before opening formal
negotiations with tribal leaders. Consequently the tribes realized that
resistance was futile. Gradually they resigned themselves to making the
most of whatever compensation might be offered.
S. REP. No. 102-250, at 2.
Chairman Murry of the JTAC testified before the Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs that the federal government had in 1946 and 1947 given "specific and implicit
promises of just compensation to the Fort Berthold Indians but that "in many instances
[these promises] were never fulfilled and in other instances only partially fulfilled." Three
Affiliated Tribes and Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Equitable Compensation Act of 1991,
Hearings on S. 168 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102d Cong. 15-19
(199 1) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 168].
360. Chairman Murry's testimony refers to the 1946 congressionally authorized
Missouri River Basin Investigations ("MRBI") as concluding that the Fort Berthold Indians
were "for all practical purposes, self sufficient." His testimony emphasizes that "Congress
recognized that the bottomlands of these reservations represented the sole remaining
economic base for the tribes' welfare and their social existence." Hearings on S. 168, supra
note 359, at 16.
361. See Ronald G. Cummings, Valuing the Resource Base Lost by the Three
Affiliated Tribes as a Result of Lands Taken from Them for the Garrison Project (1986)
(unpublished report prepared for the JTAC, on file with author).
Dr. Cummings valued these lost tribal lands by estimating the "flow of the land-base
earnings or income that was attributable to that resource." Hearings on S. 168, supra note
359, at 17. Dr. Cummings then "capitalized [the expected income flows] at 3.5 percent,
which was then the Congressionally mandated rate in 1950, and then he raised this
[amount] to 1986 dollars at the time we were filing the report this totaled $178.4 million for
the Fort Berthold Reservation." Id.
362. The JTAC retained Dr. Ronald G. Cummings, a leading natural resources
economist, to prepare a valuation report that would assess the nature and amount of
"damages to [tribal] infrastructure" that was caused by the construction of the Garrison Dam
and Reservoir on the Fort Berthold Reservation. See Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at
17.
363. Chairman Murry testified that enactment of S. 168 "would move toward just
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The Fort Berthold Indians' misfortune was to be in the way of the federal
government's proposed development of the water resources potential of the Upper
Missouri River Basin. Congress' conflicting roles as Indian guardian and as the
resource developer of last resort on behalf of its non-Indian constituencies in the
Upper Missouri River Basin fundamentally compromised its institutional ability to
justly compensate the Fort Berthold Indians. Congress ultimately chose to sacrifice
the Indians' economic and cultural interests to achieve its latter goal.36"
But the Fort Berthold Indians' claim for just compensation was
strenuously opposed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"). 365 Indeed, Secretary
Hodel eliminated the just compensation issue from the JTAC's charter despite the
GDUC's explicit direction to the contrary. However, the JTAC construed the
"other issues" portion of its charter so as to allow it to hear the Indians' claim.3 66
The BIA argued that the taking act barred this claim.3 67 But the GDUC's express
directive and its own secretarial charter persuaded the commission to hear the Fort
Berthold Indians' just compensation claim.368
compensation" for the Fort Berthold Indians as a means of helping that tribe re-establish a
viable economic base "that was destroyed by the construction of the two dams and the
resulting impoundments." ML at 18.
364. Michael L. Lawson asserts that:
Without prior warning the Corps of Engineers entered Fort Berthold
Reservation to begin construction of the dam in April 1946. The first of
the army's Pick-Sloan projects on the main stem of the Missouri River
was Garrison Dam, which became America's fifth largest dam at a cost
of over $299 million. The 212-foot-high structure provided a storage
capacity of 24.2 million acre-feet and a generating capacity of 400,000
kilowatts. Its long reservoir, Lake Sakakawea, was named for the famous
Shoshone woman who helped guide Lewis and Clark on their expedition
up the Missouri in 1804.
MICHAEL L. LAWSON, DAMMED INDIANS: THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN AND THE MISSOURI RIVER
Sioux, 1944-1980, at 59 (1982).
365. The Senate report recounts that the Bureau of Indian Affairs' testimony was
"strongly opposed to S. 168 [because] the United States is under no continuing legal
liability to provide any additional compensation to either tribe." See S. REP. No. 102-250,
at 7 (1992).
The BIA's hearings representative contended that the Fort Berthold Indians had
"already been compensated by the Federal Government for the taking of their land," and the
United States has "no legal liability to provide additional compensation." Hearings on S.
168, supra note 359, at 53 (statement of Patrick Hayes, Deputy Assistant Director of Trust
Services).
366. The GDUC's finding that "tribes of the Standing Rock and Fort Berthold
Indian reservations bore an inordinate share of the cost of implementing Pick-Sloan
Missouri Basin Program mainstem reservoirs" and its direction to the Secretary that he
"find ways to resolve inequities borne by the tribes" were interpreted by the JTAC as a
warrant for hearing the Indians' just compensation claims. S. REP. No. 102-250, at 3.
367. The BIA viewed the Fort Berthold Taking Act, Pub. L. No. 81-437, 63 Stat.
1026 (1949), as a full and complete settlement of all Indian claims that may have arisen
from that taking. See Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 29.
368. See Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 30-31.
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B. The Background of the 1886 Sovereign Bargain that Established the Fort
Berthold Indian Reservation
The Three Affiliated Tribes-the Arikara, Hidatsa, and Mandan
peoples-had resided from time immemorial within the riparian lands and valleys
of the Missouri River and its tributaries.169 The Missouri River, called the "Big
Muddy" by unappreciative non-Indian settlers, once flowed freely through lands
then carpeted with mixed grass prairie. Its basin had been home to vast herds of
buffalo and prong horn antelope. It also served as home to the Arikara, Hidatsa,
and Mandan peoples, whose material and spiritual cultures were inextricably linked
to both these lands and herds.370
The Mandans were especially dependent on the Missouri River for their
subsistence. They were farmers who cultivated the alluvial soils near the rivers
where the water table was high enough to support their crops without using
irrigation and where temperatures were more moderate than on the plains.37' But
they also hunted the wild game that frequented the river valleys. They used the
river valleys' abundant cottonwood and other trees for firewood and building
materials. They used the lush vegetation as pasturage for their thriving livestock
herds.372 The Mandans were later joined by two other Indian tribes, the Hidatsa and
Arikara. These three tribes banded together for common defense against the influx
of woodlands Sioux who had flooded into the Great Plains from the forest lands of
Minnesota in the early eighteenth century.373 In 1886, the Three Affiliated Tribes
369. Meyer, supra note 45, at 232-34.
370. The Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1851 confirmed the Fort Berthold Indians'
rights to a large aboriginal area of some 12.5 million acres. This area included the right
bank of the Missouri River from the mouth of the Heart River to the mouth of the
Yellowstone River. This description enclosed a vast land mass that extended in line from
the mouth of the Powder River in Wyoming to the headwaters of the Heart River. See id. at
223.
371. See id. at 233.
372. The Fort Berthold Indians, Meyer notes, made a "satisfactory adjustment" to
a "forbidding" country and climate during the "centuries they had lived in the Upper
Missouri Valley." Id. Meyer concludes that they had become "even more attached" to the
land by the 1940s. Id. The Indians made full use of the available natural resources of their
reservation: "the wild game, the fruits and berries, the timber that grew in the river bottoms
and along the tributary ravines, [and] the lignite coal found here and there in readily
accessible form." Id.
Gordon Macgregor, the chief author of the 1946 congressionally mandated MRBI
Reports, examined the impact of the Garrison Dam on the Fort Berthold Indians and
concluded that "[p]eople and land make a virtually unbroken social and geographical unit."
Meyer, supra note 45, at 233.
Meyer comments that this fact is "usually overlooked" by "those who believed that the
Indians could be adequately compensated for the loss of their land by a cash payment. By
far the greater part of their income was derived, directly or indirectly, from the land." Id.
(emphasis added).
373. Meyer describes the reduced state of the Fort Berthold Indians by the 1860s.
Their numbers had been decimated by small pox and other diseases. They were "penned up"
in their agency-established village and unable to defend themselves against the increasingly
aggressive Sioux. Meyer, supra at 225. Ironically, the hostile Sioux were able to obtain
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reluctantly agreed to occupy the present Fort Berthold Indian Reservation that was
established by agreement with the United States. 374
The Missouri River was a friend to the Fort Berthold Indians. But non-
Indian settlers and urban city dwellers viewed the river's frequent floods as a
menace to their lives and property. Several times during the early 1940s, the
Missouri River overflowed its banks and wreaked havoc on downstream cities,
including Omaha, Nebraska.37 Colonel Lewis Pick of the Army Corps of
Engineers had to ask civilian volunteers for help in manning the levees along the
river in 1943. On April 15 of that year, the river crested at twenty-two feet, some
twelve feet above its normal level.376
Congress, after the massive floods of 1943 subsided, directed Colonel
Pick to propose a comprehensive approach for the multipurpose control and
development of the Upper Missouri River Basin.3' But two rival water resource
development plans were offered for congressional consideration: the Bureau of
Reclamation's plan, sponsored by W. Glenn Sloan, and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers' plan, sponsored by Colonel Pick. At the behest of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's staff, these two plans were eventually merged in a "shotgun wedding"
and emerged from Congress in 1944 as the Pick-Sloan Program.378
The Pick-Sloan Program was hailed by its proponents as the answer to the
region's prayers for an end to the twin devastations caused by recurring summer
dust bowls and spring floods.379 The program called for a mammoth multipurpose
water development programs that entailed the construction of five major mainstem
dams along the Missouri River. The contemplated dams would include Gavins
Point near Yankton, South Dakota; Big Bend at Fort Thompson, South Dakota;
horses, firearms, and annuity goods from traders and government agents. Chief White
Shield of the Arikaras complained in 1870 that prior to becoming "agency Indians" they
had been able to defend themselves; now "when we listen to the whites we have to sit in our
villages, listen to [the Sioux's] insults, and have our young men killed and our horses
stolen, within sight of our lodges." Id.
374. By that 1886 agreement the Fort Berthold Indians ceded all their lands north
of the 48th parallel and west of a north-south line drawn six miles west of the most westerly
point of the Big Bend in the Missouri River. This agreement was not ratified until 1891. Id.
at 224.
375. Constance Hunt contends that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers'
channelization and diking of the Missouri River from 1912 to 1927 contributed to the flood
potential that later devastated downstream cities such as Omaha during the 1940s. See
CONSTANCE E. HUNT, DOWN BY THE RIvER: THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL WATER PROJECTS AND
POLICIES ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSrrv 116-17 (1988).
376. Disastrous floods in the early 1940s led the downstream Missouri River
states to demand a comprehensive congressional plan for flood control. See id. at 117.
377. As a result of the disastrous 1943 flooding of the Missouri River, Congress
directed the Army Corps of Engineers to draw up a flood control program for the Upper
Missouri River Basin. Colonel Pick responded with a brief ten-page plan that called for the
construction of levees along the river, dams on several tributaries, and several major dams
between Sioux City and Fort Peck. See Meyer, supra note 45, at 239.
378. HUNT, supra note 375, at 117.
379. See id.
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Oahe at Pierre, South Dakota; and Garrison at Riverdale, North Dakota.380 But the
Pick-Sloan Program was as much a product of interagency political competition as
it was of rational water resources planning.38' According to resource economist
David C. Campbell:
[T]he Pick-Sloan Program was a victory of politics and bureaucracy
over economics and nature. The Corps had lost a huge chunk of its
jurisdiction with the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
BuRec, which has converted much of California water resources
into an intricate plumbing network, was looking to expand eastward.
There was serious talk of creating a Missouri Valley Authority
[("MVA")] modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority, which
would have displaced both the Corps and BuRec. They, along with
the Federal Power Commission and the.Department of Agriculture,
resisted the proposed MVA.
382
Both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") and the Bureau of
Reclamation ("BuRec" or "Bureau") had substantial roles in the development of
the Pick-Sloan Program. The Corps was assigned the job of constructing the
multipurpose facilities on the Missouri River and flood control facilities on the
tributaries. The Bureau was assigned the job of building the program's irrigation
facilities on the Missouri River, as well as the multipurpose dams on the tributary
streams.
383
The Corps and the BuRec carefully planned the Pick-Sloan Program so
that its reservoirs would not inundate any non-Indian towns along the Missouri
River. But the Three Affiliated Tribes were not so fortunate. The Garrison Dam
was intended to serve as the "high dam-the major regulating structure-in the
Pick-Sloan Program. It was to be sited on the Fort Berthold Indians' last remaining
riparian lands. 3 4 These lands were remnant of the Indians' historic treaty lands of
some 12.5 million acres. By its 1886 agreement with the Fort Berthold Indians,
Congress had expressly guaranteed their exclusive use and occupancy of these
riparian lands.38 5
Congress commissioned in 1946 a comprehensive social and economic
assessment of the likely impacts on the Fort Berthold Indians of the siting of the
Garrison Dam and Reservoir on that reservation.38 6 These interdisciplinary
380. See id.
381. See id. at 117-118.
382. Id. at 118.
383. See id.
384. See JOHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE PoLITIcs OF
MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER 65 (1994).
385. Congressman Lemke from North Dakota made it clear that by taking the
affected Indian lands, Congress was "again violating a treaty solemnly entered into [in
1886] with these tribes-a treaty in which we promised never to disturb them again,"
Cummings, supra note 361, at 3.
386. Meyer reports that the BIA began "making surveys as early as the summer of
1945 to determine who and what would have to be moved where." Meyer, supra note 45, at
265. Additional contract planning staff was employed to complete a series of investigations
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assessments were based on extensive on-site work and analysis of the lives and
economy of the Fort Berthold people. The team of economists, anthropologists,
and sociologists that compiled the Missouri River Basin Investigations Reports
("MRBI Reports") confirmed what the Fort Berthold Indians had long asserted
before the Indian congressional committees: siting one of the world's largest earth-
filled dams on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation would irretrievably disrupt the
economic and social life of an ancient tribal people.3 7
These reports recited the expected impacts of the Garrison Dam on the
Fort Berthold people. First, approximately ninety percent of the Indian people
would have to be removed from their historic settlements along the bottom lands of
the Missouri River.388 Second, the agricultural treaty purposes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation would be frustrated due to flooding of the Indians' arable land base.
38 9
Third, the only agriculturally self-sufficient Indian tribe on the Great Plains would
have its economic and social base destroyed by the proposed flooding and would
regarding the impact of the Garrison Dam on the Fort Berthold Indians. These reports
became part of the MRBI Reports that would help inform the Indian congressional
committees about needed legislative action. These reports, published as MRBI Report, No.
46, include H.D. McCullough, Social and Economic Report on the Future of the Fort
Berthold Reservation, North Dakota (Dec. 24, 1947), and Gordon Macgregor & John C.
Hunter, Survey of Attitudes Regarding Resettlement Among the Three Affiliated Tribes of
the Fort Berthold Indians (Nov.-Dec. 1946). Meyer, supra note 45, at 266 n.2.
387. Gordon Macgregor, a leading sociologist, commented on the future impact of
the Garrison Dam on the Fort Berthold Indians and succinctly summarizes the reservation
lands' value to those Indians:
The "reservation" is to the Fort Berthold Indian his homeland. Within it
are abandoned village sites of the Gros Ventre and Mandan and the site
of the last village where they and the Arikara lived in a common
community following their old village life. They were never assigned
this land and forced to reside on it as prisoners of war as were many
tribes of the nomadic plains culture. The "reservation" is the last holding
of their former lands where they farmed and hunted before the coming of
the white man.
Meyer, supra note 45, at 237-38 (quoting Gordon Macgregor, Attitudes of the Fort
Berthold Indians Regarding Removal from the Garrison Reservoir Site and Future
Administration of Their Reservation, 16 N.D. HIsT. 56 (1949)).
388. Ralph Shane, agency superintendent, estimated that the Garrison Dam would
require "that 90% of the total population were moved 'lock, stock and barrel' from their old
homes to new homes on the highlands." They were to be "uprooted, shuffled and mixed"
and every "semblance of organization was destroyed." Meyer, supra note 45, at 266.
But the economic impact was even more devastating. Meyer estimates that while the
Indians "lost one-fourth of the reservation lands, the Indians were losing nearly all of the
Class I and II agricultural lands-the rich bottomlands on which they had lived for
generations." Id.
389. The MRBI Reports exhaustively and meticulously detailed the expected
adverse effects of the Garrison Dam on the Fort Berthold Indians. More importantly, they
how Congress should act legislatively to mitigate and ameliorate these impacts. Meyer,
supra note 45, at 265-74.
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likely be reduced to dependence on the federal government for their future
subsistence and maintenance.
390
Meanwhile, the Corps was working feverishly to lay the major earthen
groundworks of the Garrison Dam. Critics of the Pick-Sloan Program contended
that project proponents hoped that by the time the MRBI Reports were made to
Congress, so much time, money, and effort would have been sunk into the Garrison
project that Congress would be loathe to cancel it or to force major project
revisions on behalf of the Fort Berthold Indians. 9' However, in 1946 Congress did
respond to the Indian pleas to stop the dam's construction. Congress statutorily
forbade the Corps' building of any of the dam's major structural features until the
Secretary of War located and offered an adequate replacement reservation to the
Fort Berthold Indians.392
The Secretary of War was required to locate and offer this substitute
reservation to the Fort Berthold Indians before he could actually construct the
Garrison Dam,393 and had to provide them with replacement compensation for their
390. Meyer, supra note 45, at 235-37. The House Subcomnmittee on Public
Lands concluded that the Fort Berthold Indians in 1949 were "in sight of complete
economic independence" due to their "strong and growing cattle industry and steadily
expanding agricultural program." Cummings, supra note 361, at 6.
391. Meyer reports that "work was speeded up in 1946, and by August the
construction of an access road to the damsite, the work bridge, and the town site of
Riverdale was well under way." Meyer agreed with the "calloused" view of project
proponents that the federal government would not abandon this six-million dollar
investment regardless of the "Indians' plight." Meyer, supra note 45, at 249.
392. A tribal delegation was assured in 1945 by Congressmen that "no work can
be done until some settlement is made as to their status." Id. at 246. That assurance was
statutorily embodied in the War Department Civil Appropriations Act for 1947. Section 6 of
that act stated:
No part of the appropriation for the Garrison Reservoir herein contained
may be expended for actual construction of the dam itself until the
Secretary of War shall have selected and offered, through the Secretary
of the Interior, to the Three Affiliated Tribes, land which the Secretary of
the Interior approves as comparable in quality and sufficient in area to
compensate the said tribes for the land on the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation which shall be inundated by the construction of the Garrison
Dam: Provided further, That said selection and offer by the Secretary of
War and approval by the Secretary of the Interior shall be consummated
before January 1, 1947, after which consummation actual construction of
the dam itself may proceed."
War Department Civil Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 79-374, § 6, 60 Stat. 167 (1946).
393. The Secretary of War commenced his efforts to locate replacement
reservation lands well before the statutory requirement to do so was enacted. One such
proposal was to add some 470,000 acres of land that lay to the west and southwest of the
Fort Berthold Reservation. However, tribal leader Martin Cross characterized that offered
land as "good country for rattlesnakes and homed toads." His attitude was representative of
the Indians' unwillingness to exchange any of their present lands for the so-called "lieu
lands" that were to be offered by the War Secretary in compliance with the statutory
command. Meyer, supra note 45, at 249.
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lands.3"4 But dam proponents argued that such a standard of compensation was too
high and would set a dangerous precedent for the Corps' negotiations with the
downstream Indian tribes who likewise opposed taking of their lands for the Pick-
Sloan Program.
3 95
The Secretary of War suggested that it would be hard to convince local
non-Indian communities to accept the creation of a large replacement reservation
for the relocated Fort Berthold Indians.396 He nonetheless did locate and propose a
couple of potential new reservation sites. But the Secretary of the Interior rejected
these sites as failing to meet the statutory requirement that the replacement lands be
of "like quality and quantity" as the taken Indian lands . 3 In the meantime, project
proponents contended that the Indians' refusal to accept these replacement lands
demonstrated the impracticability of this congressional compensation scheme.
31
Substantial constituent pressure motivated Congress to move speedily on
the construction of the Garrison Dam.399 Given the Indians' and the Interior
Secretary's 1947 rejection of the proffered "Stanton Block" as the War Secretary's
last offer of replacement Indian lands, it rescinded the Garrison construction ban.'
The Fort Berthold Indians were now to be removed from their lands so as to make
way for the Garrison Dam and Reservoir."1
394. First Deficiency Act, 1946, ch. 589,'Pub. L. No. 79-269, 59 Stat. 632, 654
(1945).
395. LAWSON, supra note 364, at 62-63.
396. Meyer reports that only one non-Indian community in the proposed lieu land
areas was at all "ambivalent." That was the town of Stanton, which would be excluded from
the lieu lands grant but saw a money-making opportunity if it were to become the agency
headquarters of the "new" Fort Berthold Reservation. Meyer, supra note 45, at 253.
397. The War Department's "last offer" of the Stanton block of lieu lands was
rejected by Interior Secretary Krug in January, 1947, as falling to meet the statutory
requirement of "like quantity and quality" of the reservation lands. Krug's rejection
signaled the death knell for the lieu lands proposal and congressional attention shifted to the
possibility of a cash payment to the Indians for their taken lands. Id. at 255.
398. Governor Aandahl and Senators Young and Langer of North Dakota agreed
that the Garrison Dam must go forward and that the Fort Berthold Indians must be removed
to make way for the dam. Senators Young and Langer proposed to introduce a bill that
made possible either the piecemeal relocation of the Indians or a general cash settlement.
The governor pushed for a new Garrison Dam bill without any "Indian clause limitation,"
which would allow the Indians to be removed upon payment for their lands on the same
basis as the affected non-Indians in the area. Id at 255.
399. Congress' rescission of the "Indian Clause" was regarded as a victory for the
pro-dam forces represented by the Governor and State Water Commission of North Dakota.
Id. at 256.
400. War Department Civil Appropriations Act, ch. 411, Pub. L. No. 80-296, 61
Stat. 686, 690 (1947).
401. Meyer comments that Pub. L. No. 80-296 represented "forced" legislation
that ignored the interests and treaty reserved rights of the Fort Berthold Indians. The
language of the bill, regarded as a triumph for the Governor and North Dakota Water
Commission, specified that the Indians would be paid $5,105,625.00 for the "acquisition of
lands and rights therein within the taking line of Garrison Reservoir which lands lie within
the area now established as the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, North Dakota, including
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The Fort Berthold Indians continued their battle for just compensation.
But Colonel Pick intensely lobbied the Indian leaders to accept a proposed contract
that would facilitate the removal of the Indian people and hasten the construction
of the dam. His proposed agreement treated the Fort Berthold Indians as if they
were mere private condemnees whose lands were taken for a federal purpose.4"
The proposed contract also required the federal government to pay for removing
the Indians. 4"3 A leading commentator concluded that the tribal leaders accepted
this contract as the only way of ensuring that their tribal members had some
subsistence support after they were removed from their lands. 4 Colonel Pick,
believing that he had been insulted by tribal members at a meeting in 1947,
characterized the Fort Berthold Indians as belligerently uncooperative, and used
that incident as a "reason to dictate his own settlement terms to Congress. 40 5
The Fort Berthold Indians objected to their treatment as mere private non-
Indian condemnees.' They insisted that their right to sue for just compensation in
the appropriate judicial forum be preserved in any agreement. 401 They argued that
just compensation was owed for real losses that arose from the devastation of their
tribal economy and governmental capabilities. 4 8 A Corps-Indian contract was
signed in an emotion-filled ceremony in Secretary Krug's office on May 20,
1948. 9
Senator Watkins reasoned that Congress, not the courts, was the
appropriate forum for the determination of a "just and generous" settlement for the
Fort Berthold Indians, one that would "prevent[] the necessity for any further
all elements of value above or below the surface thereof including all improvements,
severance damages and reestablishment and relocation costs." 61 Stat. at 690. This
appropriation was contingent upon the conclusion of a contract between the Indians and the
United States or the money was to return to the Treasury on a certain date. Tribal
representatives, such as Jefferson B. Smith, who appeared to testify regarding this bill were
given the "cold shoulder" and were later told that they had agreed to accept this
appropriation as compensation for their taken lands. Meyer, supra note 45, at 256-57.
402. Meyer ironically comments that this proposed contract gave the Indians a
better deal than they were to ultimately receive via the 1949 Taking Act. For example, the
Indians, under Article 10, were to have free use of the area between the taking line and the
actual shoreline for hunting, fishing, trapping, and grazing uses as well as boat harbor and
other recreational uses. Under Article 12, they were to receive a one-eighth royalty from any
oil or gas that may be later extracted from lands within the taken area. Id. at 258-59.
403. Id. at 259.
404. Meyer comments that the Fort Berthold Indians accepted their inevitable fate
and began "working out a contract so as to avoid losing the money that had been
conditionally appropriated for them." Id. at 258.
405. LAWSON, supra note 364, at 60.
406. Meyer, supra note 45, at 257
407. The Indians were successful in inserting a provision that would allow them
to bring a just compensation suit in the Court of Claims for any additional damages "of any
treaty obligation of the Government or any intangible cost of reestablishment or relocation,
for which the said tribes are not compensated by the said $5,105,625." War Department
Civil appropriations Act, 1948, ch. 411, Pub. L. No. 81-296, 61 Stat. 686, 690 (1947).
408. Meyer, supra note 45, at 261.
409. Id. at 259.
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action in the Court of Claims."41 Senator Watkins urged his Indian committee
colleagues to reject any Indian agreement that recognized the Indians' right to just
compensation. Terminating the Fort Berthold Indians' right to a judicial
determination of just compensation was appropriate, he reasoned, given the
"substantial unanimity of opinion [in the Senate] to the effect that the Congress
should provide for a definitive settlement with the Three Affiliated Tribes.",41
Watkins' counsel to his committee colleagues to formulate the "complete
and final settlement of all [Indian] claims and demand[ed]" congressional plenary
power over Indian lands.412 Nonetheless, he assured the Fort Berthold Indians that
any congressional settlement would be "both just and generous...thereby removing
any reason [or] necessity for any further action in the Court of Claims. ' 413 But the
Fort Berthold Indians remained unconvinced of Senator Watkins' sincerity
regarding the justice of a congressionally imposed settlement.414
C. The Doctrinal Basis for a Modern Indian Takings Doctrine
The Fort Berthold Indians argued before JTAC that Senator Watkins'
Indian committee demonstrably failed to justly compensate them for their taken
lands, that their lands should be valued on the same basis as non-Indian lands that
serve comparable governmental or public welfare functions." 5 They contended that
410. Cummings, supra note 361, at 18. The original version of House Joint
Resolution 33 ratified the terms of the contract and added $9.5 million dollars in additional
compensation to cover items not covered by the contract. Attorney Case, on behalf of the
tribe, argued that the capitalized value of the factors of income from the reserved lands
totaled $24,561,000, from which he deducted $2,580,000 as the value of the residual
reservation lands, leaving a just compensation claim of $21,981,000. But the chairman of
the House subcommittee accepted the BIA's just compensation figure of $14,605,625. This
amount of compensation, coupled with a three million dollar readjustment fund and grant of
20 megawatts of preference power to the Indians from the future Garrison power plant,
proved far too generous to Senator Watkins of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee. His
committee struck out everything in the contract, changed the purpose of the bill, and
reduced the just compensation appropriation to four million dollars. Meyer, supra note 45,
at 261-63.
411. Cummings, supra note 361, at 17. Cummings quotes Interior Secretary
Krug's letter to Watkins' Indian committee wherein Krug concludes that such a
congressional settlement may eliminate the "more protracted and less certain remedy of a
suit in the Court of Claims" given that there "might be a question of whether the real needs
of the tribes, directly caused by the taking of their lands, could be made the legal basis of an
award." Id at 18.
412. Id. at 18.
413. Id.
414. Cummings cites the fact that each "successive effort by Congress to propose
a settlement for the Tribes' taken lands seemed to offer less and less to the Tribes-a trend
that did not escape the attention of the Tribes." Id. at 18-19.
415. Cummings concluded that the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation represented
a dedicated public or governmental entity whose lands and territory possessed a value to the
tribal community that far transcended their fair market value. He cited the 1886 agreement
between the Fort Berthold Indians and the United States as confirming the governmental
and public welfare status of the Indians' reserved lands: "([Tihis Reservation is formed) in
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this valuation standard would fulfill two important underlying goals of the Just
Compensation Clause. First, such a valuation standard would ensure the continued
viability of the Three Affiliated Tribes as a recognized government consistent with
the purposes of its 1886 agreement with the federal government.4 6 Second, such a
valuation standard would discourage future "rent seeking" initiatives by Indian
congressional committees that sought to exploit their plenary power over Indian
lands for their non-Indian constituents' benefit.
41
'
The 1886 sovereign bargain that established the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation declared that the reservation was formed in order for the Mandan,
Hidatsa, and Arikara Tribes "to obtain the means necessary to enable them to
become wholly self-supporting by the cultivation of the soil and other pursuits of
husbandry."4"8 This goal was to be realized by the Indians' development of the
agricultural potential of their reserved riparian farming and grazing lands along the
Missouri River and its tributary streams." 9 The 1946 MRBI Reports confirmed that
without these riparian lands, the Three Affiliated Tribes would not achieve the
treaty's goal of economic and social independence.42
self-supporting by the cultivation of the soil and the other pursuits of husbandry." Id. at 14-
15 (quoting Agreement of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, 1032).
416. Cummings points to the Indian committees' keen awareness, in light of the
MRBI Reports, that the Fort Berthold Indians would lose the vast majority of their arable
and irrigable land base that was the essential means for carrying out the purposes of the
1886 treaty agreement. Id. at 23-24.
417. See Lunney, supra note 250, at 753-61.
418. 26 Stat. at 1032
419. The critical role of the Indians' reserved Missouri River bottom lands as the
keystone economic base for their tribal future and security is expressed in an August 1949
MRBI Report to Congress:
Most of the natural resources upon which the Indians depend for
subsistence will be wiped out by the completion of the Garrison project.
These losses must be replaced by cash income. The reservoir area
includes most of the timber land from which building materials, fence
posts and firewood are obtained. In these river bottomlands are the june-
berries, wild plums and chokecherries which form such an important part
of the Indian diet. It is estimated that the wild life losses will cut off most
of the supply of deer and other game since these animals and birds are
dependent upon the brush and timber for their existence. Most of the
surface coal deposits from which Indians mine their coal will be
flooded...families obtain almost all their fuel, a large portion of their
meat and fruit, a considerable amount of garden vegetables, and most of
their building material without the expenditure of any cash. After the
inundation of these natural resources by the Garrison Reservoir Project,
the amount of cash required for subsistence will be greatly increased.
Cummings, supra note 361, at 21.
420. Mr. R. W. Rietz, Indian Agency Relocation Officer, concluded that although
there were 420 Indian families on the historic reservation, the residual reservation lands
would be able to support only 175 families. The rest would likely, in his opinion, have to be
re-educated in vocational skills to survive in off-reservation job placement. Id.
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In other words, these Indian lands formed the essential trust res of the Fort
Berthold Indians' Tribes' economic and governmental infrastructure.42' That res
was composed of the easily irrigable bottom lands of the reservation. Destruction
of these lands imposed on the Fort Berthold Indians economic losses to be
measured by the capitalized value of the expected future incomes that would be
generated by their lands. The Corps' flooding of the Fort Berthold lands destroyed
the Indians' governmental and economic resource base as completely as would any
comparable natural cataclysm.
41
Private lands, assets, and capital are protected by the Just Compensation
Clause from similar demolition by governmental action.4' But Senator Watkins
worked to persuade his congressional colleagues that the Fort Berthold Indians
deserved less compensation for their lost capital assets than similarly situated non-
Indian entities 24 The value of these Indian lands transcended their individual
parcel value, but Senator Watkins' Indian committee failed to acknowledge this
basic reality.4
However, the JTAC did recognize that the federal government had a legal
duty to make the Fort Berthold Indians whole for their economic losses.
426
Therefore, the JTAC directed Dr. Ronald G. Cummings, a leading natural resource
economist, to do an assessment of the Indians' economic losses imposed by the
421. The Indian committees recognized that the Fort Berthold Indians had abided
by the terms of the 1886 agreement and that their development of a ranching and
agricultural industry had rendered them in sight of complete economic independence and
justified compensation for the "reestablishment of a sound economic base for the future of
said tribes." 95 CONG. REC. 8930 (1949).
422. The Indian committees recognized that the Fort Berthold Indians were bound
by treaty agreement, tradition, and custom to their reserved tribal lands that were intended
to serve in perpetuity as their homeland. Unlike the non-Indian farmer or rancher who can
take his condemnation payment from the government and buy like farmland in a nearby
state, the Fort Berthold Indians could not replace their unique territory, social, and
governmental status through the payment of fair market value. Cummings, supra note 361,
at 20.
423. The Supreme Court enunciated the equivalent value or "make whole"
standard for just compensation in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312, 326, 341 (1893). The private owner of lands that are taken for public use is to be put in
"as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken." Olson v. United
States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
424. Cummings cites the "log-rolling" between the House Subcommittee on
Public Lands and the Senate Indian Affairs Committee that resulted in progressive and
arbitrary reductions of the proposed just compensation amounts to the Fort Berthold Indians
as evidence of an institutional failure to comply with anything resembling the "make whole"
command of the Just Compensation Clause. Cummings, supra note 361, at 22-24.
425. In October 1845, Acting Interior Solicitor Felix S. Cohen gave his legal
opinion before Watkins' Senate Indian Affairs committee regarding the Corps' power to
condemn the Fort Berthold lands. He testified that a right of condemnation by the Corps did
not exist over tribal lands and that if Congress exercised its plenary power to take those
lands, it would be in breach of its treaty agreements with the Fort Berthold Indians. Meyer,
supra note 45, at 244.
426. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 16-19.
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1949 taking.427 He was directed to use known and accepted 1949 valuation
standards as the means to capitalize the stream of income the Indians would have
received from those lands.4' Such a valuation approach replicated Congress' 1946
valuation standard that required the War Department to provide the Indians with
the "in-kind" replacement value of their taken lands. 429 The War Secretary had
been instructed to provide the Indians with "land...comparable in quality and
sufficient in area to compensate the said Tribes for the land on the Fort Berthold
Reservation which shall be inundated by the construction of Garrison Dam. 430
Only "in-kind" replacement or substitute compensation would fairly compensate
the Fort Berthold Indians for the taking of their lands.
431
The 1946 Congress expressly rejected the Corps' claim that "parcelized"
valuation of the Indian lands would provide just compensation to the Fort Berthold
people. Congress recognized that the Indians' treaty-reserved lands were tribal
public welfare and governmental facilities whose intrinsic value could not be
measured by the Corps' traditional land valuation approach.432 Those Indian lands
427. Id at 17.
428. Id
429. Senate Report 102-250 emphasized that the JTAC's recommended
compensation amount was intended to "substitute for or replace the value of the economic
base that was taken as the site for Lake Sakakawea and Lake Oahe." See S. REP. No. 102-
250, at 3 (1992).
430. Meyer, supra note 45, at 246.
431. Id at 251-52.
432. Chairman Murry emphasized the JTAC's awareness that
"Congress...required the War Department, by statute, [in 1946] to provide a suitable
replacement reservation called 'in lieu lands' so that the reservation as an ongoing concern
could continue." Recommendations of the Garrison Unit Joint Tribal Advisory Committee
Regarding the Entitlement of the Three Affiliated Tribes and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
to Additional Financial Compensation for the Taking of Reservation Lands for the Site of
the Garrison Dam and Reservoir and the Oahe Dam and Reservoir, Hearings on H.R. 2414
Before the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102 Cong. 109 (1992) (statement
of Emerson Murry, Former Chairman of the Joint Tribal Advisory Commission) [hereinafter
Hearings on H.R. 2414]. Because the department was unable to do so, "Congress decided to
pay [the Fort Berthold Indians] compensation in lieu of replaced lands, with the amount to
be a substitute for the replacement valuation." Id.
Chairman Murry described the valuation methodology undertaken by the JTAC to
establish a just compensation amount for the taking of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation
in 1949.
The JTAC, in an attempt to value these lands that were taken
and damages to the infrastructure did procure the services of a Dr.
Ronald G. Cummings, who specializes in resource economics, to prepare
a report on the issue. He emphasized that the 156,000 acres of land taken
were the sole major resource available to carry out the purposes of the
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. He chose the value of these resources
by estimating the flow of land-base earnings or income that was
attributable to that resource and the methodology he used contemplates
the exchange of one income producing asset for another. Of course, that
"in lieu" or income producing asset to be exchanged was money
damages. He then had this cash that would have been received
HeinOnline  -- 40 Ariz. L. Rev.  492 1998
1998] PRESERVING INDIAN COUNTRY 493
had been perpetually dedicated to tribal governmental and economic uses by the
1886 agreement. These background factors persuaded the JTAC that the just
compensation owed the Indians should be measured by the capitalized value of the
expected stream of income that they would have derived from their lands.433
The JTAC also rejected the BIA's contention that the 1949 Taking Act
barred the Indians' claim for just compensation. The JTAC read its explicit
directive from the GDUC and its own charter as requiring the renewed scrutiny of
the federal government's conduct in the taking of the Fort Berthold Indians'
lands.43 It had been empowered to recommend an equitable solution as the basis
for possible congressional legislation.435 Like the GDUC, its congressional
predecessor, the JTAC was to investigate fully the impacts on Indians of the
Garrison Project and to recommend remedial legislation that would redress those
impacts in a fair and equitable manner.436 It concluded that only such an equitable
remedy would put the Fort Berthold Indians in as good a position pecuniarily as
they would have occupied if their property had not been taken.437 The JTAC
concluded simply that just compensation had not been provided to the Fort
Berthold Indians.438
The JTAC then determined that replacement or substitute value of the
taken lands would adequately compensate the Indians for their losses due to the
1949 taking.439 Such an alternative valuation standard has been endorsed by the
Supreme Court in the federal taking of lands that served essential governmental or
public welfare functions. The Court held that the just compensation standard
required that such essential governmental resources be valued at their substitute or
replacement cost.' The Fort Berthold Indians' taken lands provided the social
capitalized at 3.5 per cent, which was then the Congressionally mandated
rate in 1950, and then he raised this to 1986 dollars at the time we were
filing the report this totalled $178.4 million for the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation.
Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.
433. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.
434. S. REP. 102-250, at 3.
435. The JTAC was expressly created by Secretary Hodel "to find ways to resolve
the inequities" borne by the Fort Berthold Indians. IaL
436. Congress concurred in the JTAC's findings that the Fort Berthold Indians
had never been adequately compensated for their lands taken as the site for the Garrison
Dam and Reservoir. Id. at 8.
437. Cummings cites fair market value as the baseline standard of valuation that
the Supreme Court typically applies as the basis of just compensation to private parties
whose lands have been taken for governmental purposes. He synthesized the leading
Supreme Court decisions on the appropriate valuation standard for private property or
resources. Cummings, supra note 361, at 9-14.
438. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.
439. Id.
440. The taking of dedicated governmental or public welfare facilities triggers the
application of the substitute valuation doctrine that was articulated in Brown v. United
States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923). The Court recognized that when land or public welfare facilities
are condemned or taken by the federal government, an alternate valuation standard other
than fair market value may be used to make the wronged party whole. The Court in Brown
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welfare and governmental benefits described by the Court, by their use in ranching
and agricultural employment as was contemplated by the 1886 agreement. Only the
continued existence of those lands, or the just compensation equivalent, would
ensure that the Fort Berthold Indians would be able to fulfill the governmental and
economic goals that were contemplated by the 1886 sovereign bargain between
them and the federal government."'
The JTAC fashioned an equitable remedy based on the substitute or
replacement value of the taken Indian lands." 2 It recognized that payment of the
fair market value of any taken property generally satisfies the "full and perfect"
equivalent and "make whole" standard of the Just Compensation Clause.443 But the
Court in Olson v. United States held that it is "the property and not the cost of it
that is safeguarded by state and Federal Constitutions."' The Court also made it
clear that if a fair market price prevailed for private property taken for public use,
then that ruling market price should define the just compensation amount owed to
the injured private party.445 Conversely, if there is no active market for specialized
public or social welfare resources, then a commission, like JTAC, is authorized to
resort to alternative valuation methods other than fair market value." 6 The JTAC
recognized that the Court had stringently limited the application of this alternative
valuation standard to those circumstances wherein the property taken was of a kind
that is seldom exchanged on a market or that has a value transcending any
held that "[a] method of compensation by substitution would seem to be the best means of
making the parties whole." Brown, 203 U.S. at 82. Cummings cites the post-Brown
decisions that expanded the reach and scope of the substitute valuation doctrine as it applies
to unique or irreplaceable lands or resources that are either not traded on any market or have
elements of value that transcend market value. Cummings, supra note 361, at 12-14.
441. Cummings points to the 1886 Fort Berthold treaty language and legislative
history of Public Law 479 as clearly establishing the inextricable relationship between the
'"Tribe's arable lands (virtually all of which were in their taken lands) and the basic
purposes intended for the Reservation (to allow the Tribes to become 'wholly self-
supporting by the cultivation of the soil and other pursuits of husbandry.')" Cummings,
supra note 361, at 15 (citations omitted). He concludes that the Tribe's reserved bottom
lands unequivocally represented treaty-established "public welfare facilities" that were
intended to serve as the perpetual homeland for the Fort Berthold Indians. Id.
442. Cummings had been directed by the JTAC to recommend an equitable
valuation methodology that addressed the Indians' claims that their treaty-reserved lands
that were taken in 1949 had served as the unique situs for their governmental, associational,
and cultural homeland pursuant to the 1886 Fort Berthold agreement. He concluded that an
equitable valuation methodology would have capitalized the values of all the n-factor and
related incomes that the Fort Berthold Indians would have derived from their reserved lands
in perpetuity. ld. at 25-31.
443. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.
444. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
445. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343 (1923) ("When
private property is taken for public use, and there is a market price prevailing at the time
and place of the taking, that price is just compensation.... More would be unjust to the
United States and less would deny the owner what he is entitled to." (citations omitted)).
446. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
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ostensible market price. 7 The Court in Miller v. United States further qualified the
general applicability of the fair market value standard, holding that "[w]here, for
any reason, property has no market, then resort must be had to some other data to
ascertain its value."" 8
The JTAC was persuaded that the Fort Berthold Indians' lands were a
paradigmatic example of governmental or social welfare resources. Therefore, the
JTAC concluded that the value of the taken Indian lands could not be reliably
determined by resort to fair market value. 9 The 1946 Congress had recognized
this same fact by its adoption of the substitute or replacement value as the basis of
the just compensation award to the Fort Berthold Indians.45
The JTAC's valuation approach sought to do justice to both the federal
government and the Fort Berthold Indians. It refused to make a fetish of market
value as the only or best measure of just compensation. But it was also
appropriately wary of "those...special circumstances" of Indian lands that have no
fair market value. It sought expert testimony and evidence regarding the
appropriate valuation methodology that would fairly value those lands from an
objective viewpoint.45' It recognized that the fair market valuation method would
447. The testimony of JTAC's Chairman Murry before the Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs recognized that fair market value is not the exclusive valuation
method for taken Indian lands. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17. The JTAC's
valuation approach is likewise confirmed by a Second Circuit decision holding that "fair
market value 'is not an absolute standard nor an exclusive method of valuation.'... It should
be abandoned 'when the nature of the property or its uses produce a wide discrepancy
between value of the property to the owner and the price at which it could be sold to anyone
else."' United States v. Certain Property Located in the Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d
800, 802 (2d Cir. 1968) (citation omitted).
448. Miller, 317 U.S. at 374.
449. The JTAC's Chairman Murry cited Dr. Cummings' extended treatement of
the public welfare character of the Fort Berthold Indian lands as strongly influencing the
JTAC's recommendation of the equitable award of just compensation for those taken lands.
Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.
450. Id.
451. Emerson Murry, Chair of the JTAC, testified before the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs that the JTAC employed Dr. Ronald G. Cummings, a natural
resource economist, to prepare a valuation report regarding the just compensation issue
raised by the Fort Berthold Indians. Murry pointed out that the 156,000 acres of taken
reservation lands were the "sole resource available to carry out the purposes of the
reservation." Hearings on H.R. 2414, supra note 432, at 110. He emphasized that the JTAC
wanted Cummings to construct an "exchange value" of the taken lands for an equivalent
income-producing financial asset. Id. He explained the JTAC's response to the "grossly
inadequate amount" of compensation paid to the Indians under the 1949 taking act that did
not allow the Indians sufficient compensation to "replace their economic base" that was
taken as the site for the Garrison Dam. Id. Murry cited the MRBI Reports to Congress
evidencing that the Three Affiliated Tribes were "self-sufficient, well-integrated Societies"
before the advent of the Garrison Dam. The just compensation amount of $178.4 million
recommended by the JTAC was derived from Dr. Cummings capitalization of the factor
returns or perpetual eaming capacity of the Indians' taken lands at a 1949 rate of 3.5%.
Chairman Murry hoped the House committee would recommend that amount of just
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not capture the unique characteristics of the Fort Berthold lands, and thus resorted
to the alternative valuation approach announced in Brown v. United States.452
The circumstances of the 1949 Fort Berthold taking strikingly resembled
the facts presented in the Brown decision. In Brown, the federal government took
three-quarters of the business center of a town as the site for a water reservoir.4"3
The town's lands had provided the region's inhabitants with a wide array of
economic and public welfare values. The injured parties were the region's
inhabitants who had historically depended and relied on the services provided by
this town. The Court concluded that the real value of these nonmarket services and
opportunities could not be captured by any market-based concept of value.
4 4
By adopting the alternative valuation approach, the JTAC acknowledged
that the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation was established in 1886 for specific
governmental and public welfare purposes: to provide a permanent homeland for
the Three Affiliated Tribes.455 The Indians' ethnographic and legal history
persuaded the JTAC that the 1886 agreement contemplated the perpetual use of the
reservation's fertile and productive bottomlands as the Indians' resource base.45 6
The 1946 Congress rejected the idea that the Fort Berthold Indians were only
entitled to the fair market value of their individual parcels of trust lands. 457 Thus,
both JTAC and the 1946 Congress agreed that only replacement value for the taken
lands would ensure that the Indians were made whole. For that reason, the JTAC
directed Cummings to prepare a land valuation assessment that would allow the
commission to reasonably ascertain the cost of providing property in substitution
for the Fort Berthold Indian lands.458
compensation on behalf of the Fort Berthold Indians because it would "materially move the
Tribes forward in their efforts to establish a viable economic base." Id at 11.
452. The Court reasoned that:
A town is a business center. It is a unit. If three-quarters of it is to be
destroyed by appropriating it to an exclusive use like a reservoir, all
property owners, both those ousted and those in the remaining quarter,
as well as the State, whose subordinate agency of government is the
municipality, are injured. A method of compensation by substitution
would seem to be the best means of making the parties whole.
Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1923).
453. Id.
454. l
455. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 16-18.
456. Id.
457. The 1946 Congress required that the Fort Berthold Indians be provided
"land...comparable in quality and sufficient in area to compensate the said tribes for the land
on the Fort Berthold Reservation which shall be inundated by the construction of the
Garrisbn Dam." War Department Civil Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 79-374, § 6, 60
Stat. 167 (1946).
458. Cummings, supra note 361, at 15-16
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D. Why the Congressional "Good Faith" Standard Fails to Provide Just
Compensation to Injured Indian Peoples
The 1949 Congress' alleged failure justly to compensate the Fort Berthold
Indians was a key issue for JTAC investigation. That investigation required an
examination of the legislative record of the 1949 Taking Act.4 9 Although Congress
does enjoy a qualified immunity to Indian taking claims,46 it must make a good
faith effort to provide the injured Indians with the fair value of their taken lands. 46'
The Indians argued that the legislative record demonstrated that Congress did not
make such a good faith effort.462 They also contended that JTAC's charter and the
GDUC's directive required a searching inquiry into the issue of congressional good
faith.46
3
Congress is no longer allowed to take Indian lands as a mere incident of
its exercise of guardianship power over those lands.464 It must satisfy a reviewing
federal court that it made a good faith effort to fairly compensate the affected
Indians for their lands. 46 The reviewing federal judge must evaluate the relevant
legislative history and surrounding circumstances of an alleged taking in making
this good faith determination.466
But this good faith test may well prove illusory, as it did in the Fort
Berthold experience, to ensure that the affected Indians are justly compensated for
their taken lands. Absent an objective valuation standard, there is simply no
reliable reference point for the court's evaluation of claimed congressional good
faith.46
7
Restricting the JTAC's inquiry to a review of the legislative record of the
1949 Fort Berthold taking illustrates this point: two congressional Indian
459. Id. at 14-25.
460. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
461. M at 416-17.
462. Cummings concluded that "Congress was asea in terms of a well developed
line of reasoning as to just what would compensate the [Fort Berthold Indians] for their loss
of an economic base." Cummings, supra note 361, at 25. This was true, despite the fact that
it was "well established in economic theory" that governmental or public welfare resources
"such as land, water and minerals may constitute a 'resource base,' or 'economic base,'
whose value extends well beyond the market value of the resource per se." Id.
463. Professor Newion emphasizes the difficulty that a reviewing court faces in
implementing the good faith inquiry into Congress' compensation of injured Indian peoples.
Newton, supra note 34, at 259.
464. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371.
465. Id. at 416-17.
466. Professor Newton demonstrates the inquiry burden that the good faith
standard imposes on a reviewing court. Newton, supra note 34, at 259-60.
467. Cummings cites the congressional committees' "admixture of interests" as
the lead developer of the Pick-Sloan Project as preventing Congress from fairly valuing and
compensating the Fort Berthold Indians for their taken lands. He cites to the Court's
admonition that "[t]he right of the legislature...to apply the property of the citizen to public
use, and then to constitute itself the judge to determine what is the just compensation it
ought to pay therefor...cannot...be tolerated under our constitution." Cummings, supra note
361, at 24.
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committees-the House Public Lands Committee and the Senate Indian Affairs
Committee-agreed that it was necessary to take the Fort Berthold Indians' lands
as the site for the Garrison Dam, 468 but there is little or no discussion regarding the
value of those lands to the Indian people.469 The JTAC would have searched in vain
for any principled guidance on the meaningful calculation by those committees of
the just compensation amount that was owed to the Fort Berthold Indians.470
Indian congressional committees, given their deeply conflicting interests,
are rarely capable of objectively valuing Indian lands as is envisioned by the
Court's Sioux Nation decision. They are neither sufficiently disinterested nor
sufficiently expert to be entrusted with the task of calculating the just compensation
amounts that are owed to injured Indian peoples.47
Reliance on congressional Indian committees' subjective land valuations
renders the Just Compensation Clause nearly meaningless.472 A "make whole"
standard that begins and ends with Indian congressional committees' good faith
assertions subjects Indian compensatory rights to the vagaries of the political
process.473 The JTAC would have been unable to perform its mandate consistent
with its GDUC directive and its secretarial charter if it had been bound by this
review standard.474 It would have ignored the fundamental gap between what the
1946 Congress promised as compensation to the Fort Berthold Indians and the
amount that the 1949 Congress actually provided to them under the 1949 Taking
Act. 75 The 1949 report of the Senate Indian Committee declared that "the real
needs of the tribes directly caused by the taking of their lands" must be the basis
for a legislative award of just compensation.476 But this rhetorical flourish is empty
468. Meyer, supra note 45, at 260-64.
469. Professor Newton perhaps would not find surprising the Indian committees'
failure to evaluate the Indians' economic losses in objective economic terms. Newton, supra
note 34, at 259-60.
470. Cummings, supra note 361, at 19-24.
471. Cummings rhetorically asks:
In light of the above, we might well ask: what was Congress' view of
that amount of money that would justly compensate the Tribes for their
taken lands? $17 million, "more than" $20 million, $21-plus million, or
$30 million? Moreover, we might inquire as to the logical grounds on
which any of these possible settlements were derived. In the end, of
course, the "how much" question was resolved at still a different
amount: $5.1 million for the Tribes' lands and relocation costs...and $7.4
million for, essentially, any other claim that one might think of. The
question as to how the Congress arrived at these figures remains open.
We find no discussions in the Congressional records that describe the
bases for this determination of what would be just compensation to the
Tribes for their taken lands.
Ild. at 24-25.
472. Newton, supra note 34, at 259-60.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 50.
476. The Senate report accompanying H.R.J. Res. 33, 81st Cong. (1949),
concludes that the:
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of meaning unless it is read in conjunction with the 1946 congressional directive to
provide replacement or substitute compensation to the Fort Berthold Indians.
4 77
The JTAC gave substance to this promise by "reading in" the 1946 Congress'
valuation of the affected Indian lands.47 The JTAC found that only this amount of
compensation would enable the Fort Berthold Indians to survive as a viable
economic and governmental entity.479
The Indian committees were obviously aware of this issue. The House
Committee on Public Lands poignantly expressed its concern about the future
survival of the Three Affiliated Tribes.480 But it did not translate its concern into
any cognizable just compensation theory or valuation principle. It found that the
Fort Berthold Indians' development of an agricultural livestock industry on their
reserved bottom lands had rendered them "in sight of complete economic
independence" as contemplated by the Fort Berthold agreement.48 ' It concluded
that compensation was required "for the destruction of the basic industry of the
said tribes; for the intangible costs of relocation and for the reestablishment of a
sound economic base and the future of said tribes. 482
These Indian committees were well aware of the critical role of the taken
lands in light of the Department of Interior's report in August of 1949, which
stated:
Most of the natural resources upon which the Indians
depend for subsistence will be wiped out by the completion of the
Garrison project. These losses must be replaced by cash income.
proposed legislation provides for a complete and final settlement of all
claims and demands of said tribes for all damages sustained by reason of
the taking of said lands and rights in the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation, and of all other claims and demands of said tribes whether
of tangible or intangible nature, or any alleged claims or demands,
arising out of the said treaty of September 17, 1851 (11 Stat. 749), or
any other treaty (including any unratified treaty) or agreement, prior to
the approval and acceptance of the provisions of this resolution.
S. REP. No. 81-605, at 3-4 (1949).
The Senate Report explains that this resolution "remove[s] any reason for further
petition to Congress for additional money and prevent[s] the necessity for any further action
in the Court of Claims." Ma at 6-7.
477. Cummings, supra note 361, at 18.
478. Hearings on H.R. 2414, supra note 432, at 109-10.
479. Murry points to the original version of H.R.J. Res. 33, which called for a just
compensation amount of $17.1 million to be paid to the Fort Berthold Indians for their
taken lands. Murry notes that not even this admittedly "inadequate congressional amount"
was paid to the Indians. Instead, the Indians were later offered $12.6 million by Congress
on a "take it or leave it basis." See Hearings on H.R. 2414, supra note 432, at 109-10.
480. The House Committee on Public Lands explained that because of the
Garrison dam the Indians' "homes will be lost, their cattle industry will be ruined, their
churches and schools, and their social life will be completely disrupted." H.R. REP. No. 81-
544, at 3 (1949).
481. Id.
482. Cummings, supra note 361, at 20-21.
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The reservoir area includes most of the timber land from which
building materials, fence posts and firewood are obtained. In these
river bottomlands are the june-berries, wild plums and
chokecherries which form such an important part of the Indian diet.
It is estimated that the wild life losses will cut off most of the supply
of deer and other game since these animals and birds are dependent
upon the brush and timber for their existence. Most of the surface
coal deposits from which Indians mine their coal will be flooded....
... [Indian] families obtain almost all of their fuel, a large
portion of their meat and fruit, a considerable amount of garden
vegetables, and most of their building materials without the
expenditure of any cash. After the inundation of these natural
resources by the Garrison Reservoir Project, the amount of cash
requiredfor subsistence will be greatly increased.483
But the Indian committees' failure to fairly value the taken Indian lands
reflects Senator Watkins' power over the legislative process. The harsh reality was
that a "governmental subsystem" of western congressional delegations and related
constituency interests disproportionately influenced Indian congressional
committees. 4 4 This influence is patently evident in the 1949 legislative hearing
record regarding the Fort Berthold taking. It is virtually silent regarding the just
compensation that would respond to the economic costs imposed on the Fort
Berthold Indians by the taking of their treaty-reserved lands. 48' The House
Committee on Public Lands and the Senate Indian Affairs Committee did briefly
debate this cost versus loss basis of just compensation.486 For example, the House
committee was clearly uneasy with the Corps' cavalier assertion that payment of
fair market value to individual Indian allottees would adequately compensate Fort
Berthold Indians:
The Committee on Public Lands feels that [$17 million dollars] is
small compensation for the disruption forced upon the 2,215
483. Id. at 21 (quoting BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
REPORT No. 94, SOcIAL & ECONOMIC REPORT OF FORT BERTHOLD RESERVATION 12, 17
(Supp. 11949) (emphasis added)).
484. Lunney, supra note 250, at 753-56.
485. Cummings found this congressional silence puzzling given three factors that
would have enabled Congress to fashion an appropriate just compensation methodology for
the Fort Berthold Indians: First, he cited "legal precedents...which would provide
guidance...to... insure[] that sufficient damages will be awarded to finance replacement for
the condemned facility." Cummings, supra note 361, at 19-20. Second, he cited Congress'
grasp of the Fort Berthold lands as a permanent "homeland to the Tribes" as expressed in
the 1886 agreement, which specified the terms that the Indians were "'to become wholly
self supporting by cultivation of the [Missouri river bottom lands]',...their sole resource
base for pursuing agricultural activities." Id. at 20. Third, he cited the Indian congressional
committees' failure to use established precedent to establish a baseline valuation of the
taken Indian lands as an analytic departure point for providing the Fort Berthold Indians
with just compensation for their taken lands. Id. at 21-23.
486. Id. at 22-24.
HeinOnline  -- 40 Ariz. L. Rev.  500 1998
1998] PRESERVING INDIAN COUNTRY 501
Indians. A conservative estimate of the basic value of the lands and
their annual use value is approximately $21,981,000. Therefore, the
United States by making the settlement [at $17 million], will obtain
the reservoir right-of-way at about two thirds of its basic value and
its annual use value to the Three Affiliated Tribes.48 7
Individual congressmen, such as Mr. Lemke from North Dakota,
expressed their dismay that the Fort Berthold Indians were to be paid an amount of
compensation substantially less than the real economic value of their treaty-
reserved lands. 488 He colorfully expressed his opinion on this issue:
Here is a factory.. .that produced a net income last year of $774,000.
That alone capitalized at 4 percent equals about twenty million.
Surely no one would voluntarily surrender an income of 4 percent
on twenty million for less than twenty million cash.
In taking these lands, we are.. .depriving these tribes of
their landfor less than its value.'4 89
Interior Secretary Krug commented ironically about the fairness of the
House committee's proposed $17 million payment as just compensation to the Fort
Berthold Indians:
[I]t is well to bear in mind that the Indians would much prefer to
retain their existing reservation intact. In the discussions preceding
the execution of the contract, they expressed the belief that it would
require $30 million to compensate them properly for what is being
taken from them. If they are willing to accept the lesser benefits
provided for in the contract and in House Joint resolution 33, I
believe the approval of this compromise would be to the best
interests of the United States. '490
Secretary Krug was referring to the House committee's proposed
compensation package that was to serve as the basis for just compensation to the
Three Affiliated Tribes. 491' This proposed compensation package was embodied in
House Joint Resolution 33 and included these elements:
1. $5.1 million for the fair market value of the Indian trust parcels of lands
that were to be taken and related relocation costs;
492
2. $3 million for a land readjustment fund that would be used to
consolidate fragmented land holdings of tribal members into viable economic units
and for purchasing private lands for needy tribal members;
493
487. H.R. REP. No. 81-544, at 3-4 (1949).
488. Meyer, supra note 45, at 263.
489. 95 CoNG. REc. 15052, 15051 (1949) (statement of Rep. William Lemke)
(emphasis added).
490. Cummings, supra note 361, at 23-24 (emphasis added).
491. Id at 22-23.
492. H.R. REP. No. 81-544.
493. Id. at 10.
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3. $6.5 million as additional compensation to the Three Affiliated Tribes
for "values not compensated for under the contract; 494
4. 20,000 kilowatts of electric power (when available from the Garrison
Dam):
for sale and distribution by the.. .Tribes...delivered at such point or
points on the reservation.. .as may be determined by the Secretary of
the Interior. Payment shall be made for the power actually used at
the lowest wholesale rate or rates, applicable to the same class of
service made available to other customers.... The transmission and
distribution system necessary for the delivery of such... power...shall
be constructed with funds made available...by the U.S. without cost
to the said tribes;
4 95
and
5. Construction of "any irrigation works and related facilities which...the
Secretary of the Interior determines to be feasible....496 If constructed, the irrigation
works must be operated on a basis not less favorable than to non-Indian lands, and
the costs thereof must be repayable in accordance with the terms of other laws
applicable to Indian lands."49
This proposed compensation package-including the 20 megawatts of
future-delivered low cost hydroelectric power-was valued by the House
Committee on Public Lands at approximately seventeen million dollars.4 98 The
committee members stated that the seventeen million dollars proposed
compensation to the Indians "would be to the best interest of' the federal
government. 4' The earlier MRBI Reports to Congress had capitalized the economic
value of the taken Fort Berthold lands at a conservative estimate of $21,981,000."0
The harsh reality was that the Fort Berthold Indians-when all the "horse
trading" was completed between the House and Senate Indian committees-were
to receive substantially less compensation than was recommended as the "bare
minimum" by the House Committee on Public Lands.5"' The Fort Berthold Indians
did not receive an amount between the seventeen million to thirty million dollar
range that was judged by the House committee as the minimum fair amount of
compensation for the Indians' taken lands."m Indeed, the minimum just
494. Id. at 11.
495. Id. at 12.
496. Id. at 13.
497. Id. at 36.
498. Id. at 12.
499. Id.
500. See Cummings, supra note 361, at 23.
501. Meyer asserts that "unfortunately the bill did not survive long after it was
referred to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs." Meyer, supra note 45, at
263. That committee struck out everything "except the legal description of the taking area,"
and the additional just compensation amount was reduced to four million dollars. Id.
502. Id. At conference on the rival bills, "some House members expressed
dissatisfaction with the bill in its final form, as well they might, but a sense of urgency and
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compensation amount proposed in House Joint Resolution 33 was substantially
reduced by the Senator Watkins' committee."0 3 This dramatic downward spiral of
proposed just compensation did not escape the Fort Berthold Indians' attention: 5°4
"We (the tribal council) advised them (the tribal members) that if we should reject
the Act (P.L. 437), the next offer of the government would probably not be even as
good as the one we are considering."'
05
The Fort Berthold Indians were well aware that the amount of
compensation they would receive would be determined by the comparative power
of the House Committee on Public Lands and the Senate Indian Affairs Committee.
Senator Watkins' influence was reflected in that, in each negotiation round, the
proposed amount of just compensation substantially went down.50 6 Ultimately, the
House and Senate Indian committees agreed on a just compensation figure of $12.6
million that would be offered to the Fort Berthold Indians in exchange for taking
156,035 acres of their reservation.5"7 On March 15, 1950, the Fort Berthold Indians
reluctantly agreed to accept that amount of compensation and to remove from their
historic reservation lands." 8
E. The Articulation of A "New" Compensation Standard in the Three Affiliated
Tribes Equitable Compensation Act of 1992
The JTAC issued its final report in 1986 and recommended that the
Secretary of Interior propose legislation on behalf of the Three Affiliated Tribes
that would award just compensation to the Three Affiliated Tribes for the 1949
taking of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. 5°9 The JTAC recommended just
compensation to the Fort Berthold Indians in an amount ranging between $178.4
million and $411.8 million. In calculating the amount, the JTAC directed Dr.
Ronald Cummings to use two alternative formulas. The JTAC's range of just
compensation values reflects the application of these alternative land and resource
valuation formulas. 10
But Secretary Hodel declined to implement the JTAC's
recommendation. 5" Instead, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs and the
perhaps of the futility of further wrangling led them to accept it." Id.
503. Id.
504. Cummings, supra note 361, at 19.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Meyer, supra note 45, at 264.
508. Meyer reports that "[t]he approval by the Tribes called for was obtained by a
vote in which 525 affirmative votes were cast out of 900 eligible voters and on March 15,
1950, council chairman Carl Whitman, Jr., with a seven man delegation, presented a
briefcase containing the ballots to Secretary Chapman." Id. Local newspapers described this
as yet "another emotion laden ceremony." Id. Meyer concludes that this ceremony marked
the end of the "long struggle between the Fort Berthold Indians and the United States
government over the Garrison Dam project." Id.
509. See S. REP. No. 102-250, at 3 (1992).
510. Id.
511. Id. at 1.
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House Interior Subcommittee on Indian Affairs initiated joint oversight hearings on
the JTAC's final report in 1986.512 The JTAC's just compensation recommendation
was referred by the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs to the General
Accounting Office ("GAO") for its review and response.5t3 The GAO report, issued
in 1990, concluded that, although it somewhat disagreed with the economic
methodology utilized by the JTAC, the JTAC's findings provided a substantial
basis for Congress to consider an equitable award of just compensation to the
Three Affiliated Tribes in the amount of $149.5 million." 4 Legislation to
implement the JTAC's just compensation recommendation was introduced by
Senator Kent Conrad from North Dakota.515 It provided $149.5 million in just
compensation to the Three Affiliated Tribes for the 1949 Fort Berthold taking.
516
The BIA testified that it had no opposition to this legislation as long as it otherwise
met the "pay-as-you-go" constraints of the controlling budget resolution.51 7
The Fort Berthold Indians, after lengthy discussions with various
interested groups such as the National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association
were able to craft an agreement that would authorize the deposit of a specified
amount of Pick-Sloan hydropower receipts into a Treasury account on behalf of
the Three Affiliated Tribes." 8 The Three Affiliated Tribes were required to submit
an economic and social recovery plan for approval by the Secretary of the
Interior.5"9 The Tribes would have access to the interest from their Treasury
account beginning in fiscal year 1998.520 President Bush threatened to veto the
512. The Senate report notes that the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs
held three oversight hearings on the JTAC recommendations beginning on March 31, 1987,
with ajoint oversight hearing with the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and
the Water and Power Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs. That hearing examined the need for legislation to implement the recommendations
of the JTAC report. The second hearing was held on November 19, 1987, wherein the
committee "urged" the Tribes to provide "further justification for the level of additional
financial compensation to which the tribes felt they were entitled" and "explore a budget
neutral mechanism to finance the compensation needed to carry out the recommendations."
The third hearing was held regarding S. 168 wherein the tribes "expressed their overall
support for the bill" and the GAO "expressed its approval of the compensation figures set
forth in [S. 168]." Id. at 6.
513. Id.
514. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFF. (GAO), REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN ISSUES: COMPENSATION CLAIMS ANALYSIS
OVERSTATE ECONOMIC LossEs (May 1991).
515. "Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 13-15.
516. Id.
517. The BIA representative testified that if the "Budget Enforcement Act
provisions can be complied with.... the administration would look at that and give
consideration to that additional compensation." Id. at 31-32.
518. A brief exchange between Senator Conrad and Mr. Dennis Hill, executive
vice president of the North Dakota Association of Rural Electric Cooperatives, made clear
that, "as drafted," the North Dakota rural electric cooperatives "did not oppose." Id. at 26.
519. S. REP. No. 102-250, at 9 (1992).
520. Id. at 4.
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legislation, but nonetheless signed the Tribes' compensation act into law in
November 1992 as part of a larger water resources development bill. 2'
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1949 Fort Berthold taking demonstrates the need for a modern Indian
takings doctrine. Marshall sought to reconcile the competing interest of the United
States and the Indian people in his Johnson v. M'Intosh opinion.5" By
incorporating the Indian lands into paramount federal ownership, while
simultaneously confirming the Indian peoples' exclusive use and occupancy rights
in those lands, he created an inherently unstable and ultimately untenable land-
based relationship between these sovereigns. The Indian peoples were recognized
by Marshall's opinions as possessing inherent sovereign authority over their lands.
But their subordinated status as governmental wards portended federal dominion
over the Indian peoples and their lands.
Indian Country was originally conceived as a federally protected territory
wherein Indian peoples would be free to exercise self-governance and to
incrementally adapt to non-Indian ways of life. But this Indian Country idea would
not survive the later nineteenth-century's vision of an American manifest destiny.'1
3
Perhaps Marshall hoped that Indian Country would be preserved by his imposition
of an Indian bargaining model. That model contemplated that by mutual agreement,
the Indian peoples and the federal government could ensure a safe haven for
threatened tribal societies and cultures. But Indian bargains over land soon
degenerated into a diplomatic shell game. Indian land cession agreements served as
the transparent means for the Indian peoples' systematic dispossession. Lone
Wolf's resort to the courts to prevent the coerced allotment of his reservation
prompted the Court to jettison Marshall's model as inconsistent with the Indian
peoples' contemporary status as governmental wards.524
The contemporary survival of Indian societies requires their protection
from the ill-advised federal takings of their lands.5" Indian treaties once recognized
a vast "Indian-only" zone in the American West: a geographic area wherein the
Indian peoples were free to choose a legal, cultural, and economic system that best
suited their members' needs. 26 The federal government pledged to use its
regulatory and military capabilities to preserve this Indian Country boundary.527
But federal protection of Indian lands was always halfhearted at best.
Congress eventually repudiated its treaty commitments and bargains in favor of
fulfilling its superseding goal of manifest destiny.528 The federal plenary power
521. Reclamations Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, tit. 35, 106 Stat. 4731.
522. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
523. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 36-38.
524. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,564 (1903).
525. Newton, supra note 34, at 264-65.
526. WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 14-19.
527. Id.
528. Newton, supra note 34, at 251-52.
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doctrine became the engine that would drive Congress' Indian allotment and
assimilation policies. Definitive resolution of the "Indian question" was expected
in one generation or two at the most.529 But the Indian peoples proved far more
resilient and resistant than expected to federal programs that were designed to
destroy their tribal land base and their cultural structures.530
The Indian peoples' tenaciousness was rewarded by Congress'
repudiation of its allotment program in the 1930s and its adoption of a tribal
revitalization program that championed tribal self-determination and self-
governance.53" ' This contemporary federal Indian policy seeks to reinstate
Marshall's idea of Indian peoples as domestic, dependent nations. But this policy
will have little meaning unless it is accompanied by the effective judicial protection
of Indian lands. The contemporary Supreme Court seemingly wants to have it both
ways: it rhetorically supports the concept of tribal self-determination while
reaffirming the congressional plenary power doctrine.532
The federal government's plenary power over Indian lands threatens to
reduce the Indian self-determination policy to rhetorical extravagance. This power
threatens th6 se Indian lands that will make possible the hoped-for revitalization of
Indian economies and cultures.533
Just as Congress repudiated its Indian allotment program in the 1930s, so
should the Supreme Court now repudiate Lone Wolf's plenary power doctrine.
Felix S. Cohen's assertion that the Indian peoples were fairly compensated for the
taking of their historic lands need not be debated anew.5" Such a retrospective
assessment merely reinforces the contemporary need for judicial protection of the
Indian peoples' lands from congressional overreaching under the plenary power
doctrine.5
35
The American West has long been settled by non-Indians by virtue of the
Indian allotment and land sales program of the late nineteenth century.5 36 Cohen
may well be right that the books should be closed on this sad era of America's
treatment of Indian peoples.537 But Cohen would likely agree that any merit in
retaining the plenary power doctrine is outweighed by its potential to thwart the
contemporary Indian self-determination and self-governance policy.
5 31
529. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 45-50.
530. Id. at 80-84.
531. Id. at 89-93.
532. Newton, supra note 34, at 264-65.
533. Id. at 264.
534. GETCHEs ET AL., supra note 10, at 310.
535. Newton, supra note 34, at 251-52.
536. CoRNELL, supra note 4,'at 93-101.
537. Id.
538. Newton supposes a hypothetical "Indian Allotment Act of 1982" whereby
the federal government unilaterally allots each tribal member a 2 acre "ceremonial parcel"
and puts the balance of the Indian lands up for sale. The legislative record states that this act
intends that the Indians should use their retained lands as purely ceremonial sites for
spiritual regeneration from time to time. The sale proceeds from the lands are to be used to
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Objections to a modem Indian takings doctrine do not hold up against
analysis. First, a modem Indian takings doctrine will not cost the federal Treasury
"too much" money. 39 The 1992 congressional act that revisited the 1949 Fort
Berthold taking illustrates the practical benefits of fairly valuing Indian lands. The
Fort Berthold Indians were provided with an equitable amount of compensation
that will enable them to make a meaningful recovery from the devastating effects of
the Garrison taking. Furthermore, Congress designated that compensation to be
paid out of hydropower receipts derived from the sale of electric power from the
Pick-Sloan generating plants. This approach effectively internalized the just
compensation payment to the project itself. This stream of income from a
replacement resource-hydroelectric power-was intended by the 1992 equitable
compensation act to replace the Three Affiliated Tribes' expected revenue stream
that would have been generated by its taken lands.'
Second, a modem Indian takings doctrine would imposes a salutary "stop
and think" burden on federal agencies and Indian congressional committees. Such a
standard will likely tend to preserve the Indian land base. 4' The War Secretary was
effectively precluded under the 1946 Garrison statute from taking the Fort Berthold
Indians' lands until he provided them with the replacement value of their taken
lands.542 Just so, those federal agencies or congressional committees that face the
true value of Indian lands will be motivated to more carefully deliberate about the
need for taking Indian lands or for mitigation measures that will ameliorate the
deleterious features of proposed projedts 43
train the Indians to acquire marketable skills for deployment within the "civilized" urban
areas of America. She further supposes the federal government conducts no geological
surveys of the lands' value and does not require competitive bidding at auction. She
concludes that the affected Indians may well have no remedy against the federal government
in light of the Sioux Nation rule. Newton, supra note 34, at 261-62.
539. Cummings' analysis emphasizes that costs and benefits attributable to large
federal works projects are simply the opposite side of the same coin. Congress'
undervaluing in 1949 to appropriately value the Fort Berthold Indians' resource base is a
project related "cost" insofar as Congress ignores the real economic value of that foregone
public natural resource. Cummings, supra note 361, at 25-31.
540. Reclamations Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, tit. 35, 106 Stat. 4731. Cummings suggests an analogous approach when he
looks toward so-called Pick-Sloan "excess power revenues" that are not committed to
repayment of project-related costs as the source of just compensation for the Fort Berthold
Indians. Cummings, supra note 361, at 43.
541. Paragraph 2 of section 4(a) of S. 168 provided that:
deposits equal to 25% of the receipts from deposits to the United States
Treasury for the preceding fiscal year from integrated programs of the
Eastern Division of the Pick-Sloan Missouri River Basin Project shall
be deposited automatically in the fund each fiscal year. The amounts so
appropriated are to be "non-reimbursable and non-returnable. But the
aggregate amount to be deposited in the recovery fund shall not exceed
$149.2 million."
S. REP. No. 102-250, at 8-9 (1992).
542. Meyer, supra note 45, at 246-47.
543. Lunney characterizes a measure of compensation as just if it redresses two
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Third, an Indian taking doctrine would give substance to the fiduciary
duty that Congress owes to the Indian peoples.5" The 1992 Three Affiliated Tribes
Equitable Compensation Act provides the Fort Berthold Indians with the financial
resources to replace their economic base that was lost to the 1949 taking of their
lands.545 Requiring the federal government to fully compensate Indian peoples for
their economic losses would allow them to more effectively replace those lands and
resources that are essential to a viable tribal economy and society. 5"4
Fourth, an Indian takings doctrine would recognize that Indian lands many
times serve as specialized public welfare and governmental assets-not merely
fungible commodities. 7 Indian peoples by custom, heritage, and treaty bargain are
highly immobile. Their lands represent their collective entwinement with their
spiritual, emotional, and economic lives. Such immobility is an appropriate
circumstance for judicial consideration under a modem Indian takings doctrine.548
Fifth, an Indian takings doctrine requires no heroic innovations in existing
federal takings law or doctrine. The JTAC in the Fort Berthold case easily applied
well known and judicially accepted resource valuation methodologies so as to
arrive at a just compensation value for the 156,035 acres that were taken from the
Fort Berthold Indians. " 9 This just compensation amount was accepted by the GAO
as the basis for a congressional award of equitable compensation to those Indians
in 1992.550
Sixth, an Indian takings doctrine is a vital component of a contemporary
Indian self-determination policy. Those lands that form the economic and
"systemic mistakes" that a legislature will make under what he calls the "majoritarian" and
"interest group" models. Lunney, supra note 250, at 757. He describes the two mistakes as
follows: "(1) fiscal illusion will lead the legislature to impose improper burdens on a
scapegoat; and (2) the scape-goating process will lead the legislature to refuse to
compensate a scapegoat for a taking." Id. 757-58. He asserts that the compensation
requirement must therefore meet two objectives:
First, it must force the government to consider the full costs of its action
when it would force a scapegoat to bear the burden of government action
[and thereby] reduce the likelihood that...the scapegoat [will be required]
to bear a significant government imposed burden either when a member
of majority faction could better have borne the burden or when the
government should not have taken the action at all. Second, to ensure
that the property interests of the scapegoat are protected when they
should be.
Id
544. Newton, supra note 34, at 264.
545. S. REP. No. 102-250, at 3.
546. Cummings, supra note 361, at 28.
547. Id. at 12.
548. Id. at 20.
549. Id. at 32-39.
550. Harry Finley testified on behalf of GAO that the Congress would be "using a
very defensible method in determining compensation" if it relied on the lower bound of
JTAC's compensation recommendation for the Fort Berthold Indians. Hearings on S. 168,
supra note 359, at 23.
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governmental base for tribal governments must be preserved just like lands held by
the federal, state, and local governments. 55' How else can a legitimate
"government-to-government" relationship between the federal government and the
respective Indian peoples be expected to work? Just as the just compensation
principle prevents injury to similarly situated governmental entities, so too should
the contemporary Indian peoples be shielded from overreaching by federal
agencies or congressional committees under the guise of the plenary power
doctrine.
The fate of the Fort Berthold Indians in their direct bargaining with the
federal government is a real and symbolic reminder of the need for a modem
Indian taldngs doctrine. Such a doctrine would impose no significant burdens on
the federal government while ensuring that the Indian peoples' bargains with the
federal government would be reasonably respected.
551. Cummings, supra note 361, at 12-13.
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